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Résumé
Cette Thèse pose la question de la décision collective sous incertitude possibiliste. On propose
différents règles de décision collective qualitative et on montre que dans un contexte possibiliste,
l’utilisation d’une fonction d’agrégation collective pessimiste égalitariste ne souffre pas du prob-
lème du Timing Effect. On étend ensuite les travaux de Dubois et Prade (1995, 1998) relatifs
à l’axiomatisation des règles de décision qualitatives (l’utilité pessimiste) au cadre de décision
collective et montre que si la décision collective comme les décisions individuelles satisfont les
axiomes de Dubois et Prade ainsi que certains axiomes relatifs à la décision collective, partic-
ulièrement l’axiome de Pareto unanimité, alors l’agrégation collective égalitariste s’impose. Le
tableau est ensuite complété par une axiomatisation d’un pendant optimiste de cette règle de déci-
sion collective.
Le système axiomatique que nous avons développé peut être vu comme un pendant ordinal
du théorème de Harsanyi (1955). Ce résultat á été démontré selon un formalisme qui et basé
sur le modèle de de Von NeuMann and Morgenstern (1948) et permet de comparer des loteries
possibilistes. Par ailleurs, on propose une première tentative pour la carectérisation des règles de
décision collectives qualitatives selon le formalisme de Savage (1972) qui offre une représentation
des décisions par des actes au lieu des loteries.
De point de vue algorithmique, on considère l’optimisation des stratégies dans les arbres de
décision possibilistes en utilisant les critères de décision caractérisés dans la première partie de ce
travail. On offre une adaptation de l’algorithme de Programmation Dynamique pour les critères
monotones et on propose un algorithme de Programmation Multi-dynamique et un algorithme de
Branch and Bound pour les critères qui ne satisfont pas la monotonie.
Finalement, on établit une comparaison empirique des différents algorithmes proposés. On
mesure les CPU temps d’exécution qui augmentent linéairement en fonction de la taille de l’arbre
mais restent abordable même pour des grands arbres. Ensuite, nous étudions le pourcentage
d’exactitude de l’approximation des algorithmes exacts par Programmation Dynamique: Il appa-
raît que pour le critèreU−maxante l’approximation de l’algorithme de Programmation Multi-dynamique
n’est pas bonne. Mais, ceci n’est pas si dramatique puisque cet algorithme est polynomial (et ef-
ficace dans la pratique). Cependant, pour la règle U+minante l’approximation par Programmation
Dynamique est bonne et on peut dire qu’il devrait être possible d’éviter une énumération complète
par Branch and Bound pour obtenir les stratégies optimales .
Mots clefs: théorie de décision, théorie de possibilité, axiomatisation, choix collectif, arbres de
décision

Abstract
This Thesis raises the question of collective decision making under possibilistic uncertainty. We
propose several collective qualitative decision rules and show that in the context of a possibilistic
representation of uncertainty, the use of an egalitarian pessimistic collective utility function allows
us to get rid of the Timing Effect. Making a step further, we prove that if both the agents’ prefer-
ences and the collective ranking of the decisions satisfy Dubois and Prade’s axioms (1995, 1998)
and some additional axioms relative to collective choice, in particular Pareto unanimity, then the
egalitarian collective aggregation is compulsory. The picture is then completed by the proposition
and the characterization of an optimistic counterpart of this pessimistic decision rule.
Our axiomatic system can be seen as an ordinal counterpart of Harsanyi’s theorem (1955). We
prove this result in a formalism that is based on Von NeuMann and Morgenstern framework (1948)
and compares possibilisitc lotteries. Besides, we propose a first attempt to provide a characteriza-
tion of collective qualitative decision rules in Savage’s formalism; where decisions are represented
by acts rather than by lotteries.
From an algorithmic standpoint, we consider strategy optimization in possibilistic decision
trees using the decision rules characterized in the first part of this work. So, we provide an adapta-
tion of the Dynamic Programming algorithm for criteria that satisfy the property of monotonicity
and propose a Multi-Dynamic programming and a Branch and Bound algorithm for those that are
not monotonic.
Finally, we provide an empirical comparison of the different algorithms proposed. We mea-
sure the execution CPU times that increases linearly according to the size of the tree and it remains
affordable in average even for big trees. Then, we study the accuracy percentage of the approx-
imation of the pertinent exact algorithms by Dynamic Programming: It appears that for U−maxante
criterion the approximation of Multi-dynamic programming is not so good. Yet, this is not so dra-
matic since this algorithm is polynomial (and efficient in practice). However, for U+minante decision
rule the approximation by Dynamic Programming is good and we can say that it should be possible
to avoid a full Branch and Bound enumeration to find optimal strategies.
Keywords: decision theory, possibility theory, axiomatization, collective choice, decision trees

Contents
General introduction 1
I Background 4
1 Decision making under probabilistic uncertainty 5
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Basic concepts of decision theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Expected Utility: Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 Subjective Expected Utility: Savage’s approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2 Decision Making under Possibilistic uncertainty 15
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Basics on possibility theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 Possibilistic decision criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4 Axiomatization of pessimistic and optimistic utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3 Collective Decision Making 28
vii
CONTENTS viii
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2 Collective utility functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3 Harsanyi’s Theorem and related concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.4 Beyond Harsanyi’s theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4 Sequential decision making and decision trees 37
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.2 Definition of decision trees (DT and ΠDT ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.3 Strategy optimization problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.4 Optimization of probabilistic decision trees: Dynamic programming . . . . . . . 41
4.5 Optimization of possibilistic decision trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
II Contributions 45
5 Collective possibilistic decision making approach 46
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.2 Definition and properties of collective possibilistic decision rules . . . . . . . . . 47
5.3 Axiomatization of egalitarian pessimistic decision rule in style of VNM axiomatic
system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.4 Axiomatization of non egalitarian optimistic decision rule in style of VNM ax-
iomatic system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6 Algorithms for multi-agent optimization in possibilistic decision trees 70
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6.2 Dynamic Programming algorithm for the optimization of “ex-post” decision rules 70
6.3 Dynamic Programming algorithm for the optimization of “ex-ante” decision rules 72
CONTENTS ix
6.4 Multi Dynamic Programming algorithm for the optimization of U−maxante . . . . . 75
6.5 Exact optimization of U+minante : a Branch and Bound algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
7 Experimental study 78
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.2 Experimental protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.3 Results and interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
7.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
8 Towards collective decision rules for agents with subjective knowledge 83
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
8.2 Extending Savage’s framework for multi-agent decision making under uncertainty 83
8.3 Axioms for qualitative collective decision making under uncertainty . . . . . . . 92
8.4 Properties of collective qualitative decision rules in style of Savage . . . . . . . . 94
8.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
General conclusion 102
Bibliography 111

INTRODUCTION
General introduction
Decision theory is an important field in Artificial Intelligence (AI) that has emerged to support
decision making, particularly decision making under uncertainty. Making a decision amounts to
comparing possible alternatives and choose the best among them on the basis of a criterion or a
decision rule. The use of one or another criterion depends essentially on the nature of the decision
maker preferences and on the manner he or she expresses his knowledge. Besides, in order to solve
any decision problem, one should clearly define the environment of decision. In the last decades, a
significant progress has been noticed in this domain leading to several decision models [12,63,65].
Each of them is motivated by one or several concerns such as uncertainty, collectivity, multiple
objectives, or multiple criteria handling.
In this Thesis, we are interested in decision making problems where the knowledge about
states of nature is pervaded with uncertainty. The most well known approach for decision making
under uncertainty is the expected utility model. This model relies on a probabilistic representation
of uncertainty and it owes its success to an axiomatic justification for both objective (VNM’s
approach [72]) and subjective (Savage approach [82]) modeling of uncertainty.
In some cases, numerical information are unavailable and the decision maker is not able to
express his preferences quantitatively. Therefore, probability theory becomes inappropriate, and
gives a way to other uncertainty theories such as possibility theory where only an order between
different consequences may be required. The latter offers a simple and natural framework to
handle qualitative uncertainty. However, giving up the probabilistic quantification of uncertainty
yields giving up the EU criterion as well. Fortunately, the growth of possibilistic decision theory
has led to the proposal and the characterization of a panoply of possibilistic decision rules. In this
work, we are, particularly, interested in optimistic and pessimistic criteria that are the qualitative
counterparts of EU criterion [30, 33, 36].
In addition to uncertainty, another important aspect should be considered when making deci-
sions, is “time”. Generally, a decision maker does not make simple non related decisions but he
follows a strategy i.e. a sequence of decisions that are executed successively. That is why graph-
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ical models are of special interest. Such models indeed, allow a clear description of the problem
with a simple representation of different decision scenarios. Besides, they offer valuable compu-
tational methods; based on Dynamic Programming and variable elicitation; to compare them. In
the literature, we can specify four main families of decision models which are: decision trees [78],
influence diagrams [60], Markov decision processes [5] and Valuation Based Systems [86].
Simultaneously, in recent years there is a growing interest for collective decision problems in
the Artificial Intelligence community. This field, is inherited from classical sciences in particular
the branch of economic theory, social choice and welfare theory. Collective decision making aims
to provide a social or collective utility function that can be used to evaluate different policies and
to make decisions that satisfy not only one person but a group of persons or agents. Then, we
can say that the main question to answer in the context of collective decision is how to aggregate
individual utilities in order to obtain a collective one.
However, decision making process usually requires to deal with uncertainty. So, as for single
decision making, collective decision making under uncertainty has been studied by many scholars.
A seminal work has been proposed in 1955 by Harsanyi [59] to solve collective decision problems
under risk. In fact, under the assumption that individual preference relations as well as the collec-
tive one satisfy VNM’s axioms and considering the Pareto indifference axiom, Harsanyi proved
that the collective utility is a weighted sum of the individual expected utilities. This representation
theorem has always been interpreted as a justification of utilitarian aggregation.
Many contributions were inspired by this theorem, some of them have been developed to clar-
ify and to confirm the use of the sum of expected utilities in context of collective decision making
under uncertainty [94]. Others, like Myerson [74] proved that the use of Harsanyi’s Theorem is
the only way to avoid timing effect. More recently, several works [52, 70] have been proposed
as an attempt to extend Harsanyi’s theorem to the context of subjective expected utility model.
However, Harsanyi’s approach has been criticized by other researchers such that Diamonds [20]
who suggested the use of egalitarianism to aggregate individual preferences.
Nowadays, collective decision problems under uncertainty form an attractive field that is al-
ways in vogue. To the best of our knowledge, all the contributions provided in this domain rely
on probability theory. However, as we have mentioned before, this framework is inappropriate to
handle partial ignorance or qualitative uncertainty. In this work, we attempt to tackle this prob-
lematic and to answer the following question: How to solve a collective decision problem under
qualitative uncertainty?
In this thesis, we propose eight qualitative decision rules that differ with regard to the decision
maker attitude toward uncertainty, the used aggregation function and the time where uncertainty is
integrated. Hence, we consider uncertainty then a multi-agent aggregation (ex-post aggregation)
or the contrary collectivity then uncertainty (ex-ante aggregation). Afterward, we have studied
the relationship between those rules and proved that the coincidence between ex-ante and ex-post
approach is not synonym of utilitarianism. This result has motivated us to provide a qualitative
egalitarian counterpart of Harsanyi’s theorem. So, we have performed an axiomatic system rel-
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ative to the full min oriented and the full max oriented criteria in the style of VNM (objective
uncertainty). Besides, we have proposed an attempt to extend Savage framework (subjective un-
certainty) and its axiomatic system to handle collective decision problems.
In addition to this theoretical contribution, we have considered sequential decision making in
possibilistic decision trees and provided new algorithms to find optimal strategies in such mod-
els using the different criteria proposed. Besides, we have performed an experimental study to
compare the different algorithms and evaluate the quality of their solutions.
This thesis is decomposed into two main parts:
The first part presents an overview on decision making under uncertainty in various aspects:
1. Chapter 1 introduces the basic concepts relative to decision theory and recalls the most
known decision model, the expected utility theory, and presents its axiomatic justification
in both objective and subjective cases.
2. Chapter 2 presents possibility theory and the qualitative possibilistic decision rules. In this
chapter we focus on optimistic and pessimistic utilities (the qualitative counter parts of
expect utility) and we evoke their axiomatization in both VNM’s and Savage’s style.
3. Chapter 3 is devoted to collective decision making. We especially, detail Harsanyi’s theo-
rem and present a brief overview of related works.
4. Chapter 4 is dedicated to sequential decision problems using decision trees. These graphical
models are presented in a probabilistic and a possibilistic (qualitative) version.
The second part of the thesis represents our main contributions. It is structured as follows:
1. Chapter 5 is the core of this thesis and it defines a new approach for collective decision
making under qualitative uncertainty. In this chapter, we propose eight qualitative decision
rules to solve underlined problems on the basis of optimistic and pessimistic utilities. Be-
sides, we study the relations between these criteria and we propose an axiomatic system for
criteria that are fully min oriented or max oriented.
2. Chapter 6 extends qualitative decision trees to collective sequential problems and provides
algorithmic solutions for each of the qualitative decision rules proposed in Chapter 5.
3. Chapter 7 is dedicated to an experimental validation of the proposed algorithms.
4. Finally, Chapter 8 presents an extension of Savage’s approach and its axiomatic system to
solve collective decision problems and exposes the first steps to the characterization of the
full min-oriented and max-oriented collective decision rules in the style of Savage.
Principle results of this Thesis are published in [6–8].
Part I
Background
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CHAPITRE 1
Decision making under probabilistic uncertainty
1.1 Introduction
According to an old scientific tradition, decision making theory is a prevalent concern in cognitive
psychology, economics and social sciences. In this domain, still in vogue, several studies have
been carried out to justify the use of this or that decision criterion to compare alternatives. This
justification is based on a set of axioms capturing the choice behavior of the decision maker.
The most known models for decision making under uncertainty are based on the expected
utility (EU) criterion. It relies on a probabilistic representation of uncertainty. This classical
decision rule has been provided with an axiomatic justification, in the middle of the last century.
In this chapter, we study the properties of this model (i.e. the expected utility model) and we
recall its axiomatic foundations. First, we present the main definitions and notations relative to
decision theory under uncertainty in Section 1.2. Then, Section 1.3 details the expected utility
(EU) criterion and its axiomatization in the context of risk. Finally, Section 1.4 is devoted to
subjective expected utility (SEU) and Savage’s axiomatic system.
1.2 Basic concepts of decision theory
Decision making is primarily a matter of choosing between alternatives that most commonly are
expressed implicitly. Thus, solving a decision problem amounts to providing appealing choice
with respect to the specification of the decision problem at hand, i.e. the available knowledge
about the environment and the decision maker preferences relative to possible results of different
actions.
5
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Decision problems under uncertainty
Formally, a decision making problem under uncertainty is defined by a set of possible states of
the world S (states of nature) and a set of possible outcomes or consequences denoted by X . A
decision also called action or act, assigns a consequence to each state of nature, it is a mapping
from S to X . Besides, it is assumed that any decision maker is able to provide a well-defined
preference relation denoted by  over the set of consequences.
Uncertainty
In order to make a decision, it is necessary beforehand to clearly define the knowledge over the set
of states of nature and the associated consequences. According to the type of available information
relative to states of nature, we can distinguish several forms of uncertainty, namely:
• Probabilistic uncertainty: where uncertainty can be modeled via a probability distribu-
tion. We can distinguish two types of probabilities:
1. Objective probabilities: indicate the relative frequency of the realization of events.
A situation of uncertainty characterized by objective probability is called a situation
of risk. In this report, as in literature, we use the term risk to indicate objective
probabilistic uncertainty.
2. Subjective probabilities: are probabilistic measures derived from an individual’s per-
sonal belief about whether an event is likely to occur when no frequencies are avail-
able.
• Non probabilistic uncertainty: Since probability theory presents some draw-backs to
represent ignorance, in particular total ignorance, several non probabilistic theories (also
named non classical theories of uncertainty) have been defined to cope with this issue, such
as imprecise probabilities [90], evidence theory [85], rough set theory [75] and possibility
theory [27, 31, 100, 101] that will be investigated in the next chapter.
Preferences
A preference relation can be defined by a complete pre-order order over a set of consequences.
Formally, the preference between two consequences x and y ∈ X is denoted by x  y. It means
that “x is at least as good as y" for the decision maker.  denotes the asymmetric part of  and ∼
its symmetrical part such that:
• The strict preference relation  is defined by x  y if and only if x  y and y  x and it
means that“x is strictly preferred to y".
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• The indifference relation∼ is defined by x ∼ y if and only if x  y and y  x and it means
that “ x and y are indifferently preferred".
Generally, a preference relation  is assumed to verify a set of properties (axioms). The main
axioms are defined as follows [41]:
Axiom. (Completeness) ∀x, y either x  y or y  x.
Axiom. (Antisymmetry) If x  y and y  x then x = y.
Axiom. (Asymmetry) If x is strictly preferred to y, then y is not strictly preferred to x.
x  y then ¬(y  x).
Axiom. (Transitivity) If x is at least as good as y and y is at least as good as z, then x is at least
as good as z.
If (x  y and y  z) then (x  z).
Axiom. (Reflexivity)The relation  over a set X is reflexive if every element of X is related to
itself.
∀x ∈ X, x  x.
In the remainder of this work, we are in particular interested by preference relations defining
pre-order over consequences. The relation  is a pre-order on X iff it is transitive and reflexive.
If the relation  satisfies also the completeness then we have a complete pre-order.
The preference relation of an agent over a set of consequences is usually represented by a
utility function. This latter, denoted by u, is a mapping from the set of consequences X to a
numerical or ordinal scale U (u : X 7→ U ). Formally, U = {u1, . . . un} is a totally ordered set that
belongs to R such that u1 ≤ · · · ≤ un. The worst (resp. best) utility is denoted by u⊥ (resp. u>).
1.3 Expected Utility: Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
theory
In this section, we present the expected utility model, the most known framework to deal with
decision making problems under risk. Expected utility (EU) theory has emerged in 1738 with
Bernoulli [10] in “Commentarii Academiae Scientiarum Imperialis Petropolitanae” (translated as
“Exposition of a new theory on the measurement of risk”). It was proposed in order to solve the
Saint Petersburg paradox [17].
This paradox is a theoretical game used in economics related to probability and decision the-
ories. It presents the human beings behavior faced to random events. The value of the random
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variable is probably small with infinite expected payoff. Bernoulli has shown that in this situation,
probability theory dictates a decision that no reasonable player would take. Thus to solve this
problem, he proposed to use expected utility rather than expected value (outcome).
This proposition has motivated Von Neumann and Morgenstern [72] to provide an axiomatic
system to justify the use of expected utility and to define necessary conditions under which a utility
function exists.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s approach
In a framework of decision making under risk, the decision maker’s knowledge about the states of
nature S is represented by a probability distribution. Besides, it is also assumed that the decision
maker has a well defined weak preference relation  on the set of possible consequences X of its
choices.
In Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (VNM) approach, an act or a decision is represented by
a probability distribution over the set of possible outcomes. It is called a simple probabilistic
lottery and it is denoted by L = 〈λ1/x1, . . . , λn/xn〉, where λi = p(xi) is the probability that the
decision leads to an outcome xi.
A probabilistic compound lottery denoted by 〈 λ1/L1, . . . , λm/Lm 〉 is a normalized proba-
bility distribution over the set of lotteries where λi is the probability to obtain lottery Li.
Therefore, a decision making problem under risk can be represented using:
• A set of consequences (outcomes) X ,
• A set of probabilistic lotteries L, where each lottery Li is a probability distribution p over
the set of consequences X ,
• A utility function u: X 7→ U .
Any compound probabilistic lottery can be reduced into a simple one, denoted by Reduction (〈
λ1/L1, . . . , λm/Lm 〉). Formally, it is defined by:
Reduction(〈λ1/L1, . . . , λm/Lm〉) = 〈
∑
j=1..m
(λj × λj1)/x1, . . . ,
∑
j=1..m
(λj × λjn)/xn〉 (1.1)
Example 1.1. Let L1 = 〈0.7/10, 0.3/20〉 and L2 = 〈0.4/10, 0.6/20〉 be two probabilistic lot-
teries. Consider the compound lottery L′ = 〈 0.5/L, 0.5/L′ 〉. L′ can be reduced into the single
stage lottery L
′′
= 〈 0.55/10, 0.45/20 〉 presented in Figure 1.1.
Obviously, the reduction of a simple lottery gives a simple lottery as result. Since, the sum
(
∑
) and the product (×) operations are polynomial, the reduction is polynomial in the size of the
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(a) (b)
0.5
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20
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20
0,5
0,6
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L”L’
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0.4
Figure 1.1: A compound probabilistic lottery (a) and its reduction (b)
compound lottery. Note that the size of a simple probabilistic lottery is simply the number of its
outcomes; and the size of a compound lottery is the sum of the sizes of its sub-lotteries.
Solving a decision problem under risk amounts to evaluating risky alternatives and choosing
among them. In this context, Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s proposed to use the expected utility
(EU) criterion to compare lotteries, i.e. probability distribution over consequences. Formally, the
computation of the expected utility of a lottery L is performed as follows:
Definition 1.1. Given a probabilistic lottery L = 〈λ1/x1, . . . , λn/xn〉 and a utility function u, the
computation of the expected utility of L (denoted by EU(L)) is computed by:
EU(L) =
∑
xi∈X
λi × u(xi). (1.2)
Example 1.2. Let L = 〈0.2/5, 0.2/15, 0.6/30〉 and L′ = 〈0.7/0, 0.3/20〉 be two probabilistic
lotteries. Using Equation 1.2, we have EU(L) = (0.2× 5) + (0.2× 15) + (0.6× 30) = 22 and
EU(L′) = (0.7× 0) + (0.3× 20) = 6.
So, we can deduce that L is preferred to L′.
Formally, considering the expected utility criterion, any preference order EU defined on
simple probabilistic lotteries can be extended to compare compound lotteries as follows:
L EU L′ iff Reduction(L) EU Reduction(L′). (1.3)
Axiomatic system of Von Neumann and Morgenstern
At the middle of the last century, Von Neumann and Morgenstern have provided an axiomatic
justification to the expected utility criterion [72]. They have shown that if the preference relation
of any decision maker satisfies a set of axioms of rationality, then it can be represented via a utility
function (EU) over lotteries. This axiomatic system is detailed in the following section.
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Von Neumann and Morgenstern axiomatic system that characterize preference relation over
lotteries is based on three fundamental axioms defined as follows:
Axiom. (V NM1: Weak order) The preference relation  is reflexive, complete and transitive.
Axiom. (V NM2: Continuity) For any three probabilistic lotteries L, L′ and L′′ , if L is at least
good as L′ and L′ is at least good as L
′′
then there is a probability p for which the rational agent
(DM) will be indifferent between lottery L′ and the lottery in which L comes with probability p,
L
′′
with probability (1− p).
L  L′  L′′ ⇒ ∃ p ∈ ]0, 1[ s.t. pL+ (1− p)L′′ ∼ L′.
Axiom. (V NM3: Independence) For any probabilistic lotteries L, L′ and L′′ , if a DM prefers L
to L′, then his preferences over these lotteries isn’t affected by mixing in a third one.
L  L′ ⇔ ∃ p ∈]0, 1] s.t. pL+ (1− p)L′′  pL′ + (1− p)L′′ .
The key axiom of VNM’s formalism is the independence axiom (V NM3). It is the central
axiom of the (objective) expected utility model and it can be interpreted as follows: If the decision
maker prefers L to L′ and he have to choose between p×L+(1−p)×L′′ and p×L′+(1−p)×L′′
then he will prefer the mixture p×L+(1−p)×L′′ to p×L+(1−p)×L′′ whatever the probability
of the event that happens.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern [72] have claimed that a preference relation  satisfying the
above axioms can be represented by an expected utility function. Their representation theorem is
defined by:
Theorem 1.1. If the preference relation  satisfies axioms V NM1, . . . , V NM3 then it is exists
a utility function u: X 7→ R over the set of lotteries L such that:
∀L,L′, L  L′ ⇔ EU(L) ≥ EU(L′). (1.4)
Theorem 1.1 can be described as follows: if the preference relation of any decision maker
satisfies completeness, transitivity, continuity and independence axioms, then the DM behavior’s
obeys the maximization of the expected utility.
1.4 Subjective Expected Utility: Savage’s approach
The VNM’s model is a powerful and attractive tool to handle decision making under risk. However
in real world problems, objective probabilities are not always available. To deal with such cases,
Savage provided an extension of expected utility theory to a subjective context, namely Subjective
expected utility [82].
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Savage approach
In Savage’s framework, a decision problem is represented by:
• A set of consequences X ,
• A set of states of nature S (a subset E of S is an event),
• A decision (or “act") is a function f : S 7→ X and the set of acts is denoted by F ,
•  a preference relation on F ;  denotes its asymmetric part, ∼ its symmetric part.
The subjective expected utility was developed by Savage in 1954 [82] as follows:
Definition 1.2. Given a probabilistic distribution p over S and a utility function u on X , the
subjective expected utility of an act f (denoted by SEU(f)) is defined by:
SEU(f) =
∑
si∈S
p(si)× u(f(si)). (1.5)
Example 1.3. Let S = {s1, s2, s3, s4} be a set of states of nature such that p(s1) = 0.2, p(s2) =
0.1, p(s3) = 0.4 and p(s4) = 0.3. Consider the two acts f and g given in Table 1.1.
The utility value associated to each consequence is defined as follows: u(f(s1)) = u(g(s2)) = 5,
Acts/States s1 s2 s3 s4
f f(s1) f(s2) f(s3) f(s4)
g g(s1) g(s2) g(s3) g(s4)
Table 1.1: Consequences of acts f and g
u(f(s2)) = u(g(s3)) = 10, u(f(s3)) = u(g(s1)) = 15, u(f(s4)) = u(g(s4)) = 20.
Using Equation 1.5, we have SEU(f) = (0.2×5)+(0.1×10)+(0.4×15)+(0.3×20) = 14
and SEU(g) = (0.2× 15) + (0.1× 20) + (0.4× 5) + (0.3× 20) = 13. So, f is preferred to g.
The axiomatic system of Savage
Like VNM’s framework, the preference relation  between acts has to satisfy a certain number of
axioms of rationality. Before addressing the axiomatic system relative to Savage’s approach for
subjective expected utility we need to define some basic notions [82]:
Definition 1.3. (Constant act) A constant act fx ∈ F provides the same consequence x ∈ X ,
whatever the state of the nature:
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∀s ∈ S, fx(s) = x.
Definition 1.4. (Compound act) Giving two acts f and g ∈ F and an eventE ⊆ S. The compound
act fEg is defined by:
fEg(s) =
{
f(s) if s ∈ E,
g(s) if otherwise.
This notion (of compound acts) is illustrated by Figure 1.2.
E Ec
C
o
n
se
q
u
e
n
ce
s
X
States   S
Act f
Act fEg
Act g
Figure 1.2: Compound act fEg
Definition 1.5. (Null event) An event E ⊆ S is said to be null iff:
∀f, g, h ∈ F , fEh ∼ gEh.
Definition 1.6. (Conditioning on E) For any event E ⊆ S, for any acts f and g, f E g iff
∀h, fEh  gEh.
Savage’s axiomatic System is based on the following 6 axioms [82]:
Axiom. (Sav1: Complete Pre-order) The preference relation  is complete and transitive.
Axiom. (Sav2: Sure Thing Principle) For all acts f, g, h, h′ ∈ F and for every event E ⊆ S:
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fEh  gEh iff fEh′  gEh′.
Axiom. (Sav3: Conditioning over constant acts) For any not null event E ⊆ S, and any constant
acts fx, gy ∈ F it holds that:
∀E ⊆ S, fx E gy iff ∀h ∈ F , fxEh  gyEh.
Axiom. (Sav4: Projection from acts over events) For any consequences x, y, x′, y′ ∈ X , for any
constant acts fx, gy, f ′x′ , g
′
y′ ∈ F . If x  y and x′  y′, then ∀E,D ⊆ S we have:
fxEgy  fxDgy iff f ′x′Eg′y′  f ′x′Dg′y′ .
Axiom. (Sav5: Non triviality) ∃ f, g ∈ F , such that f  g.
The use of Axiom Sav5 avoids the case of having only one consequence or the case where all
consequences are equally preferred.
The basic axiom of Savage approach is the Sure Thing Principle (Sav2) that can be interpreted
as follows: The preference order between two compound acts does not depend on their common
consequences in a subset of S. Thus, Savage has showed that if the decision maker’s preference
among acts satisfies axioms Sav1 to Sav5 as well as two technical axioms of continuity and
monotonicity, then this preference relation can be represented by an expected utility from the set
of acts to the reals. So, for any act f , SEU(f) is the expected utility of the consequence of f in
the sense of a probability distribution on S. This implies the existence of a probability distribution
p on S and a utility function u on X such that an act f is preferred to an another act g iff the
subjective utility of f is higher than the subjective utility of g (SEU(f)  SEU(g)).
1.5 Conclusion
The popularity of the expected utility models is essentially based on two strong axiomatic justifi-
cations: Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s axiomatic system for decision making under risk and
Savage’s axiomatization for decision making under uncertainty. However, it have been proved
that these formalisms cannot represent all decision makers’ behaviors. Allais [2] and Ellsberg [37]
questioned the axiomatic foundations for respectively VNM’s and Savage approaches for expected
utility.
Many research contributions have been proposed to overcome these limits, most of them are
based on the Choquet integral [16] that is probably the most well known criterion. The latter is
based on a generalized measure of uncertainty and has proven to be an important tool for decision
making under risk and uncertainty. Besides, we can cite the Rank-Dependent Utility criterion [77]
for decision under risk and its variants [83, 97] that have received an axiomatic justification.
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These criteria involve the use of a quantitative representation of uncertainty. However, when
the agent is unable to express his uncertainty and preferences numerically and he can only give
an order among different alternatives, the previous criteria remain inappropriate. To solve such
problems, qualitative decision models have been introduced with the emergence of other decision
rules such as Sugeno integral [88] decision rule that is considered as an ordinal counterpart of
Choquet integral. In particular, one may consider qualitative possibilistic decision rules that have
emerged with the growth of Possibility theory. These alternatives are detailed in the next Chapter.
CHAPITRE 2
Decision Making under Possibilistic uncertainty
2.1 Introduction
Despite its success, it was proved that probability theory is appropriate only when numerical infor-
mation are available and it presents some limits in regards to the representation of total ignorance
and modeling qualitative uncertainty. Moreover, in decision theory, it has been proved that indi-
viduals reasoning does not necessarily conform to expected utility’s assumptions.
Giving up the probabilistic quantification of uncertainty, yields to give up the EU criterion as
well. Possibility theory presents an alternative model that offers a natural and simple framework
to handle all kind of uncertainty, especially qualitative uncertainty and total ignorance. The de-
velopment of possibilistic decision theory has lead to the proposition and the characterization of
several possibilistic decision rules, namely, optimistic and pessimistic utilities that are qualitative
counterparts of the EU criterion.
In this chapter, we will first give some basic elements of possibility theory in Section 2.2. Then
in Section 2.3, we will present possibilistic decision rules, in particular pessimistic and optimistic
utilities. Finally, in Section 2.4 we will focus on the axiomatization of pessimistic and optimistic
utilities and we will detail their axiomatic systems in both VNM and Savage styles.
2.2 Basics on possibility theory
Possibility theory is a framework to handle uncertainty issued from Fuzzy Sets theory. It has been
introduced by Zadeh [100] and further developed by Dubois and Prade [27, 28].
15
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Possibility distribution
The concept of possibility distribution is the core of possibility theory and allows to represent
qualitative knowledge about the real world. A possibility distribution π maps each state s in the
universe of discourse S to a degree in a linearly ordered scale V , exemplified by [0, 1]. The values
of this measure is interpreted as in table 2.1.
π(s) = 0 s is impossible
π(s) = 1 s is totally possible
π(s) > π(s′) s is preferred to s′ (or is more plausible)
Table 2.1: Possibility distribution π
The possibilistic scale V can be interpreted in two manners:
- In the numerical or quantitative interpretation, the values of the possibility distribution make
sense.
- In the ordinal or qualitative interpretation, the possibility degrees reflect only an order between
the possible values.
Independently of the used scale, the extreme cases of knowledge are complete knowledge and
total ignorance. In the first case, we assign 1 to a state s0 (totally possible) and 0 otherwise, i.e.
∃ s0, π(s0) = 1 and ∀s 6= s0, π(s) = 0. In the second one, we assign 1 to all situations i.e.
π(s) = 1, ∀s ∈ S.
A possibility distribution π is said to be normalized if there exists at least one element of S
which is totally possible.
max
s∈S
π(s) = 1. (2.1)
Possibility and necessity measures
In probability theory, uncertain knowledge about any eventE is represented by a single probability
measure P. This measure is auto-dual i.e. we can deduce the probability degree assigned toE from
the probability P of its complement (¬E): P (E) = 1− P (¬E).
In the contrary, possibility theory is characterized by the use of two dual measures: the possi-
bility measure Π and necessity measure N .
• Possibility measure Π: Given a possibility distribution π, the possibility of any event E ⊆
S is defined by:
Π(E) = max
s∈E
π(s). (2.2)
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Π(E) denotes the possibility degree evaluating at which level E is consistent with the knowledge
represented by π.
• Necessity measureN : Given a possibility distribution π, the necessity measure of an event
E ⊆ S is defined by:
N(E) = 1−Π(¬E) = min
s∈E
(1− π(s)). (2.3)
N(E) denotes the necessity degree evaluating at which level E is certainly implied by the knowl-
edge.
Example 2.1. Let us consider the possibility distribution π describing the opinion of a doctor
concerning the diagnosis of a patient. The universe of discourse related to this problem is the set
of three diseases (d1, d2, d3) and a healthy case (h): S = {d1, d2, d3, h}.
π(d1) = 0.5, π(d2) = 1, π(d3) = 0.7, π(h) = 0.
Note that π is normalized since max(0.5, 1, 0.7, 0) = 1. For instance, the possibility degree that
the patient has disease d1 is 0.5.
Consider an event E = {d1, d3} i.e. the patient suffers from d1 or d3. Then, the possibility
and the necessity measures of this event are:
• Π(E) = max(0.5, 0.7) = 0.7.
• N(E) = 1−max(1, 0) = 0.
Possibilistic lotteries
Following Dubois and Prade’s possibilistic approach to decision making under uncertainty, a de-
cision can be seen as a possibility distribution over a finite set of outcomes [30, 36]. A decision
can be represented by a possibility distribution on a set of consequences X , called a (simple) pos-
sibilistic lottery, denoted by L = 〈λ1/x1, . . . , λn/xn〉; where λj = π(xj) is the possibility that
the decision leads to consequence xj . This degree is also denoted by L[xj ].The outcome relative
to each consequence xj can be represented by a utility function uj . Thus, we can rewrite the
possibilistic lottery by L = 〈λ1/u1, . . . , λn/un〉.
Similar to the notion of probabilistic lottery (detailed in Chapter 1 Section 3), Dubois and
Prade have defined the notion of possibilistic compound lottery. Such a lottery is a normalized
possibility distribution over a set of (simple or compound) lotteries and it is denoted by L =
〈λ1/L1, . . . , λm/Lm〉, where λi being the possibility of getting lottery Li according to L. The
possibility πi,j of getting consequence xj from one of sub lotteries Li depends on the possibility
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λi of getting Li and on the conditional possibility λ
j
i = π(xj | Li) of getting xj from Li. So,
we shall say that πi,j = min(λi, λji ). Hence, the possibility of getting xj from a a lottery L =
〈λ1/L1, . . . , λm/Lm〉 is simply the max, over all Li’s, of πi,j .
In Dubois and Prade’s possibilistic decision theory [30,36], a compound lottery is assumed to
be indifferent according to the decision maker’s preference to the simple lottery defined by:
Reduction (L) = 〈max
i=1..m
min(λi, λ1i )/x1, . . . , max
i=1..m
min(λi, λni )/xn〉 (2.4)
Example 2.2. Let L1 = 〈1/0.5, 0.7/0.3〉 and L2 = 〈0.6/0.5, 1/0.3〉 be two simple possibilistic
lotteries, and let L′ = 〈1/L1, 0.8/L2〉 be a compound lottery represented in Figure 2.1 (a). The
reduction of lottery L′ into a simple lottery L′′; presented by (b) in Figure 2.1; can be calculated
using Equation 2.4 as follows:
• L′′(x1) = max(min(1, 1),min(0.8, 0.6)) = 1 and
• L′′(x2) = max(min(1, 0.7),min(0.8, 1)) = 0.8,
So, L′′ = Reduction (L′) = 〈1/0.5, 0.8/0.3〉.
(a) (b)
1
1 0.5
0,8
0,7
1
0,6
1
0,8
L”L’
0.3
0.3
0.5
0.5
0.3
Figure 2.1: A possibilistic compound lottery (a) and its reduction (b).
The reduction of a compound lottery is polynomial in the size of the lottery since the min and
the max operators are polynomial.
2.3 Possibilistic decision criteria
The development of possibility theory has led to the emergence of several possibilistic decision
rules depending on the (quantitative or qualitative) nature of information describing the decision
problem.
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These decision criteria can be gathered into four classes that differ according to the interpre-
tation of the used scale to encode uncertainty and utility (ordinal or numerical) as well as the
commensurability between these scales i.e. if we are able or not to measure possibility and utility
using a common standard:
• Utility and possibility scales are commensurate and purely ordinal: In this class, we
have possibilistic qualitative criteria namely optimistic (denoted by Uopt) and pessimistic
(denoted by Upes) [30,36] integrals as well as possibilistic binary utilities (denoted by PU )
[50].
• Utility and possibility scales are commensurate: This category concerns the Order of
Magnitude Utility (denoted by OMEU ) [76, 96].
• Utility and possibility scales are commensurate or not: We can find possibility-based
likely dominance (denoted by LΠ) and necessity-based likely dominance (denoted by LN )
[23, 39].
• Utility and possibility scales are commensurate and utilities are quantitative: In this
class we have possibility-based Choquet integrals (denoted by ChΠ) and necessity-based
Choquet integrals (denoted by ChN ) [79].
In the sequel of this Chapter, we present the definition of each of the above possibilistic decision
rules. Especially we detail the pessimistic and optimistic utilities and we focus on their axiomati-
zation, that constitutes the basis of our contribution (Part 2).
Pessimistic utility
In a possibilistic framework, the evaluation of a lottery consists of the combination of possibility
degrees π (encoding uncertainty) and utilities u(x) (relative to possible consequences). To ensure
this combination, Dubois and Prade [30, 34] have proposed pessimistic and optimistic criteria
under the assumption that the uncertainty and utility scales are commensurate and purely ordinal.
These decision rules constitute a qualitative counterpart to the expected utility criterion and depend
on the decision maker behavior (an optimistic or pessimistic person).
The pessimistic criterion was initially defined by Whalen [95] and it generalizes the Wald
criterion [89]. This criterion supposes that the decision maker considers the bad and plausible
consequences. It estimates to what extent it is certain (i.e. necessary according to measure N) that
L reaches a good utility.
Definition 2.1. Let L = 〈λ1/x1, . . . , λn/xn〉 be a possibilistic lottery, the pessimistic utility of L,
denoted by Upes is computed as follows:
Upes(L) = max
i=1..n
min(u(xi), n(L[xi])). (2.5)
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where n is an order reversing function (e.g. n(L[x]) = 1 - L[x]).
Particular values for Upes are as follows:
• If L assigns 1 to the worst utility (u⊥) and 0 to all other utilities then Upes(L) = 0.
• If L assigns 1 to the best utility u> and 0 to all other utilities then Upes(L) = 1.
Example 2.3. Let L = 〈1/0.2, 0.7/0.5, 0.4/0.6〉 and L′ = 〈1/0.8, 0.3/0.7, 0.5/0.9〉 be two pos-
sibilistic lotteries.
Using Equation 2.5 we have:
• Upes(L) = min(max(0.2,0),max(0.5,0.3),max(0.6,0.6)) = 0.2.
• Upes(L′) = min(max(0.8,0),max(0.7,0.7),max(0.9,0.5)) = 0.7.
⇒ Upes(L′) > Upes(L) so L′ Upes L.
Dubois and Prade have proposed an adaptation of the pessimistic utility to evaluate acts in
style of Savage. The definition of this decision rule is as follows:
Definition 2.2. Given a possibilistic distribution π over S and a utility function u on the set of
consequences X , the pessimistic utility of an act f is defined by:
Upes(f) = min
si∈S
max(u(f(si)), 1− π(si)). (2.6)
Optimistic utility
The optimistic criterion was initially proposed by Yager [98, 99] and it can be seen as a mild
version of the maximax criterion. This criterion estimates to what extend it is possible that L
reaches a good utility. It captures the optimistic behavior of the decision maker that makes at least
one of the good consequences highly plausible.
Definition 2.3. Let L = 〈λ1/x1, . . . , λn/xn〉 be a possibilistic lottery, the optimistic utility of L,
denoted by Uopt is computed as follows:
Uopt(L) = max
i=1..n
min(u(xi), L[xi]). (2.7)
Example 2.4. Let L = 〈1/0.2, 0.7/0.5, 0.4/0.6〉 and L′ = 〈1/0.8, 0.3/0.7, 0.5/0.9〉 be two pos-
sibilistic lotteries.
Using Equation 2.7 we have:
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• Uopt(L) = max(min(0.2,1),min(0.5,0.7),min(0.4,0.6)) = 0.5.
• Uopt(L′) = max(min(1,0.8),min(0.3,0.7),min(0.5,0.9)) = 0.8.
⇒ Uopt(L′) > Uopt(L) so L′ Uopt L.
Particular values for Uopt are as follows:
• If L assigns 1 to the worst utility (u⊥) and 0 to all other utilities then Uopt(L) = 1.
• If L assigns 1 to the best utility (u>) and 0 to all other utilities then Uopt(L) = 0.
Similar to its pessimistic counterpart, this criterion was also defined in Savage framework to
choose among acts rather than lotteries. Its definition is as follows:
Definition 2.4. Given a possibilistic distribution π over a set S and a utility function u on a set of
consequences X , the optimistic utility of an act f is defined by:
Uopt(f) = max
si∈S
min(u(f(si)), π(si)). (2.8)
It is important to note that the pessimistic and optimistic utilities represent particular cases of
a more general criterion based on Sugeno integrals [25, 67, 88]:
Sγ,u(L) = max
λ∈[0,1]
min(λ, γ(Fλ)). (2.9)
where Fλ = {si ∈ S, u(f(si)) ≥ λ}, is a set of preferred states for act f. γ is a monotonic
set-function that reflects the decision maker attitude toward uncertainty. Uopt is recovered when γ
is the possibility measure Π and Upes is recovered when γ corresponds to necessity measure N.
Other possibilistic decision rules
Binary utilities (PU)
Binary possibilistic utility is a qualitative decision criterion that unifies the pessimistic and opti-
mistic utilities. It has been proposed and axiomatized by Giang and Shenoy [50, 51] considering
the importance of the best and the worst lotteries when making decision. In this bipolar model, the
utility of an outcome is represented by a pair u = 〈u, u〉 where max(u, u) = 1. u is interpreted as
the possibility of getting the ideal, good reward (denoted >) and u is interpreted as the possibility
of getting the anti ideal, bad reward (denoted ⊥).
The lottery 〈λ1/u1, . . . , λn/un〉 can be seen as a compound lottery, where each ui = 〈ui, ui〉
is considered as a basic lottery 〈ui/>, ui/⊥〉. Hence, the evaluation of this lottery comes down to
the evaluation of its reduction such that:
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Definition 2.5. Let L = 〈λ1/u1, . . . , λn/un〉 be a possibilistic lottery, the binary utility of L
denoted by PU is computed as follows:
PU(〈λ1/u1, . . . , λn/un〉) =
Reduction(λ1/〈u1/>, u1/⊥〉, . . . , λm ∧ 〈un/>, un/⊥〉)
= 〈max
j=1..m
(min(λj , uj))/>, max
j=1..m
(min(λj , uj))/⊥〉
(2.10)
As qualitative utilities and many other qualitative decision rules, binary utility suffers from a
lack of decisiveness. However, a refinement has been proposed to obtain a more discriminating
criterion [92, 93].
The possibilistic likely dominance LN and LΠ
This criterion was proposed to make decisions when the utility and possibility scales are not com-
mensurate [23, 39]. It does not assign global utilities to decisions but compare them using a pair-
wise comparison between alternatives, hence the particularity of this decision rule. Possibilistic
likely dominance can be defined in the ordinal setting by LN or in the numerical setting by LΠ.
Giving two possibilistic lotteries L1 = 〈λ11/x11, . . . , λ1n/x1n〉 and L2 = 〈λ21/x21, . . . , λ2n/x2n〉,
we say that “L1 is as least as good as L2” as soon as the possibility (in the case of LΠ) or the
necessity (in the case of LN ) of the event “the utility of L1 is as least as good as the utility of L2”
is greater or equal to the likelihood (possibility or necessity) of the event “the utility of L2 is as
least as good as the utility of L1”. Formally:
Definition 2.6. Let L = 〈λ1/x1, . . . , λn/xn〉 be a possibilistic lottery, the possibility likely domi-
nance relations LN and LΠ are defined as follows:
L1 LN L2 iff N(L1 ≥ L2) ≥ N(L2 ≥ L1). (2.11)
where N(L1 ≥ L2) = 1− max
u1i ,u
2
j s.t u
1
i<u
2
j
(min(λ1i , λ2j )).
L1 LΠ L2 iff Π(L1 ≥ L2) ≥ Π(L2 ≥ L1). (2.12)
where Π(L1 ≥ L2) = max
u1i ,u
2
j s.t u
1
i≥u
2
j
(min(λ1i , λ2j )).
Order of Magnitude Expected Utility (OMEU)
Order of magnitude expected utility is based on “disbelief functions” or “Kappa-rankings” mea-
sures initially proposed by [87]. A measure κ : 2S → Z+ ∪ {+∞} is a kappa-ranking iff:
• mins∈S κ(s}) = 0
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• κ(E) = mins∈E κ({s}) if ∅ 6= E ⊆ S, κ(∅) = +∞
This criterion have received an interpretation in term of order of magnitude of “small” proba-
bilities. Hence, “κ(E) = i” is equivalent to P (E) is of the same order of εi, for a given fixed
infinitesimal ε. In this context, an eventE is more likely than eventD if and only if κ(E) < κ(D).
In [29], authors have pointed out that there exists a close link between kappa-rankings and pos-
sibility measures, insofar as any kappa-ranking can be represented by a possibility measure, and
vice versa. Thus, order of magnitude utilities have been defined in the same way to rank outcomes
in term of dissatisfaction degrees [76, 96].
Definition 2.7. Let L = 〈λ1/x1, . . . , λn/xn〉 an order of magnitude lottery, the order of magni-
tude of the expected utility of L is computed as follows:
OMEU(L) = min
i=1,n
{λi + u(xi)} (2.13)
Possibilistic Choquet integrals
When the decision problem is defined using heterogeneous information and the knowledge about
states of nature is possibilistic and the utility degrees are cardinal, then Choquet integrals seem
to be an appropriate decision rule to consider. This criterion allows the use of any monotonic set
function µ, also called a capacity or fuzzy measure that may be a probability measure, necessity
measure, possibility measure, or belief functions measure etc.
In the case of possibilistic decision problem and considering the decision maker behavior, we
use the necessity-based Choquet integrals (µ = N) for cautious decision makers and the possibility-
based Choquet integrals (µ = Π) for adventurous ones. Hence the definition of possibilistic Cho-
quet integrals is as follows:
Definition 2.8. Let L = 〈λ1/u1, . . . , λn/un〉 a possibilistic lottery, the necessity-based Choquet
integrals of L denoted by ChN (L) is defined by:
ChN (L) = u1 +
∑
i=2..p
(ui − ui−1)×N(L ≥ ui). (2.14)
The possibility-based Choquet integrals of L denoted by ChΠ(L) is defined by:
ChΠ(L) = u1 +
∑
i=2..p
(ui − ui−1)×Π(L ≥ ui). (2.15)
2.4 Axiomatization of pessimistic and optimistic utilities
Under the assumption that the utility and the possibility scales are commensurate and purely or-
dinal, Dubois and Prade [30, 36] have proposed pessimistic and optimistic utilities to evaluate
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decisions. Similar to their probabilistic counterpart, these criteria have received a theorical char-
acterization in both VNM and Savage frameworks. These axiomatic systems are detailed in the
remaining of this Section.
Axiomatization in the style of VNM
Qualitative (pessimistic and optimistic) utilities have been axiomatized in the style of VNM [30,
36] to characterize preference relations between possibilistic lotteries.
Axiomatization of Upes in the style of VNM
Let  be a preference relation on a set of possibilistic lotteries L. The axiomatic system relative
to the pessimistic utility Upes, proposed by Dubois and Prade [30] relies on the following axioms:
Axiom. (A1: Total pre-order)  is complete and transitive.
Axiom. (A2: Certainty equivalence) ∀Y ⊆ X , ∃x ∈ Y s.t. x (L[x] =1; L[y] = 0 ∀y 6= x) and Y
(L[y] =1 ∀y ∈ Y ; L[y] = 0 otherwise) are equivalent for .
Axiom. (A3−:Risk aversion) ∀x ∈ X , if L[x] ≤ L′[x] (L[x] is more specific than L′[x]), then
L  L′.
Axiom. (A4: Independence) If L and L′ are equivalents, then 〈λ/L, µ/L′′〉 and 〈λ/L′, µ/L′′〉
are also equivalents, for any λ, µ s.t. max(λ, µ) = 1.
Axiom. (A5: Reduction of lotteries) For any (compound possibilistic lottery)L,L ∼ Reduction(L).
Axiom. (A6−: Continuity) ∀x ∈ X , if L′[x] ≤ L[x] then ∃λ s.t. L′ ∼ 〈1/L, λ/X〉.
In 1998, Dubois et al. [36] have performed a deeper study of this characterization and they
have provided an axiomatizatic system with a lower number of axioms. Just four axioms are
necessary and sufficient for the representation theorem of the pessimistic utility.
In fact, authors have shown that it is possible to ignore the use of Axiom A5 relative to reduc-
tion of compound lotteries since it is implicitly obtained by the definition of possibilistic lotteries.
Besides, they have proved that Axiom A2 is also useless and redundant since it is a consequence
of the use of Axiom A1, Axiom A4 and Axiom A6−.
Thus, a new axiomatic system was proposed for pessimistic utility. It encompasses AxiomA1,
Axiom A3−, Axiom A4 and a new form of the continuity axiom (Axiom A6−’) that is defined by:
Axiom. (A6−’: Continuity) ∀x ∈ X , ∀L[x], ∃λ ∈ [0, 1] s.t. L[x] ∼ 〈1/u>, λ/u⊥〉. Where u>
and u⊥are respectively the best and the worst utility.
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The detailed axiomatic system has allowed Dubois and Prade to provide a representation the-
orem relative to the pessimistic utility such that:
Theorem 2.1. If a preference relation  on L satisfies axioms A1 . . . A6− (or axioms A1, A3−,
A4 and A6−’) then there exists a possibility distribution π: S 7→ [0, 1], an order reversing and a
utility function u: X 7→ [0, 1] such that:
L  L′ iff Upes(L) ≥ Upes(L′). (2.16)
Axiomatization of Uopt in the style of VNM
In their work [30], Dubois et al. have defined the characterization of the optimistic utility Uopt
from the axiomatization relative to the pessimistic utility by replacing axioms A3− and A6− by
their optimistic counterparts i.e. axioms A3+ and A6+ defined by:
Axiom. (A3+: Uncertainty attraction) ∀x ∈ X , if L[x] ≥ L′[x] (L′[x] is more specific than L[x]),
then L′  L.
Axiom. (A6+: Continuity) ∀x ∈ X , if L′[x] ≤ L[x] then ∃λ s.t. L′ ∼ 〈λ/L, 1/X〉.
Furthermore, in [36] they have provided an improved axiomatic system for the optimistic
utility by resuming axioms A1 and A4 that are the same as the pessimistic case, replacing Axiom
A3− by Axiom A3+ and finally providing an optimistic counterpart of Axiom A6−’ such as:
Axiom. (A6+’: Continuity) ∀x ∈ X , ∀L[x], ∃λ ∈ [0, 1] s.t. L[x] ∼ 〈λ/u>, 1/u⊥〉. Where u>
and u⊥are respectively the best and the worst utility.
Considering those axioms, the representation theorem relative to the optimistic utility is de-
fined as the following [30, 36]:
Theorem 2.2. If a preference relation  on L satisfies axioms A1 . . . A6+ (or axioms A1, A3+,
A4 and A6+’) then there exists a possibility distribution π: S 7→ [0, 1] and a utility function u:
L 7→ [0, 1] such that:
L  L′ iff Uopt(L) ≥ Uopt(L′). (2.17)
Axiomatization in the style of Savage
Axiomatization of Upes in the style of Savage
As mentioned before, in Savage framework, preference relations are defined over acts rather than
lotteries. In this context, Dubois et al. have provided an axiomatic system for Upes [34, 35].
Considering a set of acts F and a set of consequences X , this axiomatic system is defined by the
following axioms:
CHAPTER 2. DECISION MAKING UNDER POSSIBILISTIC UNCERTAINTY 26
Axiom. (Sav1: Complete pre-order) The preference relation  is reflexive, complete and transi-
tive.
Axiom. (Sav5: Non triviality) ∃ f, g ∈ F , such that f  g.
These axioms are the same axioms proposed by Savage. However, authors have proposed a
weak version of Axiom Sav3 defined by:
Axiom. (WSav3: Weak coherence with constant acts) For any not null event E ⊆ S, fx and gy
two constant acts, then fx E gy ⇒ fxEh  gyEh, ∀h ∈ F .
Besides, authors have proposed two additional axioms reflecting the decision maker behavior.
Axiom. (RDD: Restricted disjunctive dominance) Let f and g be any two acts and a constant
act fx of value x: f  g and f  fx ⇒ f  g ∨ fx (where g ∨ fx gives the best of the results of
g(s) and fx(s) in each state s).
Axiom. (Pes: Pessimism) ∀f, g ∈ F and any event E ⊆ S. If fEg  f then f  gEf .
Axiom RDD is interpreted as follows: if an act f is preferred to an act g and also preferred to
a constant act fx, then f still preferred to g even if the worst consequences of g are improved to the
value x. Axiom Pes implies that if changing f into g may improve the expectation of act f when
¬E occurs then there is no way to improve the act by changing f into g when E occurs. On the
basis of this axiomatic system, [34, 35] have proposed a representation theorem of the pessimistic
utility as follows:
Theorem 2.3. If a preference relation on acts satisfies the axioms Sav1, Sav5, WSav3, RDD
and Pes then there exists a utility function u: X 7→ [0, 1] and a possibility distribution π: S 7→
[0, 1] such that ∀f, g ∈ F:
f  g iff Upes(f) ≥ Upes(g). (2.18)
Axiomatization of Uopt in the style of Savage
The axiomatic system of Uopt in the context of Savage shares some axioms with its pessimistic
counterpart namely: axioms Sav1, Sav5 and WSav3. The remaining axioms are:
Axiom. (RCD: Restricted conjunctive dominance) Let f and g be any two acts and [x] be a
constant act of value x: g  f and fx  f ⇒ g ∧ fx  f (where g ∧ fx gives the worst of the
results of g(s) and fx(s) in each state s).
Axiom. (Opt: Optimism) ∀f, g ∈ F and E ⊆ S. If f  fEg then gEf  f .
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Axiom RCD is the dual property of the restricted disjunctive dominance. It allows a partial
decomposability of qualitative utility with respect to the conjunction of acts in the case where one
of them is constant. Axiom Opt implies that changing f into g does not improve the expectation
of act f when ¬E occurs. However, we can form a better act by changing f into g when E occurs.
Using the axioms presented above, Dubois and Prade [34, 35] have proposed the following
representation theorem of optimistic utility:
Theorem 2.4. If a preference relation on acts satisfies axioms Sav1, Sav5,WSav3,RCD and
Opt then there exists a utility function u: X 7→ [0, 1] and a possibility distribution π: S 7→ [0, 1]
such that ∀f, g ∈ F:
f  g iff Uopt(f) ≥ Uopt(g). (2.19)
Note that in [12], Dubois et al. have proposed to replace axioms RCD and RDD by a non-
compensation assumption defined as follows:
Axiom. (NC: Non Compensation) Whatever E ⊆ S, fx, gy ∈ F:{
h>Egy ∼ gy or h>Egy ∼ h>Eh⊥
fxEh⊥ ∼ fx or fxEh⊥ ∼ h>Eh⊥
where h> (resp. h⊥) is the constant act that gives always the best (resp. worst) consequence >
(resp. ⊥).
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented an overview of possibility theory that offers a flexible and simple
framework to represent uncertainty as well as the main possibilistic decision rules. We especially
investigated qualitative utilities (Uopt and Upes) and their axiomatic systems in both VNM and
Savage frameworks.
As mentioned before, these criteria present the qualitative counter part of the expected utility
model and constitute the groundwork of our contribution (Part 2). We have chosen these decision
rules among others because we are interested to make decisions in a purely ordinal context and
assuming a certain form of commensurability between the plausibility and the utility scales. Be-
sides, these criteria have received a solid axiomatic justification that guarantee the rationality of
the decision making process considering the decision maker attitude.
CHAPITRE 3
Collective Decision Making
3.1 Introduction
A Multi-Agent System (MAS) includes several entities (called agents) interacting within a com-
mon environment. An agent can be a virtual or physical autonomous entity such as software
programs, robots, or human beings. Each interacts with others in order to meet preset goals or
objectives according to available resources and skills. This paradigm describes many situations in
real world problems, especially, collective decision making where decisions involves a group of
agents instead of a single one.
In this context, the main issue is how to make a decision that satisfies everybody. However,
decision theory as presented in the previous chapters appears inappropriate to answer this question.
So, it was necessary to provide an extension of this discipline to be able to handle not only the
preferences of one decision maker but all concerned ones. Hence, the development of collective
decision theory.
This chapter focuses on the basics of collective decision theory and especially on Harsanyi’s
theorem and works relative to social choice theory. The remaining of this chapter is structured
as follows: Section 3.2 defines utilitarian and egalitarian collective utility functions. Section 3.3
details Harsanyi’s theorem regarding collective decision making under risk, in the style of VNM’s
expected utility framework. Finally, Section 3.4 is devoted to study the main proposed extensions
and criticisms relative to Harsanyi’s theory.
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3.2 Collective utility functions
In collective decision problems, we suppose that agents are able to express their satisfaction over
alternatives by a cardinal or ordinal preference relation. Then, the collective utility function (CUF)
is the result of aggregating individual preferences (see [73] for more details).
Formally, we define a collective decision problem by a set A = {1, . . . , p} of agents, where
each agent i ∈ A is supposed to express his preferences on a set of consequences X, by a ranking
function or a utility function ui that associates to each element of X a value in a subset of R+
(typically in the interval [0, 1]). Thus to solve this problem, we need to define for each x ∈ X a
collective utility degree that reflects the collective preference.
When the collective preference depends only on individual utilities, it can be obtained by a
collective utility function of the form Agg(x) = f(u1(x), . . . , up(x)).
Utilitarian collective utility functions
Classical utilitarian utility theory prescribes that the best decisions are those which maximize the
sum of individual utilities [45,73]. This collective utility function that is also known as Benthamite
social welfare function can be defined as follows:
Definition 3.1. Given a set of agents A, a consequence x ∈ X and a set of utility functions ui(x),
where ui(x) is the utility of x according to agent i, the additive collective utility function Aggsum
is defined by:
Aggsum(x) = Σ
i∈A
ui(x) (3.1)
In the case where agents don’t have the same importance (e.g. in an administration board or
direction committee), an importance degree or a weight wi is associated to each i where the agent
where the highest weight is the most important. This leads to the use of a weighted sum:
Aggsum(x) = Σ
i∈A
wi × ui(x) (3.2)
Example 3.1. Consider a consequence x ∈ X and two agents 1 and 2 where the utility of x
relative to each agent is respectively u1(x) = 0.4 and u2(x) = 0.3. When agents have the same
importance, their collective utilitarian utility can be computed using Equation 3.1 as follows:
Aggsum(x) = 0.4 + 0.3 = 0.7.
However in the case where agents are not equally important, example agent 1 is more important
than agent 2 with w1 = 0.5 and w2 = 0.2. The collective weighted utilitarian utility is performed
using Equation 3.2 as follows: Aggsum(x) = 0.4× 0.5 + 0.3× 0.2 = 0.26.
This function has several good properties [49, 55] but fails to ensure equity between agents.
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Egalitarian collective utility functions
Contrary to the utilitarian approach, the egalitarian approach proposes to maximize the satisfaction
of the least satisfied agent. This collective utility function is defined by:
Definition 3.2. Given a set of agents A, a consequence x ∈ X and a set of utility functions ui(x),
where ui(x) is the utility of x according to agent i, the egalitarian utility function is defined by:
Aggmin(x) = min
i∈A
ui(x) (3.3)
When the agents are not equally important, a weight wi can be associated to each agent i. The
collective utility is then defined in a conjunctive (cautious) way using a weighted minimum:
Aggmin(x) = min
i∈A
max((1− wi), ui(x)) (3.4)
Example 3.2. Consider a consequence x ∈ X and two agents 1 and 2 where the utility of x
relative to each agent is respectively u1(x) = 0.4 and u2(x) = 0.3. When these agents have the
same importance, the egalitarian utility function can be computed using Equation 3.3 as follows:
Aggmin(x) = min (0.4 , 0.3) = 0.3.
In the case where agents are not equally important, example agent 1 is more important than agent
2 such that w1 = 0.5 and w2 = 0.2, the weighted egalitarian utility can be computed using
Equation 3.4 such that:
Aggmin(x) = min(max((1− 0.5), 0.4),max((1− 0.2), 0.3)) = 0.5.
Notice that a non-egalitarian (max oriented) counterpart of the egalitarian utility can be used
to aggregate agents’ preferences using a disjunctive aggregation. This collective utility function
can be defined for the case when agents have same importance (Equation 3.5) as well as the case
when they are not equally important (Equation 3.6) as follows1:
Aggmax(x) = max
i∈A
ui(x) (3.5)
Aggmax(x) = max
i∈A
min(wi, ui(x)) (3.6)
3.3 Harsanyi’s Theorem and related concepts
In the presence of risk, i.e. when the information about states of nature is probabilistic, the most
popular criterion to compare decisions is the expected utility. In this context, an elementary deci-
sion is modeled by a probabilistic lottery over a set X of its possible outcomes. The preferences
1The min oriented and max oriented decision rules have received an interpretation in context of Multi-
criteria decision making to aggregate criteria rather than agents preferences [26].
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of the decision maker are supposed to be captured by a utility function assigning a numerical
value to each consequence. The evaluation of a lottery is performed through the computation of
its expected utility (the higher is the better).
When several agents are involved, the aggregation of individual preferences under risk raises
a particular problem depending on when the utility of the agents is to be evaluated, before or after
the consideration of uncertainty. This yields two different approaches that are the ex-ante and
ex-post aggregations.
ex-ante and ex-post aggregations
In collective decision making problem under risk, we have to specify the operator used to aggregate
the individual utilities: the sum operator for the utilitarian approach or the min in the case of
egalitarianism. However, it is necessary also to define the moment to consider uncertainty. Hence,
the definition of the ex-ante and ex-post approaches:
• The ex-ante approach consists in computing separately the (EUi) expected utility for each
agent i considering the uncertainty and then perform the aggregation of these expected
utilities.
• The ex-post approach combines the decision makers utilities and determines the collective
utility function (CUF) for each consequence x by defining the collective utility Agg(x) and
then considers the uncertainty. It comes down to a problem of mono-agent decision making
under uncertainty (this agent being “the collectivity”).
This terminology has been introduced in economics and social welfare theory and then it has been
extended to several fields related to collective decision making such as cooperative multi-agent
system and especially Bayesian coalitional games [62].
Timing effect
In the probabilistic context, utilitarianism comes down to calculating either the collective expected
utility of each consequence (ex-ante), or the aggregation of the individual expected utilities (ex-
post) however both give exactly the same result. Egalitarianism prescribes to maximize either the
expectation of the minimum of the satisfaction degrees or to compute the minimum of the math-
ematical expectations. The two approaches do not always coincide: this phenomenon have been
identified by Myerson [74] as “Timing Effect" and it can be observed in the following counter-
example.
Counter-example 3.1. Consider two agents 1 and 2 and two lotteriesL1 andL2 onX = {x1, x2}
depicted in Figure 3.1. The probability degrees for consequence x1 (resp. x2) are respectively 0.7
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(resp 0.3) for L1 and 0.2 (resp 0.8) for L2. The utility functions relative to consequences x1
and x2 for agent 1 (resp. agent 2) are defined such that: u1(x1) = 0.3 and u1(x2) = 1 (resp.
u2(x1) = 0.5 and u2(x2) = 0.4).
The expected value of the minimum of the utilities are:
0.7×min(0.3, 0.5) + 0.3×min(1, 0.4) = 0.33 for L1
0.2×min(0.3, 0.5) + 0.8×min(1, 0.4) = 0.38 for L2
So ex-post, L2  L1.
On the contrary, using ex-ante, computing the minimum of the expected utilities leads to L1  L2,
since:
min(0.7× 0.3 + 0.3× 1, 0.7× 0.5 + 0.3× 0.4) = 0.47 for L1
min(0.2× 0.3 + 0.8× 1, 0.2× 0.5 + 0.8× 0.4) = 0.42 for L2.
0.7 
0.3 
x1 : <0.3, 0.5> 
L1 
x2 : <1, 0.4> 
0.2 
0.8 
x1 : <0.3, 0.5> 
L2 
x2 : <1, 0.4> 
Figure 3.1: Two probabilistic lotteries in a bi-agent context.
It has been proved that in the case of egalitarian decision making under risk, the size of the
problem may considerably affect the coincidence between ex-ante and ex-post aggregation [66].
In other words, the greater the number of uncertain states of the world is, more the possibility of
equity between the two approaches is rare.
Moreover, the author has proved in the same work that in an egalitarian context, the only way
to obtain equity between ex-ante and ex-post collective expected utilities is to consider that the
less satisfied agent is always the same and this for any consequence x ∈ X .
The timing effect is not present in the probabilistic utilitarian approach, it has been proved that
utilitarianism is the only way to avoid this problem in presence of risk. This conclusion is due to
Harsanyi’s contribution to social welfare theory [59], that has pervaded the literature until now.
This result and related work are the subject of the remaining of this chapter.
Harsanyi’s representation theorem
Following Fleming [43], Harsanyi provided a representation theorem for collective decision mak-
ing in the context of Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility theory [59]. This theorem
is often interpreted as a justification of utilitarianism and it is based on three fundamental axioms,
detailed in the following.
Axiom. (Hars1) The preference relation of each agent i over lotteries satisfies Von Neumann and
Morgenstern’s axioms.
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This axiom summarizes VNM’s assumptions relative to expected utility for each individual
utility ui(x) and enforces the representation of individual preferences by expected utilities.
Axiom. (Hars2) The collective preference relation satisfies also Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
axioms.
Axiom Hars2 requires, again, the use of expected utility to represent the preference relation of
the collectivity.
In addition to these two axioms, Harsanyi imposes another condition relating collective pref-
erences to individual ones, which is Pareto indifference axiom.
Axiom. (PI: Pareto Indifference) If two decisions are indifferent for each agent they are considered
as collectively indifferent.
In [59], Harsanyi has shown that if the three assumptions (axioms Hars1, Hars2 and PI) are
satisfied by individual as well as collective preferences i.e. (i) the collective preference satisfies
Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s axioms, (ii) the preferences of each agent also satisfy these
axioms, and (iii) if two lotteries are indifferent for each agent they are considered as collectively
indifferent (Pareto indifference axiom), then the only appropriate collective utility function (CUF)
is the utilitarian one.
Theorem 3.1. If axioms Hars1, Hars2 and PI are satisfied by the collective preference relation as
well as individual ones and considering anonymity, there exists a set of individual utilities ui(x)
relative to a consequence x ∈ X and weights λi ∈ R such that:
Agg(x) =
∑
i∈A
λi × ui(x) (3.7)
Under the assumption of anonymity, Harsanyi proved that Agg(x) can be written as the sum
of individual utilities (Agg(x) = ∑
i∈A
ui(x)). On the basis of Harsanyi’s results, Myerson [74]
has proved that in presence of risk only the use of an affine collective aggregation function allows
to overcome the Timing Effect problem. Conversely; in the probabilistic case; any attempt to
introduce equity causes a divergence between the ex-post and ex-ante approaches.
3.4 Beyond Harsanyi’s theorem
Many researches have surrounded Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem by proposing several variants
and criticisms. The main related works are detailed in the following.
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Extension of Harsanyi’s theorem
Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem has been questioned w.r.t. weights λi defined in Equation 3.7.
In the initial contribution, these weights are not necessary positive. This problem was naturally
solved by strengthening Pareto Indifference [19] into Strong Pareto condition that is defined by:
Axiom. (SP: Strong Pareto) If each agent weakly prefers L1 to L2 (∀j 6= i,L1 j L2) and at least
one of them strictly prefers L1 to L2 (L1 i L2) then the collectivity strictly prefers lottery L1 to
L2 (L1  L2).
Moreover, the problem of negative weights can also be solved using a weak version of Pareto
(i.e. Weak Pareto axiom) defined as follows:
Axiom. (WP: Weak Pareto) If each agent weakly prefers L1 to L2 (∀i,L1 i L2) then the collec-
tivity weakly prefers lottery L1 to L2 (L1  L2).
Further, Fishburn [42] and Coulhon and Mongin [18] pointed out that weights may be not
uniquely defined. In order to solve this problem, Mongin et al. [69] have proposed the following
Independent Prospects assumption as an additional condition to ensure uniqueness.
Axiom. (Independent Prospects) For every agent i there exists a pair of lotteries for which he is
not indifferent.
Although, Domotor [22] and Border [11] have considered that this condition is unnecessary
and that it is implicitly used as structural assumption by Harsanyi.
Since its emergence a panoply of works have been proposed to extend Harsanyi’s Theorem,
more recent ones are [15, 44, 47] that have been developed to confirm Harsanyi’s approach and to
extend it to deal with the case of an infinite population or agents with incomplete information.
Criticisms and impossibility results
Diamond [20] was the first to challenge Harsanyi’s result, and especially the use of the VNM
expected utility to express the collective preference. He proposed to abandon VNM’s expected
utility axioms in favor of the egalitarianism. He illustrated his argumentation on the basis of this
classical example:
Example 3.3. Consider two agents 1 and 2, and two equally probable situations; say tossing a
fair coin. Let L and L′ two probabilistic lotteries (presented in Figure 3.2) describing two cases:
In the first case (lottery L), whatever the result of tossing, agent 1 gets everything and agent 2 gets
nothing. In the other case, agent 1 gets everything if head and agent 2 gets everything if tails.
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L2
0.5
0.5
head : < €€ , 0 >
tail : < 0 , €€ >
L1
0.5
0.5
head : < €€ , 0 >
tail : < €€ , 0 >
Figure 3.2: Example of Diamond [20]
Considering Harsanyi’s axioms these two decisions are equivalent, and the ex-ante and ex-
post aggregations give the same results. In fact, for the ex-ante aggregation we have:
U(L1) = [0.5× (ee +0)] + [0.5× (ee +0)] =ee
U(L2) = [0.5× (ee +0)] + [0.5× (0+ee)] =ee
The same result is also obtained using the ex-post aggregation such that:
U(L1) = [(0.5×ee) + (0.5× 0)] + [(0.5×ee) + (0.5× 0)] =ee
U(L2) = [(0.5×ee) + (0.5× 0)] + [(0.5× 0) + (0.5×ee)] =ee
However, from an ethical point of view lottery L2 is better than L1 because in L1, for any situation
(head or tail) agent 1 gets every thing U1(L1) =ee and U2(L1) = 0. While, in L2 each agent
can have half reward U1(L2) = U2(L2) =e.
Diamond pointed out this problem and deduced from this example that social preference may
violate axiom Hars2, and more precisely the independence axiom of VNM’s approach.
The Harsanyi-Diamond debate about the compelling nature of expected utility theory for col-
lective decision making spawned a large literature. Besides, researchers were also motivated by
the notion of subjective beliefs, that is more realistic. So, they gave up the VNM’s expected utility
in favor of subjective expected theory.
Hylland and Zeckhauser [61], Hammond [58], Broome [13], Seidenfeld et al. [84], Mon-
gin [69], many others and recently [1] have followed this line. All these works have provided
the same conclusion i.e. the aggregation of individual preferences into a collective subjective ex-
pected utility is not so easy to perform. In fact, replacing VNM’s formalism with a subjective one
and assuming that individuals as well as the collectivity obey subjective expected utility axioms
while considering the Pareto condition, may lead to a negative result. In other words, when indi-
viduals are simultaneously heterogeneous in terms of tastes and beliefs, imposing the satisfaction
of subjective utility axioms for collective as well as individual preference relations leads to an
impossibility result [71].
To meet this challenge, Weymark [94] and Mongin [69] have provided variants of Harsanyi’s
theorem using subjective probabilities instead of VNM lotteries. But, these works are relevant
only under the assumption that all the agents have the same beliefs, i.e. same probabilities which
is a strong hypothesis.
The negative results are generally obtained due to technical assumptions considering subjec-
tive uncertainty. More recent works, have founded their arguments on the incompatibility between
Pareto properties and axioms related to the subjective expected uncertainty models. Authors like
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Broome [13], Gilboa, Samet and Schmeidler [53] condemn the Pareto property while others like
Chambers and Hayashi [14] have proved, following Savage’s axiomatization, that Sav3 and Sav4
are not compelling at a social level.
Despite their differences, the common conclusion of all these works is that it is impossible
to perform the aggregation of social preferences under probabilistic uncertainty rather than risk,
except for some special cases where all agents have the same probabilities and/or same utility
functions [3, 69]. Making a step further, Gajdos, Tallon and Vergnaud [46] have shown that even
by considering agents sharing homogenous beliefs, the collective aggregation cannot be proceeded
unless an additional assumption defining individuals as well as society as uncertainty neutral.
In addition to this impossibility result [13,14,53], it has been proved that the use of the subjec-
tive framework leads to a gap between results obtained using ex-ante or ex-post aggregations. The
choice of the former or the latter is until now controversial and it constitutes an attractive subject
for future research.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented the problem of collective decision making, especially aggre-
gating decision makers’ preferences, in presence of probabilistic uncertainty. We have presented
the Harsanyi’s Theorem which proves that the weighted sum of individual expected utilities is the
only way to avoid the difference between ex-ante and ex-post aggregation in presence of risk.
We have also considered collective aggregation in subjective frameworks of expected utilities:
It appears that the majority of these studies have concluded to the existence of an impossibility
result considering agents with subjective beliefs. However, it has been shown that it is possible to
define a representation theorem by relaxing some constraints i.e. supposing that agents have same
knowledge or same utilities.
CHAPITRE 4
Sequential decision making and decision trees
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, we have been interested only in situations where just one decision has
to be taken (one-stage decision making problems). However, in real world problems the decision
maker is often facing a succession of decisions to be taken over time, i.e. sequential decision
problems.
Graphical decision models such as decision trees [78], influence diagrams [60], Valuation
Based Systems [86] and Markov decision process [5], offer a clear description of sequential de-
cision problems that allow an easy definition of optimal strategies. Within existing models, we
are particularly interested to the most known models namely decision trees (DT s). This graphical
representation is intuitive and constitutes a simple tool to represent decision problems at hand.
This formalism is the core of this chapter that is organized as follows: In Section 4.2, we define
the graphical and numerical (probabilistic and possibilistic) components of decision trees. Then,
we detail the optimization of these graphical models with regards to a probabilistic quantification
of uncertainty in Section 4.3 and considering the possibilistic representation in Section 4.4.
4.2 Definition of decision trees (DT and ΠDT )
The most popular graphical decision model is the decision tree (DT ) proposed by Raiffa in 1968
[78]. These models encode the structure of the problem and represent all possible scenarios by
several paths from the root to leaves of the tree. DT s are defined using a graphical component and
a numerical one as detailed in what follows.
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Graphical component
A graphical component of a decision tree T is composed of a set of nodesN and a set of edges E .
The set of nodes is partitioned into three subsets C, D and LN :
• C = {C1...Cn} is a set of chance nodes which represent states of the world. Chance nodes
are depicted by circles.
• D = {D1...Dm} is the set of decision nodes which represent decision options, or alterna-
tives. They are depicted by rectangles and the label of each decision node is coherent with
its temporal order i.e. if Di is a descendant of Dj , then i > j.
• LN = {LN1...LNk} is a set of leaves in the tree, they are called also utility leaves since
they represent utilities: ∀LNi ∈ LN, u(LNi) is the utility of being eventually in the node
LNi. In decision trees, leaves have no particular representation.
The root node is generally a decision node, denoted by D0. Let Ni be a node that belongs to
N :
• ΩNi denotes the set of possible values of the node Ni.
• Par(Ni) denotes the set of parents of Ni, its predecessors.
• Succ(Ni) denotes the set of direct successors of Ni, its children. If Ni is a decision node
Ni = Di ∈ D, Succ(Di) ⊂ C i.e. a decision node is followed by chance nodes. If Ni is
a chance node Ni = Ci ∈ C, Succ(Ci) ⊂ D ∪ LN , i.e. Succ(Ci) is the set of outcomes
of Ci: either a leaf node is observed, or a decision node is reached (and then a new action
should be executed). Leave nodes do not have successors.
A scenario (or “trajectory") is complete sequence of actions and observations that represents a
path from the root to a leaf. The size |T | of a decision tree is the number of its edges which is
equal to the number of its nodes minus 1.
Numerical component
The numerical component of decision trees consists on assigning utility values to leave nodes and
labeling the edges outgoing from chance nodes. The quantification of the decision tree, i.e. the
numerical component, depends essentially on the nature of uncertainty pertaining the problem and
the theory used to represent it. In its classical version, decision trees are probabilistic. Hence,
the uncertainty degrees following each Ci ∈ C are represented by a conditional probability dis-
tribution pi on Succ(Ci), such that ∀Ni ∈ Succ(Ci), pi(Ni) = P (Ci|Par(Ci)). The value of pi
CHAPTER 4. SEQUENTIAL DECISION MAKING AND DECISION TREES 39
depends in the values assigned to decision and chance nodes that depict the path from the root to
Ci.
With the development of uncertainty theories, decision trees have been adapted to deal with
other uncertainty models than the probabilistic one. Among these variants, we cite the possibilistic
decision trees (ΠDT ) that propose to model uncertainty according to possibility theory [48].
Possibilistic decision models share the same graphical component as the classical probabilistic
ones; namely a set of Chance nodesC, a set of decision nodesD, a set of leave nodes LN and a set
of edges connecting these nodes. However, the numerical component is different. In fact, in ΠDT s
the uncertainty pertaining to the possible outcome of each Ci ∈ C, is defined by a conditional
possibility distribution πi on Succ(Ci), such that ∀N ∈ Succ(Ci), πi(Ci) = Π(Ci|path(Ci))
where path(Ci) denotes all the value assignments to chance and decision nodes on the path from
the root to Ci. The utility value assigned to each leaf can be numerical (e.g. a currency gain) or
ordinal (e.g. a satisfaction degree).
Example 4.1. Figure 4.1 depicts an example of a probabilistic (a) and a possibilistic (b) de-
cision tree. The two models share the same graphical component with three decision nodes
D = {D0, D1, D2}, six chance nodes C = {C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6} and ten leave nodes C =
{LN1, LN2, LN3, LN4, LN5, LN6, LN7, LN8, LN9, LN10} with U = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}.
However, the uncertainty degrees pertaining to chance nodes are defined with probability distri-
butions in (a) and possibility distributions in (b).
Do
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
D1
D2
0.8
0.2
0.6
0.7
0.9
0.5
0.5
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.1
LN1 (u = 0.3)
Do
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
D1
D2
1
0.3
1
1
1
0.2
1
1
0.3
0.4
0.6
0.2
(a) (b)
LN2 (u = 0.2)
LN3 (u = 0.1)
LN4 (u = 0.4)
LN5 (u = 0.3)
LN6 (u = 0.2)
LN7 (u = 0.1)
LN8 (u = 0.4)
LN9 (u = 0.5)
LN10 (u = 0.3)
LN1 (u = 0.3)
LN2 (u = 0.2)
LN3 (u = 0.1)
LN4 (u = 0.4)
LN5 (u =0. 3)
LN6 (u = 0.2)
LN7 (u = 0.1)
LN8 (u = 0.4)
LN9 (u = 0.5)
LN10 (u = 0.3)
Figure 4.1: Example of a probabilistic decision tree (a) and a possibilistic decision tree
(b).
CHAPTER 4. SEQUENTIAL DECISION MAKING AND DECISION TREES 40
4.3 Strategy optimization problem
Solving a decision tree amounts to building a strategy that selects an action (i.e. a chance node) for
each reachable decision node. Formally, we define a strategy as a function δ from D to C ∪ {⊥}.
δ(Di) is the action to be executed when a decision node Di is reached. δ(Di) = ⊥ means that no
action has been selected for Di (because either Di cannot be reached or the strategy is partially
defined). Admissible strategies should be:
• sound: ∀Di ∈ D, δ(Di) ∈ Succ(Di) ∪ {⊥}.
• complete: (i)δ(D0) 6= ⊥ and (ii)∀Di s.t. δ(Di) 6= ⊥,∀N ∈ Succ(δ(Di)), either δ(N) 6= ⊥
or N ∈ LN .
Let ∆ be the set of sound and complete strategies relative to a decision tree. Any strategy δ in
∆ can be seen as a connected sub-tree of the decision tree whose arcs are of the form (Di; δ(Di)).
The optimization of the decision tree amounts to finding the optimal strategy δ∗ within ∆ w.r.t a
decision criterion O. Formally, δ∗ is optimal iff ∀δi ∈ ∆ we have δ∗ O δi (i.e. δ∗ is preferred to
any strategy δi ∈ ∆ w.r.t. a decision criterion O).
Since leave nodes LN are labeled with utility degrees, chance node can be seen as a simple
probabilistic lottery (for the most right chance nodes) or as a compound lottery (for the inner
chance nodes). Then, each strategy δi can be seen as a compound lottery Li. So, for evaluating
and comparing different strategies, we can use the principle of lottery reduction and reduce each
compound lottery to an equivalent simple one.
In order to define the optimal strategy, we should be able to compare different strategies w.r.t
a decision criterion (O). Formally, a strategy δ∗ ∈ ∆, is said to be optimal w.r.t. O iff:
∀δ′ ∈ ∆, Reduction(δ∗) O Reduction(δ′). (4.1)
Example 4.2. The decision trees presented in Figure 4.1 contains 5 different strategies
i.e. ∆={δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4, δ5} where:
• δ1 : δ1(D0) = C1, δ1(D1) = C3, δ1(D2) = C5;
• δ2 : δ2(D0) = C1, δ2(D1) = C3, δ2(D2) = C6;
• δ3 : δ3(D0) = C1, δ3(D1) = C4, δ3(D2) = C5;
• δ4 : δ4(D0) = C1, δ4(D1) = C4, δ1(D2) = C6;
• δ5 : δ5(D0) = C2.
For the probabilistic decision tree (Figure 4.1 (a)), the strategy δ1 corresponds to the lottery
〈0.6/LC3 , 0.4/LC5〉 where LC3 = 〈0.8/1, 0.2/5〉 and LC5 = 〈0.7/1, 0.3/4〉. Then we have:
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Reduction(δ1) = 〈0.76/1, 0.12/4, 0.12/5〉.
For the possibilistic decision tree (Figure 4.1 (b)), the strategy δ1 corresponds to the lottery
〈1/LC3 , 0.5/LC5〉 where LC3 = 〈1/0.1, 0.2/0.5〉 and LC5 = 〈1/0.1, 0.3/0.4〉. The reduction
is performed as follows: Reduction(δ1) = 〈1/0.1, 0.3/0.4, 0.2/0.5〉.
The size |δ| of a strategy δ is the sum of its number of nodes and edges; it is obviously lower
than the size of the decision tree. Besides, the set of potential strategies is combinatorial (i.e., its
size increases exponentially with the size of the tree). In a decision tree with m decision nodes
and a branching factor equal to 2, the number of potential strategies is in O(2
√
m). Then, the
determination of an optimal strategy for a given representation and a given decision criterion is an
algorithmic issue.
Furthermore, the difficulty of the optimization problem depends on some properties of the
decision criterion O, especially the satisfaction of monotonicity (or weak monotonicity) and the
transitivity properties that are respectively defined as follows:
Definition 4.1. A preference order is said to be transitive iff whatever L, L′, L′′:
L O L′ and L′ O L′′ ⇒ L O L′′; (4.2)
L O L′ and L′ O L′′ ⇒ L O L′′; (4.3)
L ∼O L′ and L′ ∼O L′′ ⇒ L ∼O L′′. (4.4)
Definition 4.2. A preference order is said to be weakly monotonic iff whatever L, L′, L′′, whatever
(α, β) such that max(α, β) = 1:
L O L′ ⇒ 〈α/L, β/L′′〉 O 〈α/L′, β/L′′〉 (4.5)
The transitivity is interpreted as follows: if exists a preference relation between two lotteries
L and L′ w.r.t a decision criterion and the same relation exists between L′ and L′′ then this relation
is also preserved between L and L′′. Weak Monotonicity states that the combination of L (resp.
L′) with L′′, does not change the initial order induced by O between L and L′. The satisfaction of
these properties, is a necessary condition the use of dynamic programming Algorithm.
4.4 Optimization of probabilistic decision trees: Dynamic
programming
Finding the optimal strategy in a decision tree may be performed via an exhaustive enumeration
of ∆, that is a highly computational task. As an alternative method, Bellman proposed a recursive
method; the so called Dynamic Programming algorithm; that builds the best strategy backwards,
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from leaves of the tree to its root [4]. However, the use of this algorithm is appealing only when
the criterion to maximize is transitive and monotonic.
The optimization of standard probabilistic decision trees [78] amounts to maximizing the ex-
pected utility criterion (detailed in Section 1.2). Since the latter satisfies the monotonicity and
transitivity properties, an optimal strategy can be computed in polytime with respect to the size of
the tree using Dynamic programming algorithm (denoted by DynProg).
The principle of the backward reasoning procedure can be described as follows: when a chance
nodeC is reached, an optimal sub-strategy is built for each of its children. These sub-strategies are
combined w.r.t. their uncertainty degrees. Then, the resulting compound strategy is reduced to an
equivalent simple lottery representing the current optimal sub-strategy. When a decision nodeD is
reached, we select a decision D∗ among all the possible ones D ∈ Succ(X) leading to an optimal
sub-strategy w.r.t. O. The choice is performed by comparing the simple lotteries equivalent to
each sub-strategy.
This principle is implemented by Algorithm (Line 2). Line (2) performs the comparison of two
simple (probabilistic) lotteries according to the criterion O to optimize that is the expected utility
(EU). These simple lotteries are the result of reduction performed in Line (1) where Succ(N) is
the set of successors ofN and γ is the probability of the current node. L[ui] defines the probability
degree to have the utility ui in the lottery L, ⊗ is the product operator and ⊕ is the sum operator.
Note that in the case of probabilistic decision tree (for the optimization of the expected utility
criterion) this algorithm performs in polytime and its complexity is polynomial w.r.t. the size of
the tree.
4.5 Optimization of possibilistic decision trees
The evaluation of a possibilistic decision tree, like the probabilistic one consists in finding the
optimal strategy δ∗ within ∆. As mentioned before, the optimization depends on the properties of
the decision criterion O. If this criterion verifies the crucial properties of weak monotonicity and
transitivity, an optimal strategy can be computed in polytime with respect to the size of the tree
using the recursive method of Dynamic programming.
Such properties are satisfied by the qualitative possibilistic decision rules Uopt, Upes and PU
(they are monotonic and transitive). Thus, just like the case of the optimization of the expected
utility, Algorithm (Line 2) may be used to obtain an optimal strategy in a possibilistic decision
tree. In Line 1, the algorithm computes the reduction of the possibilistic lottery according to
scale of evaluation: γ is the possibility measure for Uopt and PU and the necessity measure for
Upes, ⊕ is the max operator and ⊗ is the min operator. Line (2) allows the comparison of simple
(probabilistic) lotteries according to the criterionO to optimize. Then, for these criteria the optimal
strategy can be built in polytime in a recursive manner.
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Algorithm 1: DynProg(N :Node, δ: Strategy)
Data: O is the criterion to optimize.
Result: A lottery L
begin
// Initialization
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do L[ui]← 0;
// Leaves
if N ∈ LN then L[u(N)]← 1;
// Chance nodes
if N ∈ C then
// Reduce the compound lottery
foreach Y ∈ Succ(N) do
LY ← DynProg(Y, δ);
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
(Line 1) L[ui]← ⊕(L[ui], (⊗(γN(Y ), LY [ui])));
// Probabilistic lottery: ⊗ = product, ⊕ = sum
// Possibilistic lottery: ⊗ = min, ⊕ = max
// Decision nodes
if N ∈ D then
// Choose the best decision
Y ∗ ← Succ(N).f irst;
foreach Y ∈ Succ(N) do
LY ← DynProg(Y, δ);
(Line 2) if LY O LY ∗ then Y ∗ ← Y ;
δ(N)← Y ∗;
L← LY ∗;
return L;
For possibilistic likely dominance criteria which are monotonic but not fully transitive, an
Extended Dynamic Programming algorithm (ExtDynProg) can be efficiently applied [64]. Finally,
concerning possibilistic Choquet integrals that are not monotonic, the optimization problem is NP-
hard and a Branch and bound algorithm (BB) has been proposed for binary possibilistic decision
trees [9]. A detailed theoretical study on the problem of finding an optimal strategy in possibilistic
decision trees has been proposed in [9,38]. The main results of this study are summarized in table
4.1.
Example 4.3. Let us consider the decision tree in Figure 4.1 (b). The optimal strategy relative
to this possibilistic decision w.r.t. Uopt returned by Dynamic Programing (Algorithm (Line 2)) is
highlighted by bold lines in Figure 4.2, where:
δ∗ : δ∗(D0) = C1, δ∗(D1) = C4, δ∗(D2) = C6.
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Criterion O Weak monotonicity Transitivity Algorithm Complexity
Upes Yes Yes DynProg P
Uopt Yes Yes DynProg P
PU Yes Yes DynProg P
OMEU Yes Yes DynProg P
LN Yes No ExtDynProg P
LΠ Yes No ExtDynProg P
ChN No Yes BB NP-hard
ChΠ No Yes BB NP-hard
Table 4.1: Optimization of possibilistic criteria
Do
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
D1
D2
1
0.3
1
1
1
0.2
1
1
0.3
0.4
0.6
0.2
LN1 (u = 0.3)
LN2 (u = 0.2)
LN3 (u = 0.1)
LN4 (u = 0.4)
LN5 (u = 0.3)
LN6 (u = 0.2)
LN7 (u =0. 1)
LN8 (u = 0.4)
LN9 (u = 0.5)
LN10 (u = 0.3)
Figure 4.2: The optimal strategy δ∗(D0) = C1, δ∗(D1) = C4, δ∗(D2) = C6.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have recalled the foundations of sequential decision problems i.e. evaluating
strategies in probabilistic as well as possibilistic decision trees. After defining standard decision
trees, we have exposed a more recent version of this model that are possibilistic decision trees.
This graphical model, allows a natural and explicit model to handle sequential decision problems
where uncertainty and utility degrees are possibilistic. Then, we focused on finding an optimal
strategy w.r.t. the decision criterion and its properties.
The most naive solving method is exhaustive enumeration of all possible strategies to find the
best one. However, given a large number of strategies in big decision trees, this method becomes
intractable. As alternative, we can use a Dynamic Programming algorithm for probabilistic deci-
sion trees (EU criterion) as well as possibilistic decision trees where the criterion to optimize is
transitive and monotonic i.e. for Upes, Uopt and PU . For these criteria the optimal strategy can be
built in polytime w.r.t. the size of the tree. For other decision rules that are not monotonic and/or
not transitive more complex procedures have to be performed.
Part II
Contributions
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CHAPITRE 5
Collective possibilistic decision making approach
5.1 Introduction
This chapter raises the question of collective decision making under possibilistic uncertainty. We
propose a new qualitative decision rules to solve such problems depending on the decision makers’
attitude with respect to uncertainty (i.e. optimistic or pessimistic) as well as the method performed
to aggregate the decision makers’ preferences relative to the different consequences; four ex-ante
and four ex-post decision rules are defined and investigated.
We show that in context of a possibilistic representation of uncertainty, the use of an egali-
tarian collective utility function allows to get rid of the Timing Effect. Making a step further, we
prove that if both the agents’ preferences and the collective ranking of the decisions satisfy Pareto
Unanimity and Dubois and Prade’s axioms [30], particularly risk aversion, then the egalitarian col-
lective aggregation is compulsory. This result can be seen as an ordinal counterpart of Harsanyi’s
theorem [59]. The picture is then completed by the proposition and the characterization of an
optimistic counterpart of this pessimistic decision rule.
The next Section develops our proposition, defining four ex-ante and four ex-post aggrega-
tions, and shows that when the decision rules are either fully min-oriented or fully max-oriented,
the ex-ante and the ex-post possibilistic aggregations provide the same result. Section 5.3 ex-
poses our axiomatization system relative to the egalitarian pessimistic decision rule and propose
our representation theorem. Finally, Section 5.4 presents a variant of this theorem adapted to the
optimistic case.
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5.2 Definition and properties of collective possibilistic de-
cision rules
Harsanyi’s theorem previously presented in Section 3.3 is strongly related to uncertainty modeling
and is efficient only in a probabilistic view of uncertainty. In a possibilistic context, given a set
X of consequences, a set A of agents we define a collective decision problem under possibilistic
uncertainty as triplet 〈L, ~w, ~u〉1 where:
• L is a set of possibilistic lotteries;
• ~w ∈ [0, 1]p is a weighting vector: wi denotes the weight of agent i;
• ~u = 〈u1, . . . , up〉 is a vector of p utility functions on X: ui(xj) ∈ [0, 1] is the utility of xj
according to agent i;
Our aim is to compare lotteries according to decision maker’s preferences relative to their dif-
ferent consequences (captured by the utility functions) and the importance of each agent (captured
by the weighting vector). To do this, we can proceed in two different ways namely ex-ante or
ex-post:
• The ex-ante aggregation consists in computing the (optimistic or pessimistic) utilities rela-
tive to each agent i, and then perform the aggregation (U+ orU−) using the agent’s weights.
• The ex-post aggregation consists in first determining the aggregated utilities (Aggmax or
Aggmin) relative to each possible consequence xj of L and then combine them with the
possibility degrees.
In the possibilistic framework, the decision maker’s attitude with respect to uncertainty can be
either optimistic (U+) or pessimistic (U−) and the aggregation of the agents preferences can be
either conjunctive, egalitarian (Aggmin) or disjunctive, non egalitarian (Aggmax), hence the defi-
nition of four approaches of CDM under uncertainty, namely U+max, U+min, U−max and U−min;
the first (resp. the second) sign denoting the attitude of the decision maker w.r.t. uncertainty (resp.
agents preferences aggregation) [6].
Each of these utility functions can be computed either ex-ante or ex-post. Hence the definition
of eight utilities:
1Classical problems of decision under possibilistic uncertainty are recovered when |A| = 1 ; Classical
collective decision making problems are recovered when all the lotteries in L associate possibility 1 to some
xi and possibility 0 to all the other elements of X: L is identified to X , i.e. is a set of “alternatives" for the
CDM problem.
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Definition 5.1. Given a possibilistic lottery L on X , a set of agents A, a vector of utility functions
~u and a weighting vector ~w, let:
U+maxante (L) = max
i∈A
min(wi,max
xj∈X
min(ui(xj), L[xj ])). (5.1)
U−minante (L) = min
i∈A
max((1− wi), min
xj∈X
max(ui(xj), (1− L[xj ]))). (5.2)
U+minante (L) = min
i∈A
max((1− wi),max
xj∈X
min(ui(xj), L[xj ])). (5.3)
U−maxante (L) = max
i∈A
min(wi, min
xj∈X
max(ui(xj), (1− L[xj ]))). (5.4)
U+maxpost (L) = max
xj∈X
min(L[xj ],max
i∈A
min(ui(xj), wi)). (5.5)
U−minpost (L) = min
xj∈X
max((1− L[xj ]),min
i∈A
max(ui(xj), (1− wi))). (5.6)
U+minpost (L) = max
xj∈X
min(L[xj ],min
i∈A
max(ui(xj), (1− wi))). (5.7)
U−maxpost (L) = min
xj∈X
max((1− L[xj ]),max
i∈A
min(ui(xj), wi)). (5.8)
It is obviously possible to define in the same way a series of utilitarian possibilistic utilities
(U−sumante , U
+sum
ante , etc.) and a series of max-oriented ones (U
−max
post , U
+ max
post , etc. ).
Example 5.1. As a matter of fact, consider two agents 1 and 2, the first one being less important
than the second (w1 = 0.6,w2 = 1), and the simple lotteriesL1, L2 onX = {x1, x2, x3} depicted
in Figure 5.1. Using the egalitarian aggregation we have:
L2
1
x3 : <0.8 ; 0.8>L1
1
0.9
x1 : <0.9 ; 0.1>
x2 : <0.1 ; 0.8>
Figure 5.1: Two bi-agent possibilistic lotteries.
• U−minpost (L1) = min(max(1− 0.6,min max(1− 1, 0.9),max(1− 0.9, 0.1)),
max(1− 1,min max(1− 1, 0.1),max(1− 0.9, 0.8)))
= 0.1
• U−minante (L1) = min(max(1− 1,min(max(1− 0.6, 0.9),max(1− 1, 0.1))),
max(1− 0.9,min(max(1− 0.6, 0.1),max(1− 1, 0.8))))
= 0.1
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• U+ minpost (L1) = min(max(1− 0.6,max(min(1, 0.9),min(0.9, 0.1))),
max(1− 1,max(min(1, 0.1),min(0.9, 0.8))))
= 0.8
• U+ minante (L1) = max(min(1,min(max(1− 0.6, 0.9),max(1− 1, 0.1))),
min(0.9,min(max(1− 0.6, 0.1),max(1− 1, 0.8))))
= 0.4
• U−minante (L2) = U−minpost (L2) = U+ minante (L2) = U+ minpost (L2) = 0.8.
The pessimistic aggregations are related to their optimistic counterparts by duality as stated
by the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. Let P = 〈L, ~w, ~u〉 be a qualitative decision problem, let P τ = 〈L, ~w, ~uτ 〉 be the
inverse problem, i.e. the problem such that for any xj ∈ X, i ∈ A, uτi (xj) = 1 − ui(xj). Then,
for any L ∈ L:
U+maxante (L) = 1− U τ−minante (L) U+maxpost (L) = 1− U τ−minpost (L)
U−minante (L) = 1− U τ+maxante (L) U−minpost (L) = 1− U τ+maxpost (L)
U+minante (L) = 1− U τ−maxante (L) U+minpost (L) = 1− U τ−maxpost (L)
U−maxante (L) = 1− U τ+minante (L) U−maxpost (L) = 1− U τ+minpost (L)
Proof of Proposition 5.1.
Let us show that U+ minante (L) = 1−U τ−maxante (L), (i.e. 1−U+ minpost (L) = U τ−maxpost (L)), other utilities
can be proved in the same way.
1− U+ minante (L) = 1− [min
i∈A
max((1− wi),max
x∈X
min(ui(x), L[x]))]
= max
i∈A
min(wi,min min
x∈X
max(1− ui(x), (1− L[x])))
= max
i∈A
min(wi,min
x∈X
max(uτi (x), (1− L[x])))
= U τ−maxante (L).
Interestingly it appears that the coincidence between ex-post and ex-ante approaches does not
imply utilitarianism. Indeed it is easy to show that:
Proposition 5.2.
U−minante (L) = U−minpost (L)
U+ maxante (L) = U+ maxpost (L)
Proof of Proposition 5.2.
In the following we provide the proof relative to decision ruleU−min. The proof relative toU+ max
can be deduced by replacing min by max, max by min, (1− L[x) by L[x] and (1− wi) by wi.
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U−minpost (L) = min
x∈X
max(1− L[x],min
i∈A
max(1− wi, ui(x)))
= min
x∈X
min
i∈A
max(1− L[x],max(1− wi, ui(x)))
= min
i∈A
min
x∈X
max(1− L[x],max(1− wi, ui(x)))
= min
i∈A
min
x∈X
max(1− wi,max(1− L[x], ui(x)))
= min
i∈A
max(1− wi,min
x∈X
max(1− L[x], ui(x)))
= U−minante (L)
We shall thus simply use the notation U−min (resp. U+ max) for the fully min-oriented (resp.
max-oriented) aggregation. Such a coincidence happens neither in the case of U+ min nor in
the case of U−max; with U+ minpost a lottery is good as soon as there exists a possible outcome
satisfying all the agents; with U+ minante (resp. U
−max
post ), a lottery is good when each agent forecasts
an outcome that is good for her (but it is not necessarily the same one for all): it may happen that
U+ minpost (L) < U+ minante (L) (resp. U−maxpost (L) < U−maxpost (L)), as shown by Counter-example 5.1.
Counter-example 5.1. Consider two equally important agents 1 and 2 (w1 = w2 = 1) and two
lotteries L and L′ (cf. Figure 5.2) relative to three totally possible consequences x1, x2 and x3
such that x1 is good for 1 and bad for 2, x2 is bad for 1 and good for 2 and x3 is average for
both agents i.e. L[x1] = L[x2] = L[x3] = 1, u1(x1) = u2(x2) = 1, u2(x1) = u1(x2) = 0 and
u1(x3) = u2(x3) = 0.5. We can check that U+minante (L) = 1 6= U+minpost (L) = 0:
L’
1
x3 : < 0.5 ; 0.5 >L
1
1
x1 : < 1 ; 0 >
x2 : < 0 ; 1 >
Figure 5.2: Lotteries L and L′ relative to counter-example 5.1
U+minante (L) = min(max((1− w1),max(min(u1(x1), L[x1]),min(u1(x2), L[x2]))),
max((1− w2),max(min(u2(x1), L[x1]),min(u2(x2), L[x2])))).
= min(max((1− 1),max(min(1, 1),min(0, 1))),
max((1− 1),max(min(0, 1),min(1, 1))))
= 1.
U+minpost (L) = max(min(L[x1],min(max(u1(x1), (1− w1)),max(u2(x1), (1− w2)))),
min(L[x2],min(max(u1(x2), (1− w1)),max(u2(x2), (1− w2))))).
= max(min(1,min(max(1, (1− 1)),max(0, (1− 1)))),
min(1,min(max(0, (1− 1)),max(1, (1− 1)))))
= 0.
The ex-ante and ex-post approaches may lead to different rankings of lotteries. Besides while
L′ presents a constant act, we can check that U+minante (L′) = U+minpost (L′) = 0.5.
So we can verify that U+minante (L) > U+minante (L′) while U+minpost (L) < U+minpost (L′).
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Using these same lotteries L and L′, we can show that:
U−maxante (L) = 0 6= U−maxpost (L) = 1 and thatU−maxante (L′) = U−maxpost (L′) = 0.5; thenU−maxpost (L′) <
U−maxpost (L) while U−maxante (L′) > U−maxante (L): like U+min, U−max are subject to the timing effect.
In summary, U−max and U+min suffer from the timing effect, but U−min and U+max do not.
It holds that:
Proposition 5.3.
U+ minante (L) ≥ U+ minpost (L)
U−maxante (L) ≤ U−maxpost (L)
Proof of Proposition 5.3.
Let us show that U+ minante (L) ≤ U+ minpost (L), the one relative to U−max can be obtained in the same
way.
Let u′i(x) = max(ui(x), 1− wi)
U+ minpost (L) = max
x∈X
min(L[x],min
i∈A
max(1− wi, ui(x)))
= max
x∈X
min(L[x],min
i∈A
u′i(x))
= max
x∈X
min
i∈A
min(L[x], u′i(x))
U+ minante (L) = min
i∈A
max(1− wi,max
x∈X
min(ui(x), L[x]))
= min
i∈A
max
x∈X
max(1− wi,min(ui(x), L[x]))
= min
i∈A
max
x∈X
min(max(1− wi, ui(x)), max(1− wi, L[x]))
= min
i∈A
max
x∈X
min(u′i(x),max(1− wi, L[x]))
Besides since, ∀x ∈ X , ∀i ∈ A, max(1− wi, L[x]) ≥ L[x] ; we have:
(i) min
i∈A
max
x∈X
min(u′i(x),max(1− wi, L[x])) ≥min
i∈A
max
x∈X
min(u′i(x), L[x])
Let f(x,i) = min(u′i(x), L[x]), then we have:
∀x ∈ X , ∀i ∈ A, max
x∈X
f(x, i) ≥ f(x, i)
min
i∈A
max
x∈X
f(x, i) ≥ min
i∈A
f(x, i) ; ∀x ∈ X
min
i∈A
max
x∈X
f(x, i) ≥ max
x∈X
min
i∈A
f(x, i)
Then we obtain min
i∈A
max
x∈X
min(u′i(x), L[x]) ≥ max
x∈X
min
i∈A
min(u′i(x), L[x])
From (i) and (ii) we can deduce that U+ minante (L) ≥ U+ minpost (L)
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5.3 Axiomatization of egalitarian pessimistic decision rule
in style of VNM axiomatic system
In this section, we propose an axiomatization of the pessimistic egalitarian utility. Consider a setA
of p agents, a finite set of consequences X , a possibilistic scale V , the set of possibilistic lotteries
L obtained from V and X . The preference profile 〈1, . . . ,p〉 gathers the preference relations
i of each agent i on L.  denotes the collective preference on L.
Let us denote by x the "constant" lottery leading to consequence x for sure (s.t. L[x] = 1
and L[y] = 0 for each y 6= x ; e.g. L2 in Figure 5.1): constant lotteries and elements of X are
identified. In the same way, let Y be the lottery that represents a subset Y of X (it provides the
possibility degree 1 to each y ∈ Y , and 0 otherwise). As we compute a globbal criterion, the
values of this criterion are consequences in X So, we formulate first of all a completeness axiom
on the set of consequences X:
Axiom (C, Completeness of X). ∀x, y ∈ X,∀B ⊆ A, ∃z ∈ X such that: z ∼i x if i ∈ B and
z ∼j y if j /∈ B.
This axiom requires that there exists a z in X that is indifferent to x for agents in B and
indifferent to y for the others. When two agents are involved, axiom C says that if x and y are
two elements of X , then X contains an element z corresponding to the vector of satisfaction
〈xi, yj〉. This axiom ensure the existence of a sort of “collective equivalence” that can be seen
as a counterpart in the sens of social choice, of the certainty equivalence axiom (A2) defined by
Dubois and Prade for the characterization of qualitative utility.
More generally, this axiom requires the set of lotteries to be rich enough to contain all the
constant acts corresponding to all the vectors of satisfaction (in a sense, C deals more with L than
with). This implies in particular thatX contains a consequence x∗ that is ideal for all the agents,
and a consequence x∗ anti-ideal for all the agents. When the set of consequences X is too small,
it is harmless to extend and enrich it in order to obtain all the z that we need: in the following,
axiom C is supposed by construction (in Harsanyi’s paper it is implicit: X is identified with the
set of utility vectors).
We now introduce the axiom of Pareto unanimity, that is essential for collective choice:
Axiom (P, Pareto Unanimity). If ∀i ∈ A, L i L′, then L  L′.
A representation theorem for agents with different weights
Let us study the pessimistic collective decision rules in the light of the axioms and show that they
are consistent, namely obeyed by the pessimistic egalitarian utility (U−min). Consider a set L of
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possibilistic lotteries built from a set X and a scale V ; a set ui, i ∈ A of utility functions on X
taking their values in [0, 1]; and a weight vector ~w ∈ [0, 1]p (where wi is the weight of agent i).
Let us resume Dubois and Prade’s axioms relative to qualitative utilities (see Section 2.4). It
holds that:
Proposition 5.4.
The relations  and i defined by:
L  L′ iff U−min(L) ≥ U−min(L′),
L i L′ iff U−i (L) ≥ U−i (L′)
satisfy Dubois and Prade’s axioms (A1−1 . . . A6− of page 24) relative to the pessimistic utility,
as well as the Pareto Unanimity axiom.
Proof of Proposition 5.4.
• The relation i defined by U−i satisfies axioms A1− . . . A6−:
By definition, U−i is the pessimistic utility relative to each agent, then it is obvious that i
satisfies axioms A1− . . . A6−.
• The relation  defined by U−min satisfies axioms A1− . . . A6−:
By definition we have ∀i ∈ A, i satisfies axioms A1− . . . A6−.
Besides, we have: U−minpost = min
x∈X
max(1− L[x],min
∈A
max(ui(x), 1− wi))
Let u(x) = min
i∈A
max(ui(x), 1− wi)
Then, U−minpost = min
x∈X
max(1− L[x], u(x))
Hence, U−minpost can be seen as a pessimistic utility based on the utility function u(x). Since,
U−minpost = U
−min
ante = U
−min, so U−min satisfies Dubois and Prade’s axioms.
• The relation  defined by U−min satisfies the Pareto unanimity axiom:
Let: ∀i ∈ A, L i L′
By the definition of pessimistic utility we have: L i L′ iff U−i (L) ≥ U−i (L′)
Hence, ∀i ∈ A,max(1− wi, U−i (L)) ≥ max(1− wi, U−i (L))
Then, min
i∈A
max(1− wi, U−i (L)) ≥ min
i∈A
max(1− wi, U−i (L′))
We obtain, U−minante (L) ≥ U−minante (L′); which implies that L  L′
Since U−minante = U
−min
post = U
−min, then U−min satisfies axiom P (Pareto Unanimity axiom).
Regarding the other (non egalitarian) pessimistic utility U−max the news are unfortunately
very bad: not only they suffer from timing effect problem; but also due to the drowning effect we
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can show by the following counter-examples that Pareto unanimity axiom is violated by U−maxpost
(counter-example 5.2) and that U−maxante may fail to satisfy weak independence (counter-example
5.3).
Counter-example 5.2. Consider two agents 1 and 2 with different importance such that w1 = 1
and w2 = 0.8 and consider the two lotteries presented in Figure 5.3 on X = {x1, x2, x3}. We get:
L2
1
x3 : <0.2 ; 0.2>L1
1
0.9
x1 : <0.1 ; 0.9>
x2 : <0.9 ; 0.2>
Figure 5.3: A counter-example to pareto unanimity for U−maxpost criterion.
• For Agent 1:
U−(L1) = min(max((1− 1), 0.1),max((1− 0.9), 0.9)) = 0.1
U−(L2) = max((1− 1), 0.2) = 0.2
• For Agent 2:
U−(L1) = min(max((1− 1), 0.9),max((1− 0.9), 0.2)) = 0.2
U−(L2) = max((1− 1), 0.2) = 0.2
While:
U−maxpost (L1) = min(max((1− 1),max(min(1, 0.1),min(0.8, 0.9))),
max((1− 0.9),max(min(1, 0.9),min(0.8, 0.2)))) = 0.8
U−maxpost (L2) = max((1− 1),max(min(1, 0.2),min(0.8, 0.2))) = 0.2
Hence, we can verify that Agent 1 prefers L2 to L1 whereas lotteries L1 and L2 are equivalent
for Agent 2. However, we can show that U−maxpost (L1) > U−maxpost (L2), which contradicts Pareto
Unanimity.
Counter-example 5.3. Consider two agents 1 and 2, where Agent 2 is more important than Agent
1 such that w1 = 0.5 and w2 = 1, and consider the three lotteries on X = {x1, x2, x3} depicted
in Figure 5.4.
Let L and L′ be the lotteries defined by:
L = 〈1/L1, 0.9/L3〉 and L′ = 〈1/L2, 0.9/L3〉.
We can verify that L1 and L2 are equivalent: U−maxante (L1) = U−maxante (L2) = 0.5 whereas
U−maxante (L) = 0.5 6= U−maxante (L′) = 0.4, which proves that U−maxante does not satisfy the weak inde-
pendence axiom.
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0.5
1
x1: < 0.7 ; 0.2 >
L1
x2 : < 0.4 ; 0.6 >
L3
0.4
1
x1 : < 0.7 ; 0.2 >
x2 : < 0.4 ; 0.6 >
L2
1
0.5
x1: < 0.7 ; 0.2 >
x2 : < 0.4 ; 0.6 >
Figure 5.4: A counter-example to weak independence for U−maxante criterion.
Let us now go back to our egalitarian pessimistic utility and show that the relation that satisfies
Completeness, Pareto Unanimity and the axioms of pessimistic utility can be captured by U−min
- thus providing a counterpart of Harsanyi’s theorem that allows (weighted) equity. First, we
sketch the proof in the general case, allowing more or less important agents: this provides a
characterization of U−min in its full generality. Then, we impose equity between agents in a
second step - and rule out the weights.
We have seen that the set of axioms is consistent since satisfied by U−min. Let us now go the
reverse way. Consider a relation  on L (built on X and V ) that satisfies axioms A1− . . . A6−,
a set of relations i on the same L that also satisfy these axioms, and suppose that the axioms of
Pareto Unanimity and Completeness of X hold.
First of all, since axioms A1− . . . A6− are satisfied by  and i, these relations can be rep-
resented by pessimistic utilities -this is Dubois and Prade’s theorem of representation. Let us now
consider for any agent i ∈ A, the set >i = {x ∈ X: ∀y, x i y} of the best consequences
according to i (this set cannot be empty because the i ’s are pre-orders). Thanks to Axiom C,
there exists a consequence x∗ that belongs to all the >i’s. By Pareto Unanimity, x∗  y,∀y ∈ X .
In the same way, there exists a x∗ such that y  x∗, ∀y ∈ X .
Also, Axiom C allows us to define the constant act xi for any agent i, such as:
Definition 5.2. ∀x ∈ X and any agent i, let xi be the constant lottery s.t. xi ∼i x and xi ∼j x∗
for each j 6= i.
xi will be identified with the utility of x according to agent i: the influence of the other agents
is neutralized (they get their best outcome, which behaves as a neutral element in the pessimistic
approach).
Let Σi = {xi, x ∈ X}. (x∗)i (resp. (x∗)i) is the best (resp. worst) consequence according to
agent i belong to Σi by definition. The union of the Σi’s, that is to say Σ = {xi: x ∈ X, i ∈ A},
plays an important role in our proof - it allows the construction of a common evaluation scale. Σ
is naturally ordered by  and each Σi is ordered by i. By construction, we have:
Proposition 5.5. ∀x ∈ X, (x∗)i i x i (x∗)i.
Proof of Proposition 5.5.
By definition of x∗ according to Axiom C we have: ∀i ∈ A, ∀x ∈ X; x∗ i x.
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Besides, by definition of (x∗)i we have: ∀i ∈ A ; (x∗)i ∼i x∗.
Then, by transitivity of i we can obtain: (i) (x∗)i i x.
In the same way, by definition of x∗ we have: ∀i ∈ A, ∀x ∈ X; x i x∗.
and by definition of (x∗)i we have: ∀i ∈ A; (x∗)i ∼i x∗.
Also, by transitivity we can obtain: (ii) x i (x∗)i.
From (i) and (ii) we can deduce that: ∀x ∈ X, (x∗)i i x i (x∗)i.
Moreover, we can show that:
Proposition 5.6. ∀xi ∈ Σi, (x∗)i  xi  (x∗)i
Proof of Proposition 5.6.
By definition of xi, we have: ∀i ∈ A, ∀x ∈ X ; xi ∼i x.
According to Proposition 5.5, we have: ∀i ∈ A, ∀x ∈ X ; (x∗)i i x.
Then, by transitivity we obtain: (x∗)i i xi.
Besides, (x∗)i k xi, for all k (because (x∗)i ∼k x∗, whether k is equal to i or not).
Then, (x∗)i k xi and i is transitive; by Pareto Unanimity we obtain (i) (x∗)i  xi.
In the same way, by definition of xi, we have: ∀i ∈ A, ∀x ∈ X ; xi ∼i x.
According to Proposition 5.5, we have: ∀i ∈ A, ∀x ∈ X ; x i (x∗)i.
Then, by transitivity we obtain: xi i (x∗)i; besides by Pareto Unanimity we obtain (ii) xi 
(x∗)i.
From (i) and (ii) we can deduce that: ∀xi, (x∗)i  xi  (x∗)i.
(x∗)i is one of the best consequences for i and (x∗)i is one of her worst ones. It may happen
that one of the xi be indifferent w.r.t.  to (x∗)i: i prefers xi to (x∗)i, but the collectivity does
not; this is due to the fact that agent i is not so important, so the elements of X that are bad for her
(e.g. (x∗)i) are considered as not so bad for the collectivity.
Let us denote by Bi = {xi ∈ Σi: xi ∼ (x∗)i} the set of the elements of Σi that are indifferent
to (x∗)iaccording to the collectivity, and this even if agent i makes a difference; the elements of
Bi form an equivalence class according to  - but, again, not necessarily according to i.
Let denote mi the best element of Bi (according to i) 2. It reflects the importance of the agent:
the greater is mi, the less is the importance of i.
Formally3, it can be defined as follows:
Definition 5.3. ∀i ∈ A, let mi = argmaxi{xi: xi ∼ (x∗)i} be the discount degree of i.
We can now formulate the following two lemmas:
2If |Bi| > 1, mi can be any one of its elements.
3In the following, there are many relations (preorders). For the sake of clarity, we may indicate for each
minimum or maximum operation the preorder it relies on.
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Lemma 5.1. ∀x ∈ X, i = 1, p, xi ∼ maxi(mi, xi).
Proof of Lemma 5.1.
• Case 1: xi i mi: then trivially maxi(mi, xi) = xi.
Since  is reflexive, then xi ∼ maxi(mi, xi).
• Case 2: mi i xi: by definition of mi, we have:
mi = argmaxi{xi: xi ∼ (x∗)i}, then mi is a particular xi, such as xi ∼ (x∗)i. Then, we
can say that (i) mi ∼ (x∗)i.
Furthermore, from Proposition 5.6 we have (ii) xi  (x∗)i.
From (i) and (ii) and since  is transitive and reflexive we can say that xi  mi.
Hence, we can deduce that mi i xi involve xi ∼ maxi(mi, xi).
Lemma 5.2. ∀x ∈ X , x ∼ argmin {xi: i ∈ A}.
Proof of Lemma 5.2.
We consider the lottery L = 〈1/x1, . . . , 1/xp〉.
Since is a pessimistic utility (satisfies Dubois and Prade’s axioms) and the xis are constant acts;
then we have: L ∼ argmin{xi, i ∈ A}.
Let us show that L ∼ x.
Since is relations are pessimistic utilities (satisfy Dubois and Prade’s axioms), for each agent i
have: L ∼i argmini{xk, k = 1, p}.
Since ∀k 6= i, xk ∼i x∗, and x∗ i xi, by transitivity we have ∀k 6= i, xk i xi. Then L ∼i xi.
Besides, since x ∼i xi and ∼i is transitive, we obtain L ∼i x, for each agent i. Using Pareto
Unanimity axiom, we can deduce that L ∼ x.
FromL ∼ x andL ∼ argmin{xi, i ∈ A}, we can deduce by transitivity that: x ∼ argmin{xi, i ∈
A}.
From Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 we get:
Corollary 5.1. x ∼ argmin{maxi(mi, xi): i ∈ A}.
Proof of Corollary 5.1.
From Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, we have respectively:
(i) ∀x ∈ X, i ∈ A, xi ∼ maxi(mi, xi).
(ii) ∀x ∈ X , x ∼ argmin {xi: i ∈ A}.
Then the proof of this corollary is trivial by replacing xi in (ii) by maxi(mi, xi) from (i).
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In order to show that a relation satisfying axioms A1− . . . A6− is a pessimistic utility, Dubois
and Prade [30] built the scale U = {[x]: x ∈ X} where [x] is the equivalence class of x according
to . U is totally ordered by  and these authors set u(x) = [x]. Here, we use the set Σ = {xi:
x ∈ X, i ∈ A}, partially ordered by the relation  defined by:
Definition 5.4. ∀x, y ∈ X, i, j ∈ A:
xi  yi iff xi i yi
xi  yj iff xi i mi, yj j mj and xi  yj , ∀i 6= j.
This relation is a partial pre-order (it is reflexive and transitive) but if xi ≺ mi or xj ≺ mj
for all i 6= j, xi and yj are not comparable: neither xi  yj nor yj  xi hold, but this is harmless.
What is important is that (i) the restriction of  to each Σi is a pre-order (on Σi,  =i) and (ii)
that any xi that is as least as good as mi (according to i) is comparable to any xj that is as least
as good as mj (according to j) . Properties (i) and (ii) ensure that v(x) = min{max(mi, xi):
i ∈ A} exists.
Proposition 5.7.
The relation  is transitive.
Proof of Proposition 5.7.
• Case 1: ∀x, y, z ∈ X , ∀i ∈ A, if xi  yi and yi  zi then by definition of  we have:
xi i yi and yi i zi. Since i is transitive then xi i zi so, xi  zi.
• Case 2: ∀x, y, z ∈ X , if xi  yi and yi  zj (such as: i 6= j), by definition of we can say
that xi i yi, then by Pareto Unanimity we can deduce that: xi  yi.
Besides, by Definition 5.4 we have: (i) yi i mi, zj j mj and yi  zj .
We have xi  yi and yi  zj then by transitivity of  we obtain: (ii) xi  zj
From (i) and (ii) we can deduce that xi i mi, zj j mj and xi  zj besides by definition
of  we obtain xi  zj .
• Case 3: ∀x, y, z ∈ X , if xi  yj and yj  zk (such as: i 6= j 6= k), by definition of  we
have xi i mi, yj j mj and xi  yj (i) besides yj j mj , zk k mk and yj  zk(ii).
Then, from (i) and (ii) and by transitivity of  we can conclude that xi i mi, zk k mk
and xi  zk, besides by definition of  obtain xi  zk.
Then, ∀x, y ∈ X and for alli 6= j; we can deduce that  is transitive.
Then from Corollary 5.1 and Definition 5.4 it follows that: x ∼ v(x). Let k be the agent for
which the min is reached in the expression of v(x): v(x) = max(mk xk) belongs to Σk and is
such that v(x) k mk. Hence v(x) and v(y) are comparable w.r.t. , whatever x, y. This allows
us to write:
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Lemma 5.3.
x  y iff argmin{max(mi, xi): i ∈ A}  argmin{max(mi, yi): i ∈ A}.
Proof of Lemma 5.3.
By Lemma 5.1 we have: ∀x ∈ X, i ∈ A, xi ∼ maxi(mi, xi).
Then, by Definition 5.4 we can say that: (i) xi ∼max(mi, xi).
Besides, by Lemma 5.2 we have: ∀x ∈ X , x ∼ argmin {xi: i ∈ A}.
In the same way, by Definition 5.4 we can say that:
(ii) x ∼ argmin {xi, i ∈ A}.
Using Corollary 5.1 and from (i) and (ii) we can obtain:
x ∼ argmin{max(mi, xi), i ∈ A}.
Then we can deduce that:
x ∼ argmin{max(mi, xi), i ∈ A} and y ∼ argmin{max(mi, yi), i ∈ A}
So, by Definition 5.4 we obtain:
x  y iff argmin{max(mi, xi), i ∈ A}  argmin{max(mi, yi), i ∈ A}.
Because working with a partial preorder is not so convenient, we shall use any complete pre-
order ′ on Σ such that x y =⇒ x′ y (there always exists one). Then we get:
Lemma 5.4.
x  y iff argmin′{max′(mi, xi): i ∈ A} ′argmin′{max′(mi, yi): i ∈ A}.
Proof of Lemma 5.4.
The proof of this Lemma is similar to the proof relative to Lemma 5.3 since they express the same
thing; with a partial pre-order () on Σ for Lemma 5.3 and a complete pre-order (′) for Lemma
5.4.
Since satisfies axiomsA1− . . . A6−, Dubois and Prade’s result applies: there exists an order
reversing function n s.t.:
L  L′ iff min
x∈X
max(n(L[x]), u(x))  min
x∈X
max(n(L′[x]), u(x)).
Let us denote u(x) = argmin′{max′(mi, xi): i ∈ A} and next(v) = u(n(v)) (n(v) is an
element of Σ). By applying Lemma 5.4, we can write:
L  L′ iff min′
x∈X
max′(next(L[x]), u(x)) ′ min′
x∈X
max′(next(L′[x]), u(x)).
next(v),mi and xi, u(x) belong to Σ. In order to get a total order, we consider the equivalence
classes of Σ, i.e. the set U ext = {[x]: x ∈ X} where [x] is the equivalence class of x w.r.t. ′.
Because x = argmin{xi: i ∈ A} (Lemma 5.2) U ext contains the equivalence classe of each
x ∈ X to , in particular, the equivalence classe [xi] of each xi; U ext is ordered by ′ and is
equipped with a maximal and a minimal elements ([x∗] and [x∗], respectively).
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Setting ui(x) = [xi], nwi = [mi] and n(v) = [next(v)], we get:
L  L′ iff min′
x∈X
max′(n(L[x]),min′
i∈A
max′(ui(x), nwi)) ′
min′
x∈X
max′(n(L[x]),min′
i∈A
max′(ui(x), nwi)).
Hence the main result of this work:
Theorem 5.1. If the collective preference and individual preference relations satisfy axioms A1−
. . . A6−, Pareto Unanimity (axiom P) and the axiom of completeness of X (axiom C) then there
exists a scale U ext totally ordered by ′, a distribution of weights nw: A 7→ U ext, a series of
functions ui: X 7→ U ext, i = 1, n and an order reversing function n: V 7→ U ext s.t. for each
couple of lotteries L and L′:
L  L′ iff min
x∈X
max(n(L[x]),min
i∈A
max(nwi, ui(x))) ′
min
x∈X
max(n(L′[x]),min
i∈A
max(nwi, ui(x))).
This theorem can be interpreted as follows: If Dubois and Prade’s axioms A1− . . . A6− rela-
tive to the pessimistic utility, as well as axioms P and C are satisfied by the collective preference
relation and the individual preference relationsi, then there exists a scale U ext totally ordered
by ′ , a distribution of weights, a set of functions ui(x) and an order reversing function such
that for any pair of lotteries L and L′, L is preferred by the collectivity to L′ iff the pessimistic
egalitarian utility U−min(L) is better than U−min(L′).
Proof of Theorem 5.1.
According to Dubois and Prade’s result relative to pessimistic utility, since  satisfies axioms
A1− . . . A6− it exists an order reversing function n: V 7→ X such that:
L  L′ iff min
x∈X
max(n(L[x]), x)  min
x∈X
max(n(L′[x]), x).
Using Definition 5.4 and since  relative to each Σi is a complete pre-ordre (on Σi,  =i)
and each xi is at least as good as mi (for i) is comparable to each xj that is at least as good as mj
(for j) we can say that: u(x) = argmin{max(mi, xi): i ∈ A}. Using Lemma 5.4 we can say
that: u(x) = argmin′{max′(mi, xi), i ∈ A}
By applying Lemma 5.4 and using Dubois and Prade’s definition relative to the pessimistic utility,
we obtain:
L  L′ ssi min′
x∈X
max′(next(L[x]), u(x)) ′
min′
x∈X
max′(next(L′[x]), u(x)).
next(v), mi and xi, u(x) belongs to Σ. In order to have a total order, we consider the equiva-
lence classes of Σ, i.e. the set U ext = {[x]: x ∈ X} where [x] is an equivalence class of x for ′.
Since x = argmin{xi: i ∈ A} (Lemma 5.2) U ext contain the equivalence class of each x ∈ X
for , in particular, the equivalence class of [xi] for each xi ; U ext is totally ordered by ′, where
[x∗] and [x∗] are respectively the maximal and minimal elements.
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Let ui(x) = [xi], nwi = [mi] and n(v) = [next(v)], then we obtain:
L  L′ ssi min
x∈X
max(n(L[x]),min
i∈A
max(ui(x), nwi)) 
min
x∈X
max(n(L′[x]),min
i∈A
max(ui(x), nwi)).
A representation theorem for agents with the same importance (pure
egalitarianism)
We can now add two axioms that leads to pure egalitarianism.
Axiom (E). ∀i, j, (x∗)i ∼ (x∗)j .
Axiom (PW). ∀i, if x i y then xi  yi.
By E, the dissatisfaction of one agent has no more power than the one of another agent. A
direct consequence is that the agents have the same discount degree. By PW, each agent has some
power (he makes the decision at least when every other one is totally happy with both x and y). It
implies mi ∼i x∗, for each i. Because all i share the same discount mi, Pareto Unanimity implies
that mi ∼ x∗.
This provides a characterization of the full egalitarian CUF:
Theorem 5.2. If the collective preference and individual preference relations satisfy axioms A1−
. . . A6−, P, C, E and PW then there exists a scale U ext totally ordered by ′, a series of functions
ui: X 7→ U ext and an order reversing function n: V 7→ U ext such that:
L  L′ iff min
x∈X
max(n(L[x]),min
i∈A
ui(x)) ′
min
x∈X
max(n(L′[x]),min
i∈A
ui(x)).
Proof of Theorem 5.2.
From Lemma 5.1 we have: ∀x ∈ X , i ∈ A, xi ∼ maxi(mi, xi).
Then we can consider that mi is a particular xi such as: xi ∼ (x∗)i, i.e. mi ∼ (x∗)i, ∀i ∈ A.
Using axiom E ((x∗)i ∼ (x∗)j) we can say that mi ∼ (x∗)j (j 6= i). Then we can deduce that:
∀i, j;mi ∼ (x∗)i ∼ mj ∼ (x∗)j .
Using Lemma 5.4 we have:
x  y iff argmin′{max′(mi, xi):i ∈ A} ′ argmin′{max′(mi, yi):i ∈ A}.
Besides, since each agent i have the possibility to decide for the collectivity when others are
indifferent (axiom PW), Then we can rewrite Lemma 5.4 such as:
x  y iff argmin′{xi:i ∈ A} ′ argmin′{yi:i ∈ A}.
Summing up Dubois and Prade’s result relative to the pessimistic utility and considering u(x) =
argmin′x
i, we can rewrite Theorem 5.1 such as:
L  L′ ssi min
x∈X
max(n(L[x]),min
i∈A
ui(x))
′
min
x∈X
max(n(L′[x]),min
i∈A
ui(x)).
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This theorem shows that not only egalitarianism and decision under uncertainty are compatible
and can escape the Timing Effect, but egalitarianism is compulsory when the decision is to be made
on a possibilistic and cautious basis. This can be interpreted as a justification of egalitarianism just
like Harsanyi’s theorem that is interpreted as a justification of utilitarianism.
5.4 Axiomatization of non egalitarian optimistic decision
rule in style of VNM axiomatic system
Let us now propose a representation theorem relative to homogeneous optimistic utility function
U+ max, which is an optimistic counterpart of the previous representation theorem.
We consider a preference relation  on L that satisfies Dubois and Prade’s axioms relative
to the optimistic utility (presented in Section 2.3), a set of preference relations i on the same L
satisfying the same axioms, and we suppose that Pareto Unanimity and the Completeness axioms
are satisfied. Since Dubois and Prade’s axioms (A1+ . . . A6+) are satisfied by  and by any i,
it is obvious that these relations may be represented by optimistic utility functions.
A representation theorem for agents with different weights
Consider a set L of possibilistic lotteries built from a set X and a scale V ; a set ui, i ∈ A of
utility functions on X taking their values in [0, 1]; and a weight vector ~w ∈ [0, 1]p (where wi is
the weight of agent i). Similar to U−min, the homogenous utility, it holds that:
Proposition 5.8.
The relations  and i defined by:
L  L′ iff U+ max(L) ≥ U+ max(L′),
L i L′ iff U+i (L) ≥ U+i (L′)
satisfy axioms A1+ . . . A6+, as well as the Pareto Unanimity axiom.
Proof of Proposition 5.8.
This proof relative to Proposition 5.8 is very similar to the one one relative to 5.4 by replacing the
min operator by max, max by min, (1− L[x]) by L[x], (1− wi) by wi and axioms A1− . . . A6−
by axioms A1+ . . . A6+.
As shown by counter-example 5.4, U+ minpost fails to satisfy Pareto Unanimity. Likewise, U
+ min
ante
violates the weak independence axiom (counter-example 5.5).
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Counter-example 5.4. Consider two not equally important agents 1 and 2 such that w1 = 1 and
w2 = 0.8 and consider the two lotteries resented in Figure 5.5 on X = {x1, x2, x3}. We get:
L2
1
x3 : <0.8 ; 0.8>L1
1
0.9
x1 : <0.9 ; 0.1>
x2 : <0.1 ; 0.8>
Figure 5.5: A counter-example to Pareto Unanimity for U+ minante criterion.
• For Agent 1:
U+(L1) = max(min(1, 0.9),min(0.9, 0.1)) = 0.9
U+(L2) = min(1, 0.8) = 0.8
• For Agent 2:
U+(L1) = max(min(1, 0.1),min(0.9, 0.8)) = 0.8
U+(L2) = min(1, 0.8) = 0.8
While:
U+ minpost (L1) = max(min(1,min(max((1− 1), 0.9),max((1− 0.8), 0.1))),
min(0.9,min(max((1− 1), 0.1),max((1− 1), 0.8)))) = 0.1
U+ minpost (L2) = max(min(1,min(max((1−1), 0.8),max((1−0.8), 0.8)))) = 0.8. Hence, we can
verify that Agent 1 prefers L1 to L2 whereas lotteries L1 and L2 are equivalent for Agent 2. So,
U+ minpost (L2) > U+ minpost (L1), which contradicts Pareto Unanimity.
Counter-example 5.5. Consider two agents 1 and 2 such that w1 = 0.5 and w2 = 1, and consider
the three lotteries on X = {x1, x2, x3} depicted in Figure 5.6.
Let L and L′ be the lotteries defined by:
L = 〈1/L1, 0.9/L3〉 and L′ = 〈1/L2, 0.9/L3〉.
We can verify that L1 and L2 are equivalent: U+ minante (L1) = U+ minante (L2) = 0.5 whereas
U+ minante (L) = 0.5 6= U+ minante (L′) = 0.6, which proves that U+ minante does not satisfy the weak in-
dependence axiom.
In the previous section, we have seen that axiom C ensures the existence of a constant act x∗
ideal for all the agents and a constant act x∗ that is anti-ideal for all. We consider for each agent
i, ⊥i = {x ∈ X,∀y, y i x} the set of the least appreciated (worst) consequences to i, where x∗
belongs obviously to all the ⊥i’s.
For each agent i, we define the constant act xi ∈ X as follows:
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0.5
1
x1: < 0.3 ; 0.8 >
L1
x2 : < 0.6 ; 0.4 >
L3
0.4
1
x1 : < 0.3 ; 0.8 >
x2 : < 0.6 ; 0.4 >
L2
1
0.5
x1: < 0.3 ; 0.8 >
x2 : < 0.6 ; 0.4 >
Figure 5.6: A counter-example to weak independence for U+ minante criterion.
Definition 5.5. ∀x ∈ X , and any agent i, xi is the constant lottery such that: xi ∼i x and
xi ∼j x∗ ; for each j 6= i
xi will be identified with the utility of x according to agent i: the influence of the other agents
is neutralized (they get their worst outcome, which behaves as a neutral element in the optimistic
approach). Let Σi = {xi, x ∈ X} be the set of constant acts relative to agent i. Σi is ordered by
i. We define Σ as the union of the Σi’s, that is ordered by .
(x∗)i is one of the best consequences for i and (x∗)i is one of her worst ones. It may happen
that one of the xi be indifferent w.r.t.  to (x∗)i: i prefers (x∗)i to xi, but the collectivity does
not; this is due to the fact that the agent i is not so important, so the consequences that are good
for her, typically (x∗)i, as considered as not so good for the collectivity. So i is not so important
to impose her preferences to the group.
Let us denote Bi = {xi ∈ Σi, xi ∼ (x∗)i}, the set of elements of Σi that are indifferent to
(x∗)i for the collectivity, and this even if agent i makes a difference; the elements of Bi form an
equivalence class according to  but not necessarily according to i.
Let mi denotes the worst element of Bi according to i as follows:
Definition 5.6. ∀i ∈ A, mi = argmini{xi: xi ∼ (x∗)i}
We can now propose the two following lemmas:
Lemma 5.5.
∀x ∈ X, i = 1, p, xi ∼ mini(mi, xi)
Proof of Lemma 5.5.
• Case 1: mi i xi: then trivially mini(mi, xi) = xi.
Since  is reflexive, xi ∼ mini(mi, xi).
• Case 2: xi i mi: by definition of mi, we have: mi = argmini{xi: xi ∼ (x∗)i}, then mi
is a particular xi such as xi ∼ (x∗)i. Then we can say that (i) mi ∼ (x∗)i.
Besides, from Proposition 5.6 we have (ii) (x∗)i  xi.
From (i) and (ii) and since  is transitive and reflexive we can say that mi  xi.
Hence, we can deduce that xi i mi involve xi ∼ mini(mi, xi).
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Lemma 5.6.
∀x ∈ X , x ∼ argmax {xi, i ∈ A}.
Proof of Lemma 5.6.
We consider lottery L = 〈1/x1, . . . , 1/xp〉.
Since  is an optimistic utility (it satisfies Dubois ans Prade’s axioms) and xis are constant acts;
we have: L ∼ argmax{xi, i ∈ A}.
Let us show that L ∼ x.
Since is are optimistic utilities (satisfy Dubois and Prade’s axioms), for each agent i we have:
L ∼i argmaxi{xk, k = 1, p}.
Since ∀k 6= i, xk ∼i x∗, and xi i x∗, by transitivity we have ∀k 6= i, xi i xk. Then L ∼i xi.
Since x ∼i xi and ∼i is transitive, we obtain L ∼i x, and this for each agent i. Using Pareto
Unanimity, we can deduce that L ∼ x.
From L ∼ x and L ∼ argmax{xi, i ∈ A}, we can conclude by transitivity that: x ∼
argmax{xi, i ∈ A}.
From the previous lemmas we can deduce that:
Corollary 5.2. ∀x ∈ X , x ∼ argmax{mini(mi, xi), i ∈ A}.
Proof of Corollary 5.2.
From Lemma 5.5 and Lemma 5.6, we have respectively:
(i) ∀x ∈ X, i ∈ A, xi ∼ mini(mi, xi).
(ii) ∀x ∈ X , x ∼ argmax {xi: i ∈ A}.
Then the proof of the corollary is trivial by replacing xi from (ii) by mini(mi, xi) from (i).
Let us now define the relation o on Σ = {xi, x ∈ X, i ∈ A} such as:
Definition 5.7. ∀x, y ∈ X, i, j ∈ A:
xi o yi iff xi i yi
∀i 6= j, xi o yj iff mi i xi, mj j yj and xi  yj
This relation is reflexive and transitive but it defines a partial preorder on Σ; it may happens
that mi ≺ xi or mj ≺ xj , for all i 6= j so, xi and yj are not comparable: but this is harmless since
(i) the restriction of o to each Σi is a pre-order (on Σi, o = i) and (ii) that any xi which is
always equal or less than mi according to i, is comparable to any xj that is at most equal to mj
according to j. Properties (i) and (ii) ensure that u(x) = maxo{min(mi, xi): i ∈ A} exists.
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Proposition 5.9. o is transitive.
Proof of Proposition 5.9.
• Case 1: ∀x, y, z ∈ X , ∀i ∈ A, if xi o yi and yi o zi then by definition of o we have:
xi i yi and yi i zi. Since i is transitive then xi i zi so, xi o zi.
• Case 2: ∀x, y, z ∈ X , if xi o yi and yi o zj (such as: i 6= j), by definition of o we can
deduce that xi i yi, so by Pareto Unanimity we can write: xi  yi.
Besides, by Definition 5.7 we have: (i) mi i yi, mj j zj and yi  zj .
We have xi  yi and yi  zj then by transitivity of  we obtain: (ii) xi  zj
From (i) and (ii) we can deduce that mi i xi, mj j zj and xi  zj besides by definition
of o we obtain xi o zj .
• Case 3: ∀x, y, z ∈ X , if xio yj and yj o zk (such as: i 6= j 6= k), by definition of o we
have mi i xi, mj j yj and xi  yj (i) also mj j yj , mk k zk and yj  zk(ii). From
(i) and (ii), by transitivity of  we can conclude that mi i xi, mk k zk and xi  zk,
also by definition of o we obtain xi o zk.
So, ∀x, y ∈ X and for all i 6= j ; we can deduce that o is transitive.
From Corollary 5.2 and Definition 5.7, it follows that:
Lemma 5.7.
x  y iff argmaxo{mino(mi, xi), i ∈ A} argmaxo{mino(mi, yi), i ∈ A}.
Proof of Lemma 5.7.
By Lemma 5.5 we have: ∀x ∈ X, i ∈ A, xi ∼ mini(mi, xi).
Then, by Definition 5.7 we can write: xi ∼mino(mi, xi) (i).
Besides, by Lemma 5.6 we have: ∀x ∈ X , x ∼ argmax {xi: i ∈ A}.
In the same way, by Definition 5.7 we can write:
(ii) x ∼ argmaxo {xi, i ∈ A}.
Using Corollary 5.2 and from (i) and (ii) we obtain:
x ∼ argmaxo{mino(mi, xi), i ∈ A}.
Then we can deduce that:
x ∼ argmaxo{mino(mi, xi), i ∈ A} and y ∼ argmaxo{mino(mi, yi), i ∈ A}
Hence, by Definition 5.7 we obtain:
x  y iff argmaxo{mino(mi, xi), i ∈ A} o argmaxo{mino(mi, yi), i ∈ A}.
Because working with a partial pre-order is not convenient, we shall use any complete pre-
order ′o on Σ, such that xo y ⇒ x′o y (there always exists one). Then we get:
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Lemma 5.8.
x  y iff argmax′o{min′o(m
i, xi), i ∈ A}′o argmax′o{min′o(m
i, yi), i ∈ A}.
Proof of Lemma 5.8.
The proof of this Lemma is similar to the proof of Lemma 5.7 since they express the same thing;
using a partial pre-order (o) on Σ for Lemma 5.7 and a complete pre-order (′o) for Lemma
5.8.
Since  satisfies Dubois and Prade’s axioms relative to the optimistic qualitative utility, we
can resume their result: there exists a utility function u such that:
L  L′ iff max
x∈X
min(L[x], u(x))  max
x∈X
min(L′[x], u(x)).
Let us denote u(x) = argmax′o{min′o(m
i, xi), i ∈ A}. By applying Lemma 5.8, we can
write:
L  L′ iff max′o
x∈X
min′o(L[x], u(x)) 
′
o max′o
x∈X
min′o(L
′[x], u(x)).
Hence, an optimistic counter part of Theorem 5.1:
Theorem 5.3. If the collective preference and individual preference relationsi satisfy axioms
A1+ . . . A6+ relative to the optimistic utility; Pareto Unanimity and the axiom of completeness of
X are satisfied, then there exists a scale U ext totally ordered by ′o, a distribution of weights w:
A 7→ U ext, a series of functions ui: X 7→ U ext such that for each couple of lotteries L and L′:
L  L′ iff max
x∈X
min(L[x],max
i∈A
min(ui(x), wi)) o
max
x∈X
min(L′[x],max
i∈A
min(ui(x), wi)).
Proof of Theorem 5.3.
Since  satisfies axioms A1+ . . . A6+ we can write:
L  L′ iff max
x∈X
min(L[x], x)  max
x∈X
min(L′[x], x).
Using Definition 5.7 and since o for each Σi is a complete pre-ordre (on Σi, o =i) and each
xi that is equal or inferior mi (for i) is comparable to each xj that is inferior or equal to mj (for
j) we can say that: u(x) = argmaxo{mino(mi, xi): i ∈ A}. Using Lemma 5.8 we can write:
u(x) = argmax′o{min′o(m
i, xi), i ∈ A}
By applying Lemma 5.8 and using Dubois and Prade’s definition relative to the optimistic utility,
we obtain:
L  L′ ssi max′o
x∈X
min′o(L[x], u(x)) 
′
o max′o
x∈X
min′o(L
′[x], u(x)).
mi, xi and u(x) belongs to Σ. In order to have a total order, we consider the equivalence classes
of Σ, i.e. the set U ext = {[x]: x ∈ X} where [x] is the equivalence class of x for ′o. Since
x = argmax{xi: i ∈ A} (Lemma 5.6) U ext contains the equivalence class for each x ∈ X for
, in particular, the equivalence class of [xi] for each xi ; U ext is totally ordered by ′o, where
[x∗] and [x∗] are respectively the maximal and minimal elements.
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Let ui(x) = [xi] and wi = [mi], then we obtain:
L  L′ ssi max′o
x∈X
min′o(L[x],max′o
i∈A
min′o(ui(x), wi)) 
′
o
max′o
x∈X
min′o(L
′[x],max′o
i∈A
min′o(ui(x), wi)).
A representation theorem for agents with same importance
Now, to ensure the pure egalitarianism and to guarantee that all the agents have the same impor-
tance, we resume axiom PW presented previously, and we present an optimistic version of axiom
E:
Axiom (E’). ∀i, j, (x∗)i ∼ (x∗)j .
Thanks to axioms E’ and PW, we can provide an optimistic version of Theorem 5.2:
Theorem 5.4. If the collective preference and individual preference relationsi satisfy axioms
A1+ . . . A6+, C, P, E and PW then there exists a scale U ext totally ordered by ′o, a series of
functions ui: X 7→ U ext such that for each couple of lotteries L and L′:
L  L′ iff max
x∈X
min(L[x],max
i∈A
ui(x)) ′o max
x∈X
min(L′[x],max
i∈A
ui(x)).
Proof of Theorem 5.4.
From Lemma 5.5 we have: ∀x ∈ X , i ∈ A, xi ∼ mini(mi, xi).
Then we consider that mi is a particular xi such as: xi ∼ (x∗)i. In other words: mi ∼ (x∗)i,∀i ∈
A.
Using axiom E’ ((x∗)i ∼ (x∗)j) we can say that mi ∼ (x∗)j (j 6= i). Hence we can deduce that:
∀i, jmi ∼ (x∗)i ∼ mj ∼ (x∗)j .
From Lemma 5.8 we have:
x  y iff argmax′o{min′o(m
i, xi):i ∈ A} ′o argmax′o{min′o(m
i, yi):i ∈ A}.
In addition, since each agent i have the possibility to decide for the collectivity when others are
indifferent (axiom PW), then we can rewrite Lemma 5.8 as the following:
x  y iff argmax′o{xi:i ∈ A} 
′
o argmax′o{yi:i ∈ A}.
Resuming Dubois and’s results relative to the optimistic utility and considering u(x) = argmax′oxi
then we can rewrite theorem 5.3 such as:
L  L′ iff max
x∈X
min(L[x],max
i∈A
ui(x)) ′o max
x∈X
min(L′[x],max
i∈A
ui(x)).
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has provided a decision theoretical approach for evaluating collective decision prob-
lems under possibilistic uncertainty. The combination of the collectivity dimension, namely egal-
itarian and not egalitarian approach to aggregate agents preferences; and the decision maker’s
CHAPTER 5. COLLECTIVE POSSIBILISTIC DECISION MAKING APPROACH 69
attitude with respect to uncertainty (i.e. optimistic utility or pessimistic utility) leads to four ap-
proaches of collective decision making under possibilistic uncertainty. Considering that each of
these utilities can be computed either ex-ante or ex-post, we have proposed the definition of eight
aggregations, that eventually reduce to six: U−minante (resp. U
+max
ante ) has been shown to coincide
with U−minpost (resp. U+maxpost ) such a coincidence does not happen for U
+min and U−max, that
suffer from timing effect.
Under the assumption, that all the agents have the same knowledge, we have provided an ax-
iomatic system for U−min and have shown that if both the collective preference and the individual
preferences do satisfy Dubois and Prade’s axioms, and in particular risk aversion, then an egalitar-
ian CUF is mandatory. Finally, we have provided an optimistic counter part of this theorem relative
to U+max.These results can be considered as an ordinal counterpart to Harsanyi’s theorem.
CHAPITRE 6
Algorithms for multi-agent optimization in possibilistic
decision trees
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4, we have presented an algorithmic study relative to the optimization in decision trees,
where decisions concern one decision maker. In this Chapter we deal with qualitative decision
trees representing collective sequential decision problems. We focus on the optimization of the
collective qualitative decision rules presented in Chapter 5 in such trees and we propose algorithms
dedicated to find optimal strategies. A Dynamic Programming algorithm is performed to optimize
criteria that satisfy the property of monotonicity and a Multi-Dynamic programming or a Branch
and Bound algorithm is proposed for those that are not monotonic.
This Chapter is organized as follows: the next Section summarizes the adaptation of Dynamic
Programming algorithm for the optimization of the ex-post decision rules. Section 6.2 details the
adaptation of Dynamic Programming for the optimization of the U−maxante criterion and Section 6.3
is devoted to the optimization of the U+minante using a Branch and Bound Algorithm.
6.2 Dynamic Programming algorithm for the optimiza-
tion of “ex-post” decision rules
Let us now consider the strategy optimization in possibilistic (qualitative) decision trees repre-
sented in Section 4.4. As usual with decision trees, the set of potential strategies to compare, ∆, is
exponential w.r.t. the size of the input, which means that an explicit evaluation of each strategy in
∆ is not realistic. Such a problem can nevertheless be solved efficiently (i.e. in polytime, without
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an explicit evaluation of each strategy in the set) by a Dynamic Programming algorithm, as soon
as the decision rule leads to transitive preferences and satisfies the principle of weak monotonicity.
Formally, for any decision rule O (e.g. any of the decision rules proposed in the previous Chapter)
over possibilistic lotteries,O is said to be weakly monotonic iff whatever L, L′ and L′′, whatever
(α,β) such that max(α, β) = 1:
L O L′ ⇒ 〈α/L, β/L′′〉 O 〈α/L′, β/L′′〉. (6.1)
This property ensures that each sub strategy of an optimal strategy is optimal in its sub-tree.
Hopefully, each of the ex-post criteria satisfies the weak monotonicity property (because they
collapse to a classical pessimistic U− or optimistic U+ utility, which are known to be monotonic
[9, 48]). Like each of the utilities used in the previous Chapter, these criteria take their values
on R+ and thus obviously define a transitive preference on strategies. This allows the use of a
Dynamic Programming algorithm: the utility values pertaining to the leaves are aggregated; then
an optimal strategy is built in an incremental way, from the last decision nodes to the root of the
tree. The adaptation of this algorithm to the ex-post rules is detailed in Algorithm 2; which is not
very different from its classical (probabilistic) version presented by Algorithm (Line 2) in Chapter
4, and polynomial in the number of edges and nodes in the tree, as usual.
Example 6.1. Let us consider two equally important agents 1 and 2 (w1 = w2 = 1) and consider
the decision tree T represented in Figure 6.1. The optimization of the egalitarian pessimistic utility
U−minpost decision rule in this decision tree using Algorithm 2 can be performed in two main steps:
Do
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
D1
D2
1
0.3
1
1
1
0.2
1
1
0.3
x1 : < 0.5 ; 0.3 >
x2 : < 0.2 ; 0.6 >
x3 : < 0.1 ; 0.2 >
x4 : < 0.4 ; 0.4 >
x1 : < 0.5 ; 0.3 >
x2 : < 0.2 ; 0.6 >
x3 : < 0.1 ; 0.2 >
x4 : < 0.4 ; 0.4 >
x5 : < 0.6 ; 0.5 >
x6 : < 0.3 ; 0.5 >
0.4
0.6
0.2
Figure 6.1: Possibilistic decision tree for Example 6.1.
• First of all, we calculate the aggregated utility relative to each leave node LN ∈ N and we
transform each utility vector ~uN to an aggregated utility uN , as shown in Figure 6.2.
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• Then, we perform the Dynamic Programing as for a possibilistic decision tree Π DT with
a single agent.
Do
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
D1
D2
1
0.3
1
1
1
0.2
1
1
0.3
0.4
0.6
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.2
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.4
0.5
0.3
Figure 6.2: Possibilistic decision tree for Example 6.1 with aggregated utilities.
Concerning U−minante and U
+ max
ante , recall that U
−min
ante (resp. U
+ max
ante ) = U−minpost (resp. U+ maxpost ):
the optimization can thus simply be performed by the ex-post Dynamic Programming algorithm
(Algorithm 2).
6.3 Dynamic Programming algorithm for the optimiza-
tion of “ex-ante” decision rules
It is possible to propose an ex-ante variant of Dynamic Programming for the optimization of the
ex-ante criteria- see Algorithm 3. It keeps at each decision node a possibility distribution over the
utility vectors corresponding to the decision made in the future. This algorithm provides the same
results as Algorithm 2 for U−minante and U
+ max
ante . However, Algorithm 3 may provide a good strategy
for U−maxante and U
+ min
ante , but without any guarantee of optimality. This is because these decision
rules do not satisfy the monotonicity principle stricto sensu [6].
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Algorithm 2: DynProgPost: An adaptation of Dynamic Programming for the opti-
mization of “ex-post” decision rules
Data: A node N
Result: An optimal strategy δ and its value u∗
begin
// Initialization
for j ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
L[uj]← 0;
// Leaves
if N ∈ LN then
// (Disjunctive / Conjunctive) aggregation
for i ∈ {1, . . . , p} do
u′N ← ((uj)i ⊗ ωi) ;
uN ← (uN ⊕ u′N) ;
L[u(N)]← 1
// where ⊗ = min (resp. max) , ωi = wi (resp. 1 - wi) and ⊕ = max (resp. min) in the
case of disjunctive (resp. conjunctive) aggregation
// Chance nodes
if N ∈ C then
//Reduce the compound lottery
foreach Y ∈ Succ(N) do
LY ← DynProgPost(Y, δ);
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
L[ui]← max(L[ui], (min(πN(Y ), LY [ui])));
// Decision nodes
if N ∈ D then
// Choice of the best decision
Y ∗ ← Succ(N).f irst ;
foreach Y ∈ Succ(N) do
LY ← DynProgPost(Y, δ);
if LY o LY ∗ then
Y ∗ ← Y ;
L← LY ∗ ;
δ(N)← Y ∗ ;
return δ;
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Algorithm 3: DynProgAnte: An adaptation of Dynamic Programming algorithm
for the optimization of “ex-ante” decision rules
Data: a node N
Result: An optimal strategy δ and its value u∗
begin
// Chance nodes
if X ∈ C then
// (Optimistic / Pessimistic) utility
foreach Y ∈ Succ(N) do
uY ← DynProgAnte(Y ) ;
for i ∈ {1, . . . , p} do
~u′N [i] = (ui ⊗ λy) ;
~uN [i] = ( ~uN [i]⊕ ~u′N [i]);
// where ⊗ = min (resp. max), λY = π(Y ) (resp. 1 - π(Y )) and ⊕ = max (resp.
min) in the case of optimistic (resp. pessimistic) utility
// Decision nodes
if X ∈ D then
// Choice of the best decision
Y ∗ ← Succ(N).f irst ;
foreach Y ∈ Succ(N) do
for i ∈ {1, . . . , p} do
~uY [i]← ( ~uY [i]⊗ ωi) ;
uY ← (uN ⊕ ~u′N [i]) ;
// where ⊗ = min (resp. max), ωi = wi (resp. 1 - wi) and ⊕ = max (resp. min) in
the case of disjunctive (resp. conjunctive) aggregation
if uY o uY ∗ then
Y ∗ ← Y ;
u∗ ← uY ∗ ;
δ(N)← Y ∗ ;
return u∗;
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6.4 Multi Dynamic Programming algorithm for the opti-
mization of U−maxante
The lack of monotonicity is not as dramatic as it may seem, at least forU−maxante . In this case indeed,
we are looking for a strategy that is good w.r.t. U− for at least one agent. This means that if it is
possible to get for each agent i a strategy that optimizes U− according to this agent (and this can
be done by Dynamic Programming, since U− does satisfy the principle of monotonicity), the one
with the highest value for U−maxante (L) is globally optimal. Formally:
Proposition 6.1. U−maxante (L) = max
i=1,p
min(wi, U−i (L))
where U−i (L) = minxj∈X max(1− L[xj ], ui(xj)) is the pessimistic utility of L according to the
sole agent i.
It then follows that:
Proposition 6.2. Let L be the set of lotteries that can be built on X and let:
• ∆∗ = {L∗1, . . . , L∗p} s.t. ∀L ∈ L, U−i (L∗i ) ≥ U−i (L);
• L∗ ∈ ∆∗ s.t. ∀L∗j ∈ ∆∗:
max
i=1,p
min(wi, U−i (L∗)) ≥ maxi=1,pmin(wi, U
−
i (L∗j )).
It holds that, for any L ∈ L, U−maxante (L∗) ≥ U−maxante (L).
Hence, it is enough to optimize w.r.t. each agent separately: First, we keep each of the p
strategies returned by the calls (DynProg(T, i)) to a classical Dynamic Programming algorithm
(Algorithm (Line 2)); presented in Section 4.3. Then, we to select among them the strategy with
the higher U−maxante value. This is the principle of the Multi Dynamic Programming approach
detailed by Algorithm 4.
6.5 Exact optimization of U+minante : a Branch and Bound
algorithm
Let us finally study the case of U+ minante . Since the preference order defined by this rule does not
satisfy the principle of monotonicity, the use of the DynProgAnte algorithm (Algorithm 3) may
be suboptimal . In this case like in the previous one, Dynamic Programming may provide a good
strategy, but without any guarantee of optimality.
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Algorithm 4: MultiDynProg: An adaptation of Dynamic Programming algorithm
for the optimization of U−maxante
Data: A tree T
Result: An optimal strategy δ∗ and its value u∗
begin
// Initialization
u∗ = 0;
for i ∈ {1, . . . , p} do
// Leaves
foreach N ∈ LN do
uN ← ~uN [i];
δi = DynProg(T, i)1;
uδi = Upes(δi);
u∗i = maxi=1...pmin(wi, u
∗
i );
if u∗i > u∗ then
δ∗ ← δi;
u∗ ← u∗i ;
return δ∗;
As an alternative, we have chosen to proceed by an implicit enumeration via a Branch and
Bound algorithm, following the approach proposed by Ben Amor et al. [9] for Possibilistic Cho-
quet integrals and by Gildas and Spanjaard [54] for Rank Dependent Utility (both in the mono
agent case). The Branch and Bound procedure (see Algorithm 5) takes as argument a partial
strategy δ and an upper bound of the U+ minante value of its best extension. It returns the U
+ min
ante
value of the best strategy found so far, δopt. As initial value for δ we retain the empty strategy
(δ(Di) = ⊥, ∀Di). We initialize δopt with the strategy provided by the Dynamic Programming:
indeed, even not necessarily providing an optimal strategy, this algorithm generally provides a
good one. At each step of the Branch and Bound algorithm, the current partial strategy, δ, is devel-
oped by the choice of an action for some unassigned decision node. When several decision nodes
are candidate, the one with the minimal rank (i.e. the former one according to the temporal order)
is developed. The recursive procedure backtracks when either the current strategy is complete
(then δoptand U+minoptante may be updated) or proves to be worse than the current δ
opt in any case.
In order to get an upper bound of the U+ minante utility of the best completion of δ, we call a
function UpperBound(D0, δ) that computes the optimistic U+i utility w.r.t. each agent i separately
and builds an optimal strategy δi relative to each i. It then returns the p strategies obtained us-
ing classical optimization of U+i by Dynamic Programming, introduces the weights (computes
min
i∈A
max((1− wi), U+i ) and then selects, among them, the one with the highest U+ minante .
Whenever the value U+ min returned by UpperBound(D0, δ) is lower or equal to the U+ min
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value of the current strategy δ the algorithm backtracks, yielding the choice of another action for
the last considered decision nodes. When δ is complete, UpperBound(D0, δ) = U+ minante (δ).
Algorithm 5: BB: A Branch and Bound algorithm for the optimization of U+ minante
Data: A (possibly partial) strategy δ, the evaluation of its utility (U+ min)
Result: U+minopt: the value of δopt i.e. the best strategy found so far
begin
if δ = ∅ then Dpend ← {D0} ;
else
Dpend ← {Di ∈ D s.t. δ(Di) = ⊥ and ∃Dj, δ(Dj) 6= ⊥ and Di ∈
Succ(δ(Dj))};
// Is δ a complete strategy ?
if Dpend = ∅ then
if U+ min > U+−opt then
δopt ← δ;
U+minopt ← U+ min;
else
Dnext ← arg minDi∈Dpend i ;
foreach Ci ∈ Succ(Dnext) do
δ(Dnext)← Ci;
U+ min ← UpperBound(D0, δ);
if U+ min > U+minopt then U+minopt ← BB(U+ min, δ) ;
return U+minopt;
6.6 Conclusion
This Chapter focuses on the optimization of qualitative decision rules for collective decision mak-
ing in context of possibilistic uncertainty. Since all the ex-post decision rules, as well as U+maxante
and U−minante satisfy the weak monotonicity property, we have proposed to use Dynamic Program-
ming (Algorithm 2 for ex-post decision rules and Algorithm 3 for U+maxante and U
−min
ante ). For the
remaining utilities, the optimization was carried out using exact algorithms: Multi-Dynamic Pro-
gramming for U+maxante (Algorithm 4) and Branch and Bound for U
−min
ante (Algorithm 5). The quality
of solutions provided by these algorithms is studied in the next Chapter.
CHAPITRE 7
Experimental study
7.1 Introduction
This chapter is dedicated to the experimental study of the algorithms presented in Chapter 6. It
is organized as follows: Section 7.2 explains the experimental protocol and specifies the structure
of the implemented problems, then Section 7.3 provides an empirical comparison of different
algorithms in term of CPU time and in term of “quality” of the solutions.
7.2 Experimental protocol
In order to explore the feasibility of our algorithms (proposed in the previous chapter), we have
implemented them using Java; the computational experiments described in this chapter were car-
ried out on a dedicated PC with an Intel(R) Core(TM)i7-2670 QMCPU, 2.2Ghz processor, 64
bits architecture, 6Gb RAM memory and under Windows 7 operating system. The aim of the
experiments is twofold: First of all, we would like to explore the “quality” of solutions, for the
problematic cases of U−maxante and U
+ min
ante , where Dynamical Programming can provide a subopti-
mal strategy and compare the performances of respectively the Multi-Dynamic Programming and
the Branch and Bound approaches with those of the sole Dynamic Programming procedure. Sec-
ondly, we would like to compare the accuracy of results provided by the ex-post approach as an
approximation of the ex-ante approach.
The experiments were performed on complete binary decision trees with different heights. We
have considered four sets of problems, the number of decisions to be made in sequence (denoted
seq) varying from 2 to 6, with an alternation of decision and chance nodes: at each decision level
l (i.e. odd levels), the tree contains 2l−1 decision nodes followed by 2l chance nodes. Thus, the
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number of chance nodes in each tree is equal to |C| = |D| ∗ 2 and the number of leaves is equal
to |LN | = |D|+ |C|+ 1. This means that for the set of problems with a sequence length seq = 2
(resp. 3, 4, 5, 6), the number of decision nodes is equal to |D| = 5 (resp. 21, 85, 341, 1365) and
the number of nodes in the tree equal to |N | = |D| + |C| + |LN | = 31 (resp. 127, 511, 2047,
8191), see Figure 7.1 for an example of a structure of a generated decision tree with a sequence
length seq = 2.
D0 
D2 
D1 
C3 
C1 
C2 
C4 
C5 
C6 
D4 
D3 
C7 
C8 
C9 
C10 
….. 
……
…… 
….. 
……
……
……
……
……
……
……
……
……
……
……
……
……
……
……
……
……
……
……
……
…… 
Figure 7.1: Structure of the generated decision trees for seq = 2.
The utility values as well as the weights degrees are randomly fired in the set U = W =
{0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9, 1} following an equiprobable distribution. Conditional possibilities are cho-
sen randomly in [0, 1] and normalized. Each of the four samples of problems contains 1000 ran-
domly generated trees.
7.3 Results and interpretation
Feasibility analysis and temporal performances
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 present the execution CPU time of the proposed algorithms for the optimization
of respectively the ex-post (Algorithm 2) and the ex-ante criteria (Algorithms 3, 4 and 5) in the
case of 3 agents. Obviously, for any algorithm, the execution CPU time increases according to
the size of the tree. But the times remains affordable in average even for big trees (341 and 1365
decision nodes). Unsurprisingly, we can check that the approximation performed using Dynamic
Programming for U−maxante (resp. U
+ min
ante ) are faster than the Multi-Dynamic Programming and
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the Branch and Bound algorithm, respectively, which are exact algorithms. Unsurprisingly also,
the difference in CPU time between Branch and Bound and the approximation using Dynamic
Programming is more important than the difference between Multi-Dynamic Programming and its
approximation by Dynamic Programming.
U− min U+ max U− maxpost U
+ min
post
Decision nodes number\Algorithm DynProg DynProg DynProg DynProg
5 0.068 0.071 0.068 0.067
21 0.073 0.075 0.083 0.075
85 0.076 0.082 0.090 0.082
341 0.126 0.128 0.140 0.132
1365 0.215 0.207 0.235 0.211
Table 7.1: Average CPU time (in milliseconds) for ex-post utilities
U− maxante U
+ min
ante
Decision nodes number\Algorithm DynProg MultiDynProg DynProg BB
5 0.079 0.172 0.074 0.576
21 0.096 0.203 0.084 1.012
85 0.120 0.247 0.097 1.252
341 0.147 0.295 0.139 1.900
1365 0.254 1.068 0.231 5.054
Table 7.2: Average CPU time (in milliseconds) for ex-ante utilities
Furthermore, to study the effects of varying the number of agents, we consider the optimization
of U−maxante , for reasonable trees (85 decision nodes) with p agents from 4 to 7, using the more time-
consuming algorithm (Branch and Bound). Clearly, as shown in Table 7.3, the average CPU time
with 4 agents, is about 2 milliseconds and the maximal CPU time for decision trees with 7 agent is
less than 4 milliseconds. Thus, we can say that the results are good enough to allow the handling
of real-size problems.
Number of agents
4 5 6 7
U−maxante 2.190 3.237 3.782 3.863
Table 7.3: Average CPU time (in milliseconds) for U−maxante using Branch and Bound algo-
rithms for trees with 85 decision nodes
Quality of the approximations of U−maxante and U+minante
As mentioned above, the monotonicity principle does not apply for U−maxante and U
+ min
ante and Dy-
namic Programming (Algorithm 3) can lead to suboptimal strategies. In order to get an optimal
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strategy for sure, we must use a complete algorithm, i.e. the Multi-Dynamic Programming (for
U−maxante ) and Branch and Bound (for U
+ min
ante ) which may be much slower.
On the other hand, Dynamic Programming may find good strategies, and even the optimal one.
That is why we propose to estimate the quality of the approximations by comparing them to the
values generated by the multi-Dynamic Programming (for U−maxante ) and Branch and Bound (for
U+ minante ).
The comparisons are made as follows: we compute for different trees the number of cases for
which the value provided by the approximation (Dynamical Programming) is the optimal one, and
for the problems on which it fails, we report the closeness value equal to VApproxVExact where VApprox is
relative to the strategy provided by Dynamic Programming (Algorithm 3) and VExact is the value
provided by the exact Algorithms: Multi Dynamic Programming or Branch and Bound.
The results are presented in Tables 7.4 and 7.5: it appears that ex-ante Dynamic Programming
provides a very good approximation for the U+ minante case: it provides the same optimal utility as the
Branch and Bound Algorithm in about 70% of cases, with an average closeness value of 94%. This
is not the case for the approximation of U−maxante , where in most of the time, Dynamic Programming
fails to provide the optimal strategy. However, this is not so bad news since Multi-Dynamic
Programming is a polynomial algorithm and its experimental CPU time is very affordable.
Number of Decision Nodes
5 21 85 341 1365
U−maxante 17.3% 19% 22.1% 26.4% 31%
U+ minante 87% 76.8% 68% 62.6% 59.6%
Table 7.4: Percentage of problems for which the Dynamical Programming value is correct
Number of Decision Nodes
5 21 85 341 1365
U−maxante 0.522 0.56 0.614 0.962 0.981
U+ minante 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.91
Table 7.5: Average closeness value Uante(δapprox)
Uante(δoptimal)
of the strategy provided by ex-ante Dy-
namical Programming
Finally, we complete the picture by a comparison of the ex-post and ex-ante utilities; recall that
they are strongly correlated: it holds that U−maxpost (L) ≥ U−maxante (L) and U+ minante (L) ≥ U+ minpost (L).
It appears that in about 90% of the cases, U+ minpost (L) = U+ minante (L) but U−maxpost (L) = U−maxante (L)
only in 15% of the cases. We have then repeated the experiment on decision tree (Tables 7.6 and
7.7).
It appears that in 90% of the cases, the optimal value of U+ minpost is also optimal for U+ minante .
Moreover, even when the ex-post approach fails to get a strategy optimal for the ex-ante one, the
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quality of the approximation is good, as shown in Table 7.7) . We can conclude that for U+ min
the ex-post approach is to be a good approximation of the ex-ante one. Since ex-post Dynamical
Programming is faster than the Branch and Bound, we can think about using it as an approximate
algorithm for getting good ex-ante strategies. Unfortunately this is not the case for U−max. For
this rule, the optimal value of U−maxpost is equal to U
−max
ante in only 20% of the cases, and the quality
of the approximation is low.
Number of Decision Nodes
5 21 85 341 1365
U−maxante 15.4% 23.6% 30.7% 35.6% 40.4%
U+ minante 91.7% 90.8% 88.2% 86.7% 76%
Table 7.6: Percentage of problems for which the ex-post optimal strategy is also ex-ante
optimal
Number of Decision Nodes
5 21 85 341 1365
U−maxante 0.473 0.529 0.556 0.58 0.52
U+ minante 0.989 0.975 0.946 0.928 0.98
Table 7.7: Average closeness value Uante(δ)
Uante∗ of the Uante value provided by the best ex-post
approximation compared to the value of the globally best ex-ante strategy
7.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have performed experiments on different decision trees built randomly in order
to study the quality of solutions provided by the different algorithms provided in Chapter 6.
We have compared these algorithms w.r.t their execution CPU time, and then we have studied
the percentage of accuracy between Dynamic Programming and the pertinent exact algorithms
(Multi-dynamic programming and Branch and Bound), on one hand, and percentage of accuracy
of the ex-post approach as an approximation of the ex-ante one, on the other hand.
For U+minante , both approximations are good, and it should be possible to avoid a full Branch
and Bound based enumeration. They are not so good for U+maxante , but this has a little impact, since
we get a polynomial (and efficient in practice) algorithm for this rule.
CHAPITRE 8
Towards collective decision rules for agents with
subjective knowledge
8.1 Introduction
In Chapter 5 we have proposed an axiomatic justification of the fully max-oriented and min-
oriented utilities (U+max and U−min) in the style of Von Neuman and Morgenstern. In the present
chapter, we are interested in a Savage like formalization.
In Section 8.2, we generalize Savage’s framework to collective decision making by consider-
ing a new dimension relative to agents in addition to the two standard dimensions i.e. events and
consequences. Then in Section 8.3, we focus our attention on the particular case of collective deci-
sion making under uncertainty by proposing axioms specific to agents and more precisely to their
knowledge and their importance. Finally, we show in Section 8.4 that the qualitative collective
decision rules U−min and U+max obey these axioms.
8.2 Extending Savage’s framework for multi-agent deci-
sion making under uncertainty
In Savage’s original setting [82], an act is a function that maps any state to a consequence. In a
multi-agent setting, each agent gets a consequence. Formally, let us use the following notations:
• X is the set of consequences,
• S is a set of states,
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• A is a set of p agents,
• An act is a function f : S × A 7→ X: f(s, i) denotes the utility of f(s) for agent i. We
can also consider that f is a function from S to Xp and denote f(s) ∈ Xp the vector of
elements of X associated by f to s. F is the set of such functions.
•  a preference relation on F ;  denotes its asymmetric part, ∼ its symmetric part.
First of all, we recall the following basic axioms of Savage that apply to our context without any
change:
Axiom. (Sav1: Weak order)  is complete and transitive.
Axiom. (Sav5: Non triviality) ∃ f, g ∈ F such that f  g.
The remaining axioms and definitions proposed by Savage need to be generalized.
Compound acts and the Sure Thing Principle
In Savage’s framework, for any event E ⊆ S and any pair of acts f, g, the Compound act fEg is
the act that provides the same consequence as f for any state s ∈ E and the same consequence
than g for any state s /∈ E. In a multi-agent framework, the composition of acts can be generalized
as follows:
Definition 8.1 (Compound act).
Given two acts f and g and any P ⊆ S ×A, the compound act fPg is defined by:
fPg(s, i) =
{
f(s, i) if (s, i) ∈ P,
g(s, i) otherwise.
Given two acts f and g and an agent i ∈ A, the f{i}g denotes the compound act f{i} × Sg
that provides the same consequences as f for agent i and the same consequences as g for the other
agents:
f{i}g(s, j) =
{
f(s, j) if j = i,
g(s, j) otherwise.
Given two acts f and g and any event E ⊆ S, the compound act fEg denotes the com-
pound act fE × Ag that provides the same consequences as f for the states in E and the same
consequences as g for the other states:
fEg(s, i) =
{
f(s, i) if s ∈ E,
g(s, i) otherwise .
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Figure 8.1: Multi-agent compound act
Figure 8.1 illustrates an example of a compound act for three agents.
This generalization of the notion of compound acts allows us to straightforwardly extend Sav-
age’s Sure Thing Principle to multi-agent decision making under uncertainty as follows:
Axiom (Sav2: “Sure Thing Principle"). For any acts f, g, h, h′ ∈ F , for any P ⊆ S ×A,
fPh  gPh iff fPh′  gPh′.
Grant et al. [56, 57] proposed a weak version of the Sure Thing Principle, which is mainly
a principle of weak decomposability. Another weak form of the Sure Thing Principle has been
defined by Dubois et al. [32, 34] as a weak independence axiom. They can be written as follows:
Axiom (wSTP: “Weak Decomposability"). For any acts f, g ∈ F , for any P ⊆ S ×A,
fPg  g and gPf  g =⇒ f  g.
Axiom (wSav2: “Weak Independence"). For any acts f, g, h, h′ ∈ F , for any P ⊆ S ×A,
fPh  gPh =⇒ fPh′  gPh′.
The classical axioms are recovered when A contains only one agent.
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After generalizing compound acts, we can now consider the following generalization of the
conditioning by restricting  to a subset P of A× S:
Definition 8.2. (Conditioning on P) ∀P ⊆ A× S, f P g iff ∀h, fPh  gPh.
Like in Savage’s work, it follows from this definition that P is a weak order:
Proposition 8.1. Consider any P ⊆ A× S; we have:
• f ∼P g iff ∀h ∈ F , fPh ∼ gPh.
• if Sav1 holds, then f P g iff ∀h ∈ F , fPh  gPh and ∃ h, fPh  gPh.
• P is transitive.
• if Sav1 and wSav2 holds, then P is complete.
Proof of Proposition 8.1.
• f ∼P g writes ∀h ∈ F , fPh  gPh and ∀h ∈ F , fPh  gPh which is equivalent to
∀h ∈ F , fPh ∼ gPh
• f P g writes ∀h ∈ F , fPh  gPh and ∃h ∈ F , (gPh  fPh); Since  is complete,
we get f P g iff ∀h ∈ F , fPh  gPh and ∃h ∈ F , fPh  gPh.
• The transitivity of P is obvious: ∀h ∈ F , fPh  gPh and ∀h ∈ F , gPh  kPh implies
∀h ∈ F , fPh  kPh.
• Consider any acts f ,g ∈ F . Three cases are considered (they are exclusive, and exhaustive
thanks to Sav1):
– If fPh  gPh then by wSav2 we have ∀h′, fPh′  gPh′, i.e. f P g;
– If gPh  fPh then by wSav2 we have ∀h′, gPh′  fPh′, i.e. g P f ;
– If ∀h ∈ F , fPh ∼ gPh we get f ∼P g. Hence the completeness of P .
We define the restriction of  to a subset of I agents, its restriction to a single agent i and its
restriction to an event E in a similar way:
Definition 8.3.
• ∀E ⊆ S, f E g iff f A×E g.
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• ∀I ⊆ A, f I g iff f I×S g.
• ∀i ∈ A, f i g iff f {i} g.
That is to say: f E g iff for any h, fEh  gEh, f I g iff for any h, fIh  gIh and
f i g iff for any h, f{i}h  g{i}h. As a corollary of the previous proposition, all these relations
are complete and transitive.
In Savage’s work, an event is null whenever it does not make any difference between the acts;
the same definition can be used to characterize null agents:
Definition 8.4. (Null agents, null events)
• A set of agents I ⊆ A is null iff ∀f, g, h ∈ F , fIh ∼ gIh.
• An agent i ∈ A is null whenever {i} is null.
• An event E ⊆ S is null iff ∀f, g, h ∈ F , fEh ∼ gEh.
We will see in Section 8.2 how to derive the knowledge of the agents from the global prefer-
ence relation. But to this extent, we need to develop the notion of constant act, which will allow
us to derive from  the individual preferences on X .
Constant acts, individual and global preferences of X
Up to this point, the generalization of compound acts and conditioning notions was straightfor-
ward; it is slightly more complex for constant acts. Recall that constant acts in the sense of Savage
are acts that are constant over the set of states. In our context, we get three notions: acts that
gives the same vector of consequences for any state (constant acts), acts that do not make any
difference between the agents i.e. in a given state, all receive the same consequence (we call then
common acts) and acts that give the same consequence for all agents and all states (we call them
representative acts).
Definition 8.5.
• A constant act f is an act that maps the same vector of utilities to any state: ∀s, s′ ∈ S,
∀i ∈ A, f(s, i) = f(s′, i).
• A common act f is an act such that whatever f , state s maps the same utility to any agent:
∀s ∈ S,∀i, i′ ∈ A, f(s, i) = f(s, i′).
• ∀x ∈ X , the representative act of x (denoted by [x]) is the constant (and common) act
that provides x to any state and any agent:
∀s ∈ S, ∀i ∈ A, f(s, i) = x.
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A constant act maps the same vector to any state: what an agent gets does not depend on the
state of the world. The set of constant acts is ordered by . By identification of Xp with the set
of constant acts, any ~x ∈ Xp, ~x also denotes the corresponding constant act. For any ~x, ~y ∈ Xp
we write ~x  ~y whenever the constant act providing ~x for any s is at least as good (according to
) as the one providing ~y for any s:  is the common preference order on Xp.
A representative act [x] is a constant act that maps the same consequence, x, to any state and
any agent: everybody receives x, and this for any state. X is ordered by (which is a weak order):
we say that x is as least as good as y (and we denote x  y) whenever the representative act [x] is
preferred to [y].
In this work, (X,) is interpreted as a scale of satisfaction common to all the agents. To this
extend, we shall propose the following axiom:
Axiom (CS: Common Scale). For any non null agent i ∈ A,
[x]  [y] iff [x] i [y].
For some decision rules, it may happen that an agent i is not important enough: his preference
is drowned when x and y are not high in the scale, and thus not revealed by i. In this case, the
following weak version of CS may be preferred:
Axiom (wCS: Weak Common Scale). For any agent i ∈ A,
[x]  [y] implies [x] i [y].
Let us now go back to Savage’s axioms. The third axiom of Savage states that the preference
onX is not sensitive to the conditioning on non null events; we write it here in its classical version
and in its weak variant:
Axiom (Sav3). For any x, y ∈ X , for any non null event E ⊆ S,
[x]  [y] iff [x] E [y].
Axiom (wSav3). For any x, y ∈ X , for any event E ⊆ S,
[x]  [y] =⇒ [x] E [y].
Axioms Sav3/wSav3 are very close to axioms CS/wCS; it can be possible to see them as
two particular cases of a more general axiom ensuring the coherence on the conditioning of the
preference over X on any P ⊆ A×S (and not only the subsets of the form {i}×S and the events
A× E).
Axiom (Cond). For any x, y ∈ X , for any non null P ⊆ A× S,
[x]  [y] iff [x] P [y].
Axiom (wCond). For any x, y ∈ X ,for any P ⊆ A× S,
[x]  [y] =⇒ [x] P [y].
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Proposition 8.2.
If Sav1 and wSav2 hold then for any disjoint subsets P, P ′ of A × S, if f P g and f P ′ g
then f P∪P ′ g.
Proof of Proposition 8.2. Suppose that f P g and f P ′ g, i.e. that ∀h, fPh  gPh and
∀h, fP ′h  gP ′h. Then, thanks to wSav2 for any h we have:
fPfP ′  gPfP ′h and ∀h, gPfP ′h  gPgP ′h; by transitivity we get ∀h, fPfP ′h  gPgP ′h,
i.e. f P∪P ′ g.
Pareto Unanimity axiom; that is essential for collective decision making; is defined as follows:
Axiom (Pareto Unanimity). If ∀i, s, f(s, i)  g(s, i), then f  g.
It holds that:
Proposition 8.3. If Sav1, wSav2 and wSav3 then Pareto Unanimity holds.
Proof of Proposition 8.3. Suppose that ∀(s, i), f(s, i)  g(s, i); then by wSav3 we have:
∀(s, i), [f(s, i)] {(s,i)} [g(s, i)]; the repeated application of Proposition 8.2 leads to f  g.
Conversely, it is possible to show that wCond (and thus wSav3 and wCS) is a consequence
of Pareto.
Proposition 8.4. If Pareto Unanimity is satisfied then wCond holds.
Proof of Proposition 8.4. Consider any P ⊆ A×S and let x and y be two consequences such that
[x]  [y] (and thus x  y) and consider the compound acts [x]Ph and [y]Ph; it holds that ∀i ∈ A:
• if (s, i) ∈ P , then [x]Ph(s, i) = x  [y]Ph(s, i) = y,
• if (s, i) /∈ P , then [x]Ph(s, i) = [y]Ph(s, i) = h(s, i).
Thus by Pareto Unanimity we have: [x]Ph  [y]Ph. We did not put any restriction on h. Hence
∀h, [x]Ph  [y]Ph, i.e. [x] P [y], which proves that wCond is a consequence of Pareto
Unanimity.
Corollary 8.1. If Pareto Unanimity is satisfied, then wCS holds.
In other terms, Pareto unanimity also guarantees that construction is well founded, since it
allows us to get back the weak form of Axiom CS (Coherence of the scale). Another consequence
of Pareto unanimity is that the scale contains an ideal and anti ideal consequence, which we will
denote > and ⊥.
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Proposition 8.5. If Pareto Unanimity holds, then there exists > and ⊥ ∈ X such as, whatever
i ∈ A, h ∈ F ,
• [>]  f  [⊥].
• [>] i f i [⊥].
Proof of Proposition 8.5. Consider two consequences > and ⊥ ∈ X the best and worst conse-
quences (Sav1 allows them to exist: the restriction of  on representative acts is a weak order).
• For any f ∈ F , s ∈ S, i ∈ A, it holds that [>](s, i) = >  f(s, i); then Pareto implies
that [>]  f . In a similar way, it holds that f(s, i)  [⊥](s, i) = ⊥; then Pareto implies
that f  [⊥].
• For any f, h ∈ F , s ∈ S, i ∈ A, consider the act [>]{i}h and f{i}h. It holds that
[>]ih(s, i) = >  f{i}h(s, i) = f(s, i) for any s besides [>]ih(s, j) = h(s, j) ∼
f{i}h(s, j) for any s, j 6= i. Then by Pareto unanimity we get [>]{i}h  f{i}h. Since we
did not put any restriction on h, [>]{i}h  f{i}h for any h, i.e. [>] i f .
• The proof of f i [⊥] is similar to the above proof of [>] i f .
Because Pareto is a consequence of Sav1, wSav2 and wSav3, we get:
Corollary 8.2. If Sav1, wSav2 and wSav3, then there exists > and ⊥ ∈ X such as, whatever
i ∈ A, h ∈ F ,
• [>]  f  [⊥].
• [>] i f i [⊥].
The proof of Corollary 8.2 is obvious and it is a direct consequence of Propositions 8.3 and
8.5.
Likelihood of the events
Classically, the relative likelihood of the events follows from the observation of binary acts, i.e.
acts of the form [x]E[y]. This requires the satisfaction of the following axiom, which is a weak
form of Savage’s fourth axiom.
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Axiom (Sav4). For any consequences x, y, x′, y′ ∈ X , if [x]  [y] and [x′]  [y′], then ∀E,D ⊆
S we have: [x]E[y]  [x]D[y]⇔ [x′]E[y′]  [x′]D[y′].
Axiom (wSav4). For any consequences x, y, x′, y′ ∈ X , if [x]  [y], [x′]  [y′] and [x]E[y] 
[x]D[y] then [x′]E[y′]  [x′]D[y′].
Following Savage, we can define the relative likelihood of events as the relation  on 2S as:
Definition 8.6. (Likelihood of events relative to collectivity)
E  D iff ∀x, y ∈ X s.t. [x]  [y] : [x]E[y]  [x]D[y].
We can also define the personal belief of agent i:
Definition 8.7. (Likelihood of events relative to an agent)
E i D iff ∀x, y ∈ X s.t. [x] i [y], [x]E[y] i [x]D[y].
From wSav4, it follows that E  D when ∀x, y ∈ X s.t. [x]  [y], [x]E[y]  [x]D[y] and
∃x, y ∈ X s.t. [x]  [y], [x]E[y]  [x]D[y] (and similarly for the i), and that:
Proposition 8.6. If Sav1 and wSav4 are satisfied, then  is a weak order on 2S .
Proof of Proposition 8.6.
• Let D and E be any two events. We consider three cases; either there exist x, y ∈ X s.t.
[x]  [y] and [x]E[y]  [x]D[y], or there exist x, y ∈ X s.t. [x]  [y] and [x]D[y] 
[x]E[y], or for any x, y ∈ X s.t. [x]  [y], [x]E[y] ∼ [x]D[y]. Notice that the three cases
are exclusive, thanks to wSav4.
– If there exist x, y ∈ X s.t. [x]  [y] and [x]E[y]  [x]D[y], then by wSav4
[x′]E[y′]  [x′]D[y′] for any x′, y′ such that [x′]  [y′] and thus [x]E[y]  [x]D[y].
– If there exist x, y ∈ X s.t. [x]  [y] and [x]D[y]  [x]E[y], we get [x]D[y]  [x]E[y]
in the same way.
– If for any x, y ∈ X s.t. [x]  [y], [x]E[y] ∼ [x]D[y] we get [x]E[y]  [x]D[y] and
[x]D[y]  [x]E[y], i.e. [x]E[y] ∼ [x]D[y].
 on 2S is thus complete.
• Consider 3 events C,D,E such that E  D and D  C. This writes for any x, y ∈ X s.t.
[x]  [y] : [x]E[y]  [x]D[y] and [x]D[y]  [x]C[y]; the transitivity of  (Sav1) implies
that for any x, y ∈ X s.t. [x]  [y] : [x]E[y]  [x]C[y]: we get E  C, which proofs the
transitivity of  on 2S .
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Proposition 8.7. If Sav1, wSav2 , wSav3 and wSav4 are satisfied, for any agent i,i is a weak
order on 2S .
Proof of Proposition 8.7.
• Let D and E be any two events. By definition [x]E[y] i [x]D[y] iff ∀h, [x]E×{i}[y]Ē×
{i}h  [x]D × {i}[y]D̄ × {i}h, and in particular [x]E × {i}[y]Ē × {i}[y]  [x]D ×
{i}[y]D̄ × {i}[y], i.e. [x]E × {i}[y]  [x]D × {i}[y].
We consider three cases; either there exist x, y ∈ X s.t. [x]  [y] and [x]E × {i}[y] 
[x]D × {i}[y], or there exist x, y ∈ X s.t. [x]  [y] and [x]D × {i}[y]  [x]E × {i}[y],
or for any x, y ∈ X s.t. [x]E × {i}[y] ∼ [x]D × {i}[y]. Notice that the three cases are
exclusive.
– If there exist x, y ∈ X s.t. [x]E × {i}[y]  [x]D × {i}[y], then by wSav4 [x′]E ×
{i}[y′]  [x′]D × {i}[y′] for any x′, y′ such that [x′]  [y′]; by wSav2 we get
∀h, [x′]E × {i}[y′]Ē × {i}h  [x′]D × {i}[y′]D̄ × {i}h, thus [x]E[y] i [x]D[y].
– If there exist x, y ∈ X s.t. [x]  [y] and [x]D[y]  [x]E[y], we get [x]D[y] i
[x]E[y] in the same way.
– If for any x, y ∈ X s.t. [x]  [y], [x]E × {i}[y] ∼ [x]D × {i}[y], by wSav2, its
holds that ∀h, [x]E × {i}[y]Ē × {i}h ∼ [x]D × {i}[y]D̄ × {i}h. Thus, x, y ∈ X
s.t. [x]  [y] we have ∀h, [x]E × {i}[y]Ē × {i}h ∼ [x]D × {i}[y]D̄ × {i}h i.e.
[x]E[y] ∼i [x]D[y].
i on 2S is thus complete.
• Consider 3 events C,D,E such that E i D and D i C. This writes forall x, y ∈ X s.t.
[x]  [y]: ∀h, [x]E×{i}[y]Ē×{i}h  [x]D×{i}[y]D̄×{i}h and ∀h, [x]D×{i}[y]D̄×
{i}h  [x]C × {i}[y]C̄ × {i}h. The transitivity of  (Sav1) implies that x, y ∈ X s.t.
[x]  [y],∀h, [x]E × {i}[y]Ē × {i}h  [x]C × {i}[y]C̄ × {i}h, i.e. ∀x, y ∈ X s.t.
[x]  [y][x]E[y] i [x]C[y]: we get E  C, which proves the transitivity of i on 2S .
8.3 Axioms for qualitative collective decision making un-
der uncertainty
In the previous Section, we have simply generalized Savage’s model so as to add a new dimension,
the possibility of handling more than one agent. None of these axioms deals specifically with the
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influence of agents, but the axiom CS (Coherence of the scale) that was presented in the previous
Section because strongly related to Pareto Unanimity. For the sake of brevity, we assume from
this point, that Sav1, wSav2, wSav4, Sav5 are satisfied. Besides, we assume either the Pareto
Unanimity axiom, that is a very weak and very natural assumption for collective decision making,
or wSav3 that is equivalent to Pareto given Sav1 and Sav2. Let us now study additional axioms
that are more related to the presence of several agents.
Additional axioms of collective decision making
The knowledge of an agent, i.e. the relative likelihood that each of them gives to events, may
cohere or not. Of course, if ∀i ∈ A,E i D, the principle of Pareto Unanimity implies that
E  D, i.e. if all the agents share the same knowledge then this knowledge is common (for the
collectivity). However, the reciprocal is not necessarily true, since at the present point, nothing
forbids that the agents disagree with the likelihood of events. To overcome this, we explicitly
assume the following axiom of common knowledge:
Axiom (wCok: Weak Common Knowledge). For any events E,D ⊆ S, for any agent non null
i ∈ A, E  D implies E i D.
It may happen that E  D while E ∼i D because agent i is not important enough: her
preference is drowned when the likelihood of E and D is not high in the scale, and thus not
revealed by i. When all the agents are decisive and share the same importance, a stronger axiom
can be used:
Axiom (Cok: Common Knowledge). For any events E,D ⊆ S, for any agent non null i ∈ A,
E  D iff E i D.
In some cases, all the agents are equally important; this corresponds to an axiom of anonymity,
that guarantees the fairness of the decision: no agent is more important than another and the
preference is always stable even by changing the role of any two agents. Formally, we write:
Axiom (Ano: Anonymity). For any agents i, j ∈ A, for any acts f, f ′, g, g′ ∈ F such that
f(s, i) = f ′(s, j), f(s, j) = f ′(s, i), g(s, i) = g′(s, j), g(s, j) = g′(s, i), f  g iff f ′  g′.
Finally, we shall consider the following axiom that enables each agent to have some power to
make decision when others are indifferent.
Axiom (Decision). For any agent i ∈ A, ∃ f, g, h ∈ F such that fih  gih.
Axioms of qualitative decision
We finally set Dubois et al’s axioms relative toUopt andUpes [24,32,34] to the multi-agent context:
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Axiom. (RDD: Restricted disjunctive dominance) Let f and g be any two acts and [x] be a
representative act of value x: f  g and f  x⇒ f  g ∨ [x] (where g ∨ [x] gives the best of the
results of g(s, i) and x in each pair (s, i)).
Axiom. (RCD: Restricted conjunctive dominance) Let f and g be any two acts and [x] be a
representative act of value x: g  f and x  f ⇒ g ∧ [x]  f (where g ∧ [x] gives the worst of
the results of g(s, i) and x in each pair (s, i)).
Axiom. (NC: Non compensation) Whatever E ⊆ S, x, y ∈ X:
• [>]E[y] ∼ y or [>]E[y] ∼ [>]E[⊥].
• [x]E[⊥] ∼ x or [x]E[⊥] ∼ [>]E[⊥].
The meaning of the axioms does not change when extended to the multi-agent context: Axiom
RDD says that if an act f is preferred to an act g and also preferred to a representative act x, then
f still preferred to g even if the worst consequences of g are improved to the value x. AxiomRCD
is the dual property of the restricted disjunctive dominance. It allows a partial decomposability of
qualitative utility with respect to the conjunction of acts in the case where one of them is constant.
The other axioms can be written without any modification:
Axiom. (DD: Disjunctive dominance) Let f ,g,h be any three acts: f  g and f  h
⇒ f  g ∨ h.
Axiom. (RCD: Conjunctive dominance) Let f ,g,h be any three acts: f  g and f  h
⇒ f  g ∧ h.
Axiom. (Pes: Pessimism) ∀f, g ∈ F and E ⊆ S. If fEg  f then f  gEf .
Axiom. (Opt: Optimism) ∀f, g ∈ F and E ⊆ S. If f  fEg then gEf  f .
8.4 Properties of collective qualitative decision rules in
style of Savage
We now study the fully min-oriented and max-oriented decision rules in light of the axioms pre-
sented above. Hence, we show that these axioms are consistent and obeyed by the pessimistic
egalitarian utility (U−min) and by its optimistic counterpart (U+ max). We suppose here, without
loss of generality, that X is a subset of [0, 1] and consider a set of acts F built from S × A to
X ⊆ [0, 1] (with {0, 1} ⊆ X); a possibility distribution of S and a set of weights wi. U−min and
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U+ max write:
U−min(f) = min
i=1,p
max(1− wi,min
s∈S
max(f(s, i), 1− π(s))).
= min
s∈S
max(1− π(s), min
i=1,p
max(1− wi, f(s, i))).
U+ max = max
i=1,p
min(wi,max
s∈S
min(f(s, i), π(s))).
= max
s∈S
min(π(s),max
i=1,p
min(wi, f(s, i))).
It holds that:
Proposition 8.8.
The relation  defined by: f  g iff U−min(f) ≥ U−min(g), satisfies axioms Sav1, Sav5,
wSav2, wSav3, wSav4, ParetoUnanimity, NC, RDD, PES, wCS and wCoK.
If we suppose that we are in a pure egalitarian context (wi = 1, i = 1, p), we get:
U−min(f) = min
i=1,p
min
s∈S
max(f(s, i), 1− π(s))).
In this case, the preference relation satisfies Ano and Decision. Since the agents’ weights do
not have a role anymore, CS and Cok are satisfied in their full strength:
Proposition 8.9.
The relation  defined by:
f  g iff min
i=1,p
min
s∈S
max(f(s, i), 1− π(s))) ≥ min
i=1,p
min
s∈S
max(g(s, i), 1− π(s))),
satisfies axioms Sav1, Sav5, wSav2, wSav3, wSav4, ParetoUnanimity, NC, RDD, PES,
CS, Cok, Ano as well as Decision.
Proof of Proposition 8.8.
•  trivially satisfies Sav1 (each act is given by a global utility on [0, 1]).
•  satisfies wSav2:
Consider f, g, h ∈ F , P ∈ S × A such that U−min(fPh)  U−min(gPh) and any fourth
act h′, Let:
a = min
s∈P
max(1− π(s),min
i∈A
max(1− wi, f(s, i))),
b = min
s∈P
max(1− π(s),min
i∈A
max(1− wi, g(s, i))),
c = min
s∈P̄
max(1− π(s),min
i∈A
max(1− wi, h(s, i))),
c′ = min
s∈P̄
max(1− π(s),min
i∈A
max(1− wi, h′(s, i))).
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It holds that:
U−min(fPh) = min(a, c) U−min(gPh) = min(b, c)
U−min(fPh′) = min(a, c′) U−min(gPh) = min(b, c′)
U−min(fPh)  U−min(gPh) iff min(a, c) > min(b, c). Then for any d, min(a, d) ≥
min(b, d); for d = c′ we get min(a, c′) ≥ min(b, c′), i.e. U−min(fPh′) ≥ U−min(gPh′).
Hence U−min(fPh)  U−min(gPh) implies U−min(fPh′)  U−min(gPh′) for any h′:
wSav2 is satisfied.
• Pareto Unanimity follows from the fact that the max and min operators are monotonic
(U−min do not decrease when one of the f(s, i) increases).
• wSav3 follows from Sav1, wSav2 and Pareto Unanimity.
•  satisfies wSav4:
When all the agents receive the same consequence, U−min writes as a classical, mono agent
pessimistic utility. Gambles of the form [x]E[y] do assign the same consequence to all the
agents (namely, whatever i, [x]E[y](s, i) = x if s ∈ E and [x]E[y](s, i) = y is s /∈ E)
- we recover the mono agent case, with U−min([x]E[y]) = median(x,N(E), y). The
satisfaction of wSav4 follows from its satisfaction in the mono-agent case.
• Sav5 is satisfied by construction.
•  satisfies wCoK:
Consider to events E,D such that E  D, i.e. ∀x, y such that x > y, U−min(xEy) ≥
U−min(xDy); as previously noticed, U−min([x]E[y]) = median(x,N(E), y) and we
have U−min([x]D[y]) = median(x,N(D), y). Thus for any x, y such that x > y, we
obtain: median(x,N(E), y) ≥ median(x,N(D), y).
Suppose now that there is an agent i such that D i E, which means that
– ∀x > y, ∀h, U−min([x]E × {i}[y]Ē × {i}h) ≥ U−min([x]D × {i}[y]D̄ × {i}h),
– ∃x > y, ∀h, U−min([x]E × {i}[y]Ē × {i}h) > U−min([x]D × {i}[y]D̄ × {i}h),
The second point implies that U−min([x]E×{i}[y]Ē×{i}1) > U−min([x]D×{i}[y]D̄×
{i}1). Moreover, we can write: U−min([x]E × {i}[y]Ē × {i}1) = min(max(1− wi,
median(x,N(E), y)),max(1 − minj 6=iwj , 1) and U−min([x]D × {i}[y]D̄ × {i}1) =
min(max(1− wi,median(x,N(D), y)),max(1−minj 6=iwj , 1).
We thus get max(1 − wi,median(x,N(D), y)) > max(1 − wi,median(x,N(E), y)),
which implies median(x,N(D), y)) > median(x,N(E), y)).
This contradicts median(x,N(E), y) ≥ median(x,N(D), y). Hence there cannot be a
i such that D i E, i.e. E i D. This shows that E  D implies E i D: wCoK is
satisfied.
• wCS is a consequence of Pareto Unanimity and Sav1.
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•  satisfies NC because whatever x, y, E, U−min([x]E[y]) = median(x,N(E), y).
•  satisfies RDD because it satisfies NC, Sav1 and wSav3.
•  satisfies PES.
This is due to the fact that U−min is an ex-post utility; actually, setting u(~(f(s))) =
min(max(1−wi, f(s, i))), we get U−min(f) = min
s∈S
max(1−π(s), u(~(f(s)))): U−min is
a classical pessimistic utility (the sole agent being the collectivity) and thus satisfies PES.
Proof of Proposition 8.9. Using Proposition 8.8, we have proved that axioms Sav1, Sav5,wSav2,
wSav3, wSav4, Pareto Unanimity, NC, RDD and PES are satisfied. For axioms CS , Cok,
Ano and Decision the proof is performed as follows:
• The relation  satisfies anonymity axiom (Ano):
Consider acts f , g, f ′ and g′ ∈ F , and two agents i, j ∈ A f(s, i) = f ′(s, j), f(s, j) =
f ′(s, i), g(s, i) = g′(s, j), g(s, j) = g′(s, i). We have:
U−min(f) = min min
s∈S
max(f(s, i), 1− π(s)),
min
s∈S
max(f(s, j), 1− π(s)),
min
k 6=i,j;s∈S
max(f(s, k)), 1− π(s)).
Besides, we have:
U−min(f ′) = min min
s∈S
max(f(′s, i), 1− π(s)),
min
s∈S
max(f ′(s, j), 1− π(s)).
min
k 6=i,j;s∈S
max(f ′(s, k)), 1− π(s)).
Since f(s, i) = f ′(s, j), f(s, j) = f ′(s, i) and let f(s, k) = f ′(s, k) for all k 6= i, j, we
get U−min(f) = U−min(f ′). We obtain in the same way U−min(g) = U−min(g′). Hence,
U−min(f) ≥ U−min(g) iff U−min(f ′) ≥ U−min(g′), which proves Ano.
•  satisfies Dec, since U−min([1]{i}[1]) = 1 > U−min([0]{i}[1]) = 0.
•  satisfies CS:
Suppose that [x]  [y], i.e. U−min([x]) = x > U−min([y]) = y. It holds that:
U−min([x]{i}1) = x > U−min([y]{i}1) = y. Hence, ∀h, U−min([x]{i}h) ≥
U−min([y]{i}h) (by wSav2) and ∃h, U−min([x]{i}h) > U−min([y]{i}h). Thus [x] i
[y].
•  satisfies CoK:
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– We know that wCok holds, thus E ∼ D implies E ∼i D.
– Consider two eventsE,D such thatE  D, i.e. ∀x, y such that x > y,U−min(xEy) >
U−min(xDy). Since U−min([x]E[y]) = median(x,N(E), y) and
U−min([x]D[y]) = median(x,N(D), y). Thus for any x, y such that x > y,
median(x,N(E), y) > median(x,N(D), y).
Suppose now that there is a i such that D i E, which means that
∗ ∀x > y, ∀h, U−min([x]E×{i}[y]Ē×{i}h) ≥ U−min(([x]D×{i}[y]D̄×{i}h),
This implies that U−min([x]E×{i}[y]Ē×{i}1) ≥ U−min(([x]D×{i}[y]D̄×{i}1).
Moreover,U−min([x]E×{i}[y]Ē×{i}1) = median(x,N(E), y) andU−min([x]D×
{i}[y]D̄ × {i}1) = median(x,N(D), y).
So we get median(x,N(D), y) ≥ median(x,N(E), y),
which contradicts median(x,N(E), y) > median(x,N(D), y). Hence there can-
not be a i such that D i E, i.e. E i D.
This shows that E  D implies E i D:
We thus get E  D iff E i D: CoK is satisfied.
The same kind of result can be obtained for the optimistic case.
Proposition 8.10.
The relation  defined by: f  g iff U+ max(f) ≥ U+ max(g), satisfies axioms Sav1, Sav5,
wSav2, wSav3, wSav4, ParetoUnanimity, NC, RCD, OPT , wCS and wCoK.
If we suppose that we are in a pure egalitarian context (wi = 1, i = 1, p), we get:
U+ max(f) = max
i=1,p
max
s∈S
min(f(s, i), π(s)))
.
and we recover Ano, Decision, CS and Cok:
Proposition 8.11.
The relation  defined by:
f  g iff max
i=1,p
max
s∈S
min(f(s, i), π(s))) ≥ max
i=1,p
max
s∈S
min(g(s, i), π(s))),
satisfies axioms Sav1, Sav5, wSav2, wSav3, wSav4, ParetoUnanimity, NC, RCD, OPT ,
CS, Cok, Ano as well as Decision.
This shows the coherence and the relevance of our set of axioms.
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Proof of Proposition 8.10. The proofs are very similar to the ones presented for the pessimistic
utility.
•  trivially satisfies Sav1 (each act is given by a global utility on [0, 1]).
•  satisfies wSav2:
Consider f, g, h, P such that U−min(fPh)  U−min(gPh) and any fourth act h′
Let a = max
s∈P
min(π(s), max
i∈A
min(wi, f(s, i))), b = max
s∈P
min(π(s), max
i∈A
min(wi,
g(s, i))), c = max
s∈P̄
min(π(s), max
i∈A
min(wi, h(s, i))), c′ = max
s∈P̄
min(π(s), max
i∈A
min(wi,
h′(s, i))),
It holds that:
U+ max(fPh) = max(a, c) U+ max(gPh) = max(b, c)
U+ max(fPh′) = max(a, c′) U+ max(gPh) = max(b, c′)
max(a, c) > max(b, c) implies that max(a, c′) ≥ max(b, c′) i.e.
U+ max(fPh′) ≥ U+ max(gPh′).
• Pareto unanimity follows from the fact that the max and min operators are monotonic.
• wSav3 follows from Sav1, wSav2 and Pareto Unanimity.
• The proof of wSav4 is similar to the one given for the pessimistic case, considering that
U+ max([x]E[y]) = median(x,Π(E), y).
• Sav5 is satisfied by construction.
• The proof of wSav4 are similar to the ones given for the pessimistic case, considering that
U+ max([x]E[y]) writes as a mono-agent optimistic utility.
• The proofs of wCoK and NC are similar to the ones given for the pessimistic case, con-
sidering that U+ max([x]E[y]) = median(x,Π(E), y) ∀E ⊆ S.
• wCS is a consequence of Pareto Unanimity and Sav1.
•  satisfies RCD because it satisfies NC, Sav1 and wSav3.
•  satisfiesOPT sinceU+ max is an ex-post utility; setting u(~(f(s))) = max (min(wi, f(s, i)),
we get U+ max(f) = max
s∈S
min(π(s), u(~(f(s))): U+ max is a classical optimistic utility and
thus satisfies OPT .
Proof of Proposition 8.11. We only need to prove that axioms CS , Cok, Ano and Decision are
satisfied. The remaining proofs are easy and similar to the ones given for the pessimistic case.
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• The relation  satisfies anonymity axiom (Ano):
Consider acts f , g, f ′ and g′ ∈ F , and two agents i, j ∈ A f(s, i) = f ′(s, j), f(s, j) =
f ′(s, i), g(s, i) = g′(s, j), g(s, j) = g′(s, i). We have:
U+ max(f) = max max
s∈S
min(f(s, i)), π(s)),
max
s∈S
min(f(s, j), π(s)).
max
k 6=i,j;s∈S
min(f(s, k)), π(s)).
Besides, we have:
U+ max(f) = max max
s∈S
min(f ′(s, i)), π(s)),
max
s∈S
min(f ′(s, j), π(s)).
max
k 6=i,j;s∈S
min(f ′(s, k)), π(s)).
Since f(s, i) = f ′(s, j), f(s, j) = f ′(s, i) and let f(s, k) = f ′(s, k) for all k 6= i, j, we
get U+ max(f) = U+ max(f ′).
We obtain in the same way U+ max(g) = U+ max(g′)
Hence U+ max(f) ≥ U+ max(g) iff U+ max(f ′) ≥ U+ max(g′), which proves Ano.
•  satisfies Dec, since U+ max([1]{i}[0]) = 1 > U+ max([0]{i}[0]) = 0
•  satisfies CS:
Suppose that [x]  [y] since U+ max([x]{i}0) = x > U+ max([y]{i}0) = y. Hence
∀h, U+ max([x]{i}h) ≥ U+ max([y]{i}h) (by wSav2) and ∃ h,
U+ max([x]{i}h) > U+ max([y]{i}h). Thus [x] i [y].
• The proofs of CoK is similar to the ones given for the pessimistic case, considering that
U+ max([x]E[y]) = median(x,Π(E), y).
8.5 Conclusion
This Chapter makes a first attempt to propose an analysis of the possibilistic collective decision
rules in the style of Savage. Some basic axioms (Sav1, Sav5, OPT , PES) stand without any
change. Others like wSav3 and wSav4 are extended thanks to the notion of representative act
of a consequence (that plays the same role as the notion of constant act in Savage’s framework).
We also extend or propose additional axioms specific to multi-agent context - e.g. Ano, Dec,
Common Scale and Common Knowledge - . The last part of the Chapter shows that U−min and
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U+ max satisfy our extension of [24, 32, 34]’s axioms for respectively Upes and Uopt as well as
additional axioms. This axiomatic opens the way to a Savage-like representation theorem for
U−min and U+ max in the style of Savage that may be proposed.
The framework presented here imposes that all agents have the same knowledge (as in VNM’s
framework) and share the same preference order on X . However, it is also important to consider
the case where agents have different view on the environment (different knowledge). It has been
proved, in the case of probabilistic context [13, 14, 53], that subjective knowledge leads to an
impossibility result but what about possibilistic uncertainty?
CONCLUSION
General conclusion
Our contribution proposes new decision criteria for collective decision making under possibilistic
uncertainty for cautious as well as adventurous decision makers. This approach offers to decision
makers the possibility to find the best decision which satisfies the collectivity taking into account
the uncertainty aspect of the problem, the decision makers attitude towards this uncertainty, and
the method of aggregating the agents’ preferences. These considerations as well as the manner
to combine them (either ex-ante or ex-post aggregation), give rise to different decision criteria
namely, eight qualitative collective decision rules. We have proved the coincidence between the
ex-ante and ex-post homogenous utilities for both the fully min-oriented and max-oriented cases:
it is worth noticing that the use of qualitative decision criteria allows to get rid of the timing effect
even while being egalitarian.
On the basis of a set of rational axioms, we have provided a representation theorem for the
fully pessimistic and optimistic utilities in the style of VNM for agents with identical or different
weights. This result can be seen as an ordinal counterpart of Harsanyi’s theorem. Making a
step further, we have provided a first attempt to propose an analysis of the multi-agent qualitative
decision making in the style of Savage.
Furthermore, we have presented an algorithmic study relative to the optimization of the pro-
posed collective qualitative decision rules in possibilistic decision trees. We have provided an
adaptation of the Dynamic Programming algorithm for criteria that satisfy the monotonicity prop-
erty, Multi-Dynamic Programing and Branch and Bound algorithms for those that are not mono-
tonic. Finally, an experimental study has been performed to compare the different algorithms and
to evaluate the quality of the solutions provided.
The seminal work of Harsanyi [59] is generally interpreted as a justification of utilitarianism.
However, our work may be seen as an ordinal counter part of Harsanyi’s theorem and as a justifica-
tion of egalitarianism when pessimistic agents have to make decisions that satisfy the collectivity.
These results have true been presented under the assumption that all agents share the same knowl-
edge, which is seldom in real world problem. This consideration has been the topic of several
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works, always in the probabilistic context (in style of Savage), that led to an impossibility theorem
when agents have heterogeneous knowledge about states of world [3, 69]. Thus, it is interesting
to address this question in context of possibility theory. In this case, the definition of the decision
rules must be revised especially for the ex-post aggregation when collectivity is first considered.
Thus, we may consider only ex-ante decision rules or provide a new form of aggregation.
Moreover, in our formalism we suppose that all agents are either optimistic or pessimistic.
But, it may happen that agents have different attitudes toward uncertainty: the group of decision
makers may gather pessimistic as well as optimistic persons, then the study of such situations may
be envisaged. Likewise, we shall extend our approach, considering that the importance of the
decision makers is not absolute but may depend on the consequence of each decision.
Besides, the possibilistic aggregations used in this work are basically specializations of the
Sugeno integral. So, we aim at generalizing the study of collective decision making under uncer-
tainty through the development of double Sugeno Integrals. Also, on the basis of the pessimistic
utility we have proved that egalitarianism is compulsory to avoid the timing effect problem. So,
what about the use of other possibilistic decision rules (e.g. Binary possibilistic utility, Order
of Magnitude Expected utility, Possibilistic likely dominance, etc.) or even the use of different
uncertainty theories such evidence theory [85] or rough set theory [75].
Another line of research to consider is the refinement of the decision rules. In fact, since they
are based on possibilistic utilities (Uopt and Upes) our criteria as many qualitative decision rules
suffer from a lack of decisiveness, called the “drowning effect", due to the use of the idempotent
operations max and min. So, it is interesting to consider the refinement of these criteria to more
discriminating ones on the basis of existing works in the literature [40, 91].
From an algorithmic point of view, the difference of attitude and/or knowledge of the agents
may raise several difficulties. In these cases, the upcoming criteria may suffer from the lack of
monotonicity and their optimization in possibilistic decision trees can not be performed using a
Dynamic Programming algorithm anymore. An alternative idea is the deliberation of agents after
each decision. In this case, the Dynamic Programing algorithm shall be used but it leads to an
approach that is neither the ex-ante nor the ex-post aggregation.
Finally, we can notice that there is a growing interest in the literature to adapt graphical de-
cision models (decision trees [78], influence diagrams [60], Markov decision process [5] or Val-
uation Based Systems [86]) to handle more complex decision problems. In [48] for example,
the authors propose qualitative counterpart of influence diagrams. An adaptation of Markov de-
cision process to the possibilistic context has also been proposed by [80, 81]. Other works have
been provided to consider other aspects such as multiple objective decision making in influence
diagrams [21, 68]. So, why not provide new graphical models for qualitative multi-criteria or
multi-agent decision making problems.
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